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Labour and Life: 
On the Foundations of Agamben's Biopolitics 
Introduction 
From the discomforting insistence ofDa Vinci's 'Eye' to the surreal epiphany ofthe 
'Mae West Room' at the Dali museum in Figeures, the world of art has long recognised the 
central importance of anamorphosis to trtdy engaging visual representation. Whether simply 
induced as an aesthetic trick of the eye, or as a committed vehicle for political subversion 1; 
the ability of the artist to use shifts in viewing perspective to disrupt a stable image, and 
thereby bring to light the hidden content concealed within, finds its theoretical equivalent in 
Giorgio Agamben's 1998 work Homo Sacer,· Sovereign Power and Bare Life.2 Agamben's 
concern in Homo Sacer is to present the reader with an alternative reading of Western 
political history and, in doing so, bring to light a previously obscured form of political 
relation, 'biopolitics', which he identifies as conditioning our political structures from the 
age of antiquity to the present day. The central aim of Agamben's project is to provide a 
new understanding of our current political situation, placing ancient and contemporary 
events in their correct context on the basis that only a thorough understanding of the way 
biopolitics has determined our political development will allow theorists, present and future, 
to offer a coherent set of alternatives to the catastrophe of modernity. 
The distinctive tenor and innovative sweep of Agamben's work rests upon his ability 
to achieve the perspectival shift which allows us to see the entire history of the Western 
1 As in the post-war anamorphic landscapes of 17Th C. EnglaJ)d, which, when turned on end, revealed a portrait 
of executed King Charles I. 
(For this example and others see; http://inyweb.tiscali.co.uk/artofanamorphosis/what-is.html) 
2 For the purposes of this essay, the capitalised Homo Sacer will refer to Agamben's work. whilst the non-
capitalised. homo sacer denotes (Agamben's construction of) the actual figure of the 'sacred man'. 
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political tradition in an entirely new light. In the same way as a move to our left allows the 
viewer to see the glowering, ominous skull that lurks at the very centre of Holbein's 
'Ambassadors'; Agamben's Homo Sacer reveals to us the disturbing presence of a banished 
'bare life', and the oppressive monolith of sovereign power, lurking at the very heart of the 
Aristotelian Polis, our modern democratic states, and our most cherished contemporary 
political shibboleths; 'human rights' and the 'sacredness' of life. 
The journey Agamben takes, from ancient Athens to Auschwitz and on, depends 
upon his use of two of the Twentieth Century's most celebrated social theorists, whose 
unique articulations and elisions achieve the preliminary disruption of our vision that allows 
the biopolitical nexus of Western political history to emerge from the shadows. The 
centrepiece of Agamben's 'biopolitical' architecture is his appropriation, and suggested 
articulation, of Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt; it is within their potent treatments of 
biology, power, and totalitarianism that Agamben fmds the ground for his analysis of a 
sovereign political order that holds the 'bare' biological life of its citizens as the very object 
of its power, whilst also using each theorist to supplement the blind-spots he believes the 
other has missed. Investigating Agamben's claim that his theory ofbiopolitics can be based 
upon the combination of these two theorists forms the first general objective of this 
investigation. 
The second general objective of this project is to present the reader with a distinctly 
Marxian reading of Agamben 's work; arguing that Agamben 's own concept of 'bare life' 
shares a constitutive connection with the Marxist concept of alienated labour. Further, we 
will seek to assert that reading Agamben's historical account of the development of 
biopolitics, and his prescriptions for potential future actions, through the prism of a Marxian 
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critique of capitalist relations of production works to solidify Agamben's philosophical 
analysis into a compelling materialist hiStorical narrative and substantive model for future 
political action, thus fulfilling a number of Agamben's original aims. 
To be clear, it is not the aim of this project to posit a replacement for Agamben 's 
theory of biopolitics, a theory with whose foundations, diagnoses, and implications this 
author essentially agrees. Our examination of Agamben's underpinnings seeks only to 
familiarise itself with, and perhaps exercise, Agamben's theoretical base. Our suggested 
modifications of Agamben's work, the making explicit of the connection between bare life 
and alienated labour and reading the history and future of biopolitics with reference to a 
radical critique of capitalist political economy, are designed as complementary addenda to a 
theory whose innovation and compelling political urgency this author is all too happy to 
assert. Here, it remains to outline the way in which this project will lay out its specific 
arguments and fulfil its stated objectives. 
This investigation will open, in Chapter One, with a general introduction to 
Agamben's work in Homo Sacer. The aim of the chapter is to provide the reader with a brief 
exploration of the key categories and concepts deployed by Agamben and subjected to 
further analysis, modification, and criticism, as the investigation progresses. This 
preliminary grounding in crucial aspects of Agamben's Homo Sacer project is also designed 
to unpack Agamben's concepts from their often difficult technical wordings, and familiarise 
the reader with the overall tone and theoretical thrust of Agamben 's endeavour. The chapter 
will divide its exegesis into three sections, pooling together cognate concepts and motifs 
from within Homo Sacer. 
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The first section, under the moniker of 'biopolitics', will explore; the historical 
origins of the eponymous figure of homo sacer- the 'sacred man' of ancient Roman Law; 
the key Agambenian phenomenon of 'bare life' and Agamben's work on the ancient Greek 
distinction between forms of natural and political life; the problematic relationship of natural 
life to the political community - a paradoxical relationship described by Agamben as an 
'inclusive exclusion'; and a brief description of the origins of the term 'biopolitics' itself in 
the work of Michel Foucault. 
The secOnd section examines elements of Agamben's work relating to the concept of 
'the exception'; beginning with Agarnben's appropriation of Carl Schmitt's model of 
'sovereign power' and the relationship of sovereign power to bare life in the form of the 
'sovereign ban'; further, it will go on to explain the meaning of 'the exception' itself, both as 
the Schmittian legal-political phenomenon and the wider-reaching Agarnbenian logic of 
exception; it will discuss the 'birth-nation link' which Agamben identifies as the mechanism 
by which bare life is incorporated into the order of the nation-state, and the subsequent 
collapse of that link when faced with the limit-case of the 'refugee'; this section will also 
look at the instrument created to replace the failed birth-nation link as the regulator of the 
relationship between bare life and political order in the form of the 'concentration camp' and 
examine Agarnben's understanding of the camp as paradigmatic of the political space of 
modernity. 
The final section of Chapter One seeks to briefly outline the 'foundations/futures' of 
Agamben' s biopolitics; beginning with a description of the 'ontological foundations' of the 
phenomena Agarnben explores - foundations rooted deep within the ancient metaphysical 
configurations of Western thought, and thus requiring more than a simple political 
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restructuring if lasting change is to be achieved; and, finally, glimpsing the contours of 
Agamben's 'new politics', the fragmentary outline of a new mode of politics gestured 
towards by Agamben at the close of Homo Sacer. After this general introduction to 
Agamben's work, and a note of criticism regarding Agamben's ambiguous use of the term 
'bare life' to describe two distinct phenomena within Homo Sacer, Chapter One closes with 
a brief summary and opens the way for our full investigation to follow. 
The first analytical element of this project, to be examined in Chapter Two, involves 
the theoretical foundations of Agamben's concept of 'biopolitics'. Primarily, it seeks to 
investigate the claim that Agamben makes for his notion of biopolitics as built upon the 
articulation of two other thinkers - on Michel Foucault's original concept of 'biopolitics' 
and Hannah Arendt's treatment of the phenomenon oftotalitarianism and investigation into 
the colonisation of modern political life by what she describes as 'collective life processes'. 
The Chapter aims to examine whether Agamben' s work can be based upon these theorists by 
tracking the areas of convergence and divergence that exist between Agamben's work and 
the theoretical constructions of his named intellectual interlocutors. 
Chapter Two opens with a section examining Agamben's relationship with Foucault, 
the original author of the term biopolitics. The section will begin with an overview of the 
work Agamben bases his appropriation upon - The History of Sexuality, and the lecture 
series published as Society Must Be Defended, noting Foucault's understanding of 
humanity's transgressed 'threshold of modernity', as a species whose very life may now 
depend upon its political conditions. This section will also demonstrate the way in which 
Foucault sees his concept of biopolitics -the increasing intervention of the political order in 
managing the biological lives of its citizens - developing, from the seventeenth century 
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onwards, in response to the growing influence of capitalist economics on the rationale of 
state action. lt will also examine two interesting convergences between Agamben and 
Foucault in their common reading of the classical theory of sovereignty, and in Foucault's 
use ofthe logic of the 'inclusive exclusion' in his treatment of social contract theory and its 
relation to the bare life of the citizen. 
The second section of this Chapter will move on to identify a number of differences 
between both the aims and the theories of each author; firstly, that biopolitics does not 
occupy Foucault, or his output, to the extent that Agamben seeks to maintain; secondly, that 
Agamben and Foucault are working on totally different timeframes, Foucault remains 
primarily a theorist of the modem age whilst Agamben seeks to provide an entire alternate 
history of Western politics based upon his conclusions; it will also examine the wide 
differences that exist between each theorists use of the term 'biopolitics' and the significant 
difference in each theorist's understanding of contemporary sovereignty ~ for Foucault, 
challenged by the new development of 'biopower', yet for Agamben, a unitary centre of 
power which deploys Foucauldian biopower as a weapon; and, finally, it will discuss the 
distance that exists between Foucault's understanding of capitalist economics as the motor 
for the development ofbiopolitics and Agamben's apparent reticence to examine the role of 
economic forces in this context. 
Chapter Two will then go on to examine the work of Hannah Arendt, and attempt to 
co-ordinate her work with the output of both Agamben and Foucault. Beginning with an 
analysis of her key work On the Origins of Totalitarianism, and a brief overview of the key 
concepts contained within her later work The Human Condition, this section will establish 
Arendt as a critical voice in our understanding of the phenomenon of totalitarianism and an 
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early theorist of concerns that would later be described as the biopolitical. A fourth section 
will then move on to examine the precise mechanics of Agamben's articulation of Foucault 
and Arendt, identifying the shortcomings identified by Agamben in each theorists' work and 
examining the way in which Agamben uses each thinker, in a relation to be described as 
'mutual supplementarity', to fill in the gaps that he finds in the work of the other. This 
section will challenge Agamben's assertion that Arendt's Origins ... fails to engage in 
biopolitical analysis by demonstrating a number of ways in which Arendt's work can clearly 
be read as proto-biopolitical, despite Agamben's objection. 
Following that challenge, the task of the penultimate section will be the identification 
of areas of convergence that bring together the work of all three theorists with various 
combinations of the others, and grouped according to their 'historical' or 'theoretical' nature. 
The 'historical' convergences will explore; Agamben and Arendt's common identification of 
the First World War as a key historical ctux whose epic dislocations generate the 
catastrophic developments each trace thorough the twentieth century; the same theorists' 
understanding of the concentration camps as the centrally important phenomenon of our 
times; Agamben and Arendt's shared understanding of the impossibility describing the 
events within the camp system as a 'crime' in the traditional sense of the term; and the 
critique, common to all three theorists, of a contemporary society based upon labour, 
production, consumption, and the bestialisation of man. The 'theoretical' convergences will 
focus upon; a common understanding of, to use Kathrin Braun's phrase, 'processual 
temporality'- an understanding of time as constituted by supra-human processes which flow 
through populations with no regard to the individual - an important point of reference in 
Foucault's 'biopower', Arendt's 'totalitarianism', and Agamben's 'biopolitics'; the second 
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theoretical convergence, common to Agamben and Arendt, is the criticism of Marxism as a 
tradition implicit in the oppressive systems each is fighting ....., for Arendt, predicated upon the 
very 'labour' that has reduced man to an animal and, for Agamben, reliant upon the state of 
exception in a way that perpetuates the existence of the sovereign power it should seek to 
negate; this section will then examine the common criticism of modem humanitarianism that 
all three thinkers see as a misguided distraction from the genuine political struggles which 
can promise emancipation; Arendt and Foucault will be seen to share a point of emphasis in 
their ~derstandings of the theory of evolution as a prime conditioning factor for the 
developments they both track from the mid-nineteenth centuryonwards; and the final note of 
convergence to be examined will be Arendt and Foucault's shared focus upon the role of 
capitalist economics in conditioning and forcing the pace of the developments they explore, 
a point of focus which, again, is conspicuously absent from Agamben's own work. 
Having established a number of points of convergence, the remaining task of Chapter 
Two will be to identify and investigate the areas of divergence that exist between Agamben, 
Arendt and Foucault. These divergences will be divided into three sub-sections; 
'methodological-perspectival', 'analytic', and 'speculative'. This investigation will argue 
for the existence of two 'methodological-perspectival' differences; firstly, it will locate each 
theorist at different points on a ~pectrum graded by their focus on specific institutions -
ranging from Foucault's renowned emphasis on the particular objects of his subject matter, 
through Arendt's close focus on totalitarianism which opens out into wider theoretical and 
philosophical waters, to Agamben's legal-political analysis which becomes the foundation of 
an epochal attempt to rewrite Western political history. The second divergence to be treated 
here will examine the extent to which each theorist engages in a normative political analysis, 
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arguing that Foucault's crypto- or non..,normative analysis of institutions puts him somewhat 
in contradistinction to Agamben and Arendt, both of whose work constitutes a definite part 
of a greater political project. 
The central 'analytical' divergence to be discussed will relate to the role of 'power' 
and the 'nation-state' in each author's work, and will demonstrate how Arendt's conception 
of power as a potentially positive attribute of free people acting in concert, and the nation-
state as an entity founded upon consent and equality and opposed to the logic of imperialism, 
stands at odds to the work ofFoucault and Agamben, who see both power and the nation-
state in a distinctly negative light. The remaining 'analytical' differences concern Agamben 
and Arendt and focus upon their divergent understanding of the nature and role of the 
concentration camps; identified by Agamben as regulators of the relationship of bare life to 
political order and by Arendt as 'laboratories' attempting to create the perfect Pavlovian 
animal-man to be the citizen of the totalitarian state. 
Finally, the 'speculative' divergence between each theorist visits their perceived 
alternatives; Foucault, in-keeping with his perspectival focus, offers no programmatic 
alternative; Arendt seeks to recapture the ancient distinctions between public and private 
realms and animal and human life, that have been undone by the progress of modernity; and 
Agamben will be seen to reject as impossible the Arendtian solution, and reassert the 
philosophical imperative of renegotiating human being itself as the first step towatd an order 
free of sovereign power and biopolitics. 
This Chapter will conclude by noting that each theorist's work can be used by 
Agamben for his specific task of opening up a horizon of biopolitics, and that it is the very 
specificity of that task that allows Agamben to articulate and appropriate Foucault and 
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Arendt. We will accept that Foucault's 'biopolitics' and Arendt's 'totalitarianism' do not sit 
comfortably together, but recognise the way in which they do form the kind of conceptual 
architecture Agamben requires for his Homo Sacer project. Chapter Two will end by 
raising, once again, the question of why Agamben fails to enact a properly economic 
analysis of the role of capitalism in the phenomena he is attempting to understand, 
particularly when the prime importance of capitalist relations of production is a point on 
which both Foucault's and Arendt's theories strongly agree. 
The question with which we left the previous Chapter becomes the starting-point of 
Chapter Tbree, in which we seek to put Agamben's theorisation, particularly ofthe concept 
of 'bare life', in close proximity to a Marxian critique of capitalist political economy. This 
Chapter's overall objective is to demonstrate that Agamben's analysis of bare life stands to 
be enhanced by the recognition of the structural links it shares with the Marxist notion of 
alienated labour. Further, this Chapter will argue that both Agamben's historical narrative of 
the phenomenon of bare life, and his prescriptions for an alternative to escape our current 
biopolitical impasse, benefit from the inclusion of a critique of alienated labour which, we 
shall maintain, is already implicit at their centre. In order to achieve its objectives, this 
Chapter will be divided into three sections; the first dealing with Agamben's understanding 
of modern biopolitics and the conceptual intersections between his notion of 'bare life' and 
the concept of alienated labour; the second exploring Agamben 's historical analysis of the 
originary exclusion of bare life from the Athenian polis, and tracing the relationship between 
this exclusion and the problematic relationship of labour-power to political community in 
Classical Greece; and the final section will suggest the ways in which accepting what will be 
referred to as the 'labour-thesis' - that Agamben's bare life maintains a constitutive 
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connection to human labour-power - allows the theorist to create a feasible model of 
material praxis that is lacking in Agamben's philosophical demand for a renegotiated 
human ontology. 
Setting out from the observation that Agamben offers a tantalising glimpse of 
economic critique within Homo Sacer when he examines the caB of Nazi eugenicists to 
begin accounting for biological life in calculations of national wealth, the first section will 
bring Agamben's analysis of the modem aspect of biopolitics into a firm relation with the 
concepts and concerns of the Marxist tradition. This section will establish four key points of 
intersection between the phenomenon of bare life and the concept of alienated labour, an 
intersection which, we will maintain, indicates a structural link between the two; the first 
point of convergence identifies how bare life for Agamben and commodified labour-power 
for Marx, reside within each individual as a separable and isolated attribute, capable of 
monopolisation by a hostile power; the second link to be established concerns the 
consequent effects of each phenomenon on its surrounding society - for Agamben, a society 
predicated on bare life which has degenerated into a nihilistic consumerist spectacle and for 
Marx, a society based on the extraction and exploitation of alienated labour - which both 
theorists argue shares the same effect, the reduction of man to the level of an animal; a third 
convergence is identified by the distinctive dialectical relationship each phenomenon shares 
with its governing power structure, both bare life and alienated labour are products of a 
power, sovereign or economic, that cannot tolerate its continued presence inside the system 
without provoking a fatal dialectical destabilisation; the fmal point of convergence between 
Agamben's bare life and Marx's alienated labour to be argued for here is eschatological-
both theorists maintain that the only way in which a future society might heal the iniquities 
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of the present order is to fmd a form of unity in which the separable elements of each human 
being, their bare life or their labour-power, can no longer be isolated. In addition to these 
four compelling areas of convergence, this section will outline the explicit theoretical debt 
owed by Agamben to French Situationist figurehead Guy Debord, and in particular his 
notion of the 'integrated spectacle' as the modus operandi of a new global power, and 
demonstrates that Agamben is neither able, nor willing, to distance himself from the 
continental Marxist legacy which must necessarily form part of his schema if he is to 
appropriate Debord's work in pursuit ofhis aims. 
As a vehicle for opening up the analysis of the second section, this Chapter will 
briefly examjne a major point of critique from Paul Passavant, who argues that Agamben's 
work contains two contradictory understandings of the s_tate - as primarily determined by the 
configuration of the economy in his earlier work, and as the determining power in all 
situations in his later works, among which Passavant numbers Homo Sacer. This point 
appears reinforced by Agamben's earlier use of a much more explicitly Debordian analysis 
and his later transition to a critique of Marxism as unable to recognise, and therefore escape 
from, the political quagmire of sovereign power. Agamben uses the term arcanum imperii, 
or ancient secret, to characterise the way in which the complex of sovereign power pre-dates 
any modern economic structure by millennia. In order to challenge Passavant's analysis, and 
simultaneously modify Agamben's arcanum imperii argument, the second section of this 
Chapter returns to the Athenian polis, finding evidence in the work of Aristotle, supported 
by similar findings in Arendt, that the 'bare' life originarily excluded from the polis is 
excluded precisely because of its intrinsic connection with human labour-power. This 
section will establish that Aristotle's definition of the natural distinction between slave and 
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master is based upon the slave's capacity for physical labour and that, whilst couched in an 
argument about the availability of time to fulfil civic functions, Aristotle's polis is founded 
upon the expropriation of the labour-time of others, others whose labouring condition then 
excludes them for participation in the City. In doing so, this section seeks to assert that, 
pace Agamben, the arcanum imperii, the ancient root of sovereign power, has always been 
centred upon the problem of the management and expropriation of human labour-power. As 
a corollary of this position, we will also seek to conclude that Passavant's allegation of an 
about-turn ultimately fails to convince, as Agamben has, albeit unknowingly, maintained the 
content of his earlier insight (of the primacy of the economy in determining political 
conditions) whilst changing his emphasis to an examination of the entity of sovereign power. 
The final section of this Chapter opens the question of Agamben's prescriptions for 
future political action and examines the potential connotations of our 'labour-thesis' for 
Agamben's political theory. It begins with an exposition of Agamben's treatment of the 
concept of 'constituting power' - a form of power that exists prior to, and outside of, any 
established political order, and remains accessible to all individuals at all times - and the 
work of Antonio Negri in returning the question of constituting power from the realm of 
political theory to a philosophical footing. This section goes on to consider Agamben's use 
of Aristotle to demonstrate the necessity of fundamentally restructuring our philosophical 
foundations, particularly the problematic relationship of potentiality and actuality, if we are 
to escape the paradoxes of sovereign power. After examining Agamben 's model of radical 
non-participation, based upon his wish to sever the relationship between potential and act 
and embodied by the literary figure of 'Bartleby', this section finds a note of agreement with 
Passavant, who demonstrates the complete inability of Agamben's philosophical schema to 
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challenge the material existence of a sovereign power whose sine qua non remains an 
unmitigated ability to kill. This section will go on to assert that Agamben's biopolitical 
analysis can be materialised into a form of praxis if we accept the 'labour-thesis', the 
assertion of a fundamental continuity between bare life and labour-power. Whilst unable to 
offer a programmatic model of political action based upon this insight, we will venture to 
assert that it is Agamben's failure to recognise the role of labour-power at the very heart of 
sovereign power and modem biopolitics that has forced his overly-philosophical 
understanding of the phenomena he correctly identifies as of crucial importance to our 
current political condition. Finally, this section will make the argument that a praxis based 
upon our 'labour-thesis', the material challenge to the socio-economic roots of contemporary 
power structures, might provide the necessary precondition for the very ontological 
renegotiation Agamben demands. In this way, the 'labour-thesis' will be shown to function, 
to paraphrase Agamben's characterisation of his own relation to the work of Foucault, as a 
potential completion, or at least correction, of Agamben's endeavour in Homo Sacer. 
At the close of this investigation, our Conclusions will briefly re-state the essential 
elements that have formed the core of this investigation. It will pull together the critical 
insights and conclusions of each Chapter to make a final case for the acceptance of our 
thesis; firstly, that the basis of Agamben's biopolitics in the work ofFoucault and Arendt is a 
safe one, but begs the question of his failure to include the critique of capitalist economics 
that forms such an important aspect of each theorist's work; and, secondly, that Agamben's 
concept of 'bare life' should be read as intimately connected with the Marxian notions of 
'labour-power' and 'alienated labour' -a connection which deepens our understanding of 
modem biopolitics, adds to Agamben's own historical account of the exclusion of life from 
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the Athenian polis, and allows us to conceive of a material praxis which gives Agamben's 
groundbreaking analysis the potential for feasible political action that it so richly deserves. 
This investigation will ultimately conclude by indicating two possible areas of 
research to complement the preliminary analysis embarked upon here; firstly, asserting the 
importance of re-visiting the divergence between Agamben and Foucault over the 
relationship between sovereign power and biopower, a crucial question if we are to correctly 
understand the further relationships between sovereignty, biopower, and the anomic, 
'constituting power' from which the well of future political action must be drawn; and, 
finally, the question of exactly what form of socio-economic contest, and what form ofunity 
between labour and life, or natural and political life, will be sufficient to the taSks of 
preventing the isolation of labour-power/bare life in the future and also successfully 
challenging a complex of sovereign-economic power whose current hold over the lives of 
our populations remains as politically pernicious as it is historically ancient. 
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Chapter One: 
··Key Concepts in Agamben's Homo Sacer 
As a brief introduction to the content of Agamben's Homo Sacer, this chapter will focus 
on identifying and elaborating a number of key concepts used by Agamben within his work. The 
decision to structure this introduction along those lines, as opposed to a more traditional 
synopsis, was taken in order to ensure that the material presented here maintains fidelity to the 
original without crowding the reader with material extraneous to the requirements of this 
particular investigation. Each key concept has been selected on the basis of its direct relevance 
to our subsequent enquiry into the Agambenian notion of 'bare life' and its relationship to a 
critique of capitalist political economy. Further, each element of Agamben's schema which 
plays an important role in understanding his appropriation of other political theorists will be 
given an exploratory treatment. The ultimate objectives of this chapter are twofold; firstly, to 
familiarise the reader with the overall tone, and theoretical thrust, of Agamben's work, prior to 
our more detailed investigation; and secondly, to unpack the critical content of Agamben's 
concepts from their often challenging technical wordings, and to form a point of reference to 
which, if necessary, the reader may return in the course of this investigation to understand the 
precise senses in which the words and terms of the Agambenian vocabulary are being used. 
The concepts selected will, for the purposes of this introduction, be split into three 
groups, each of which will be treated in a separate section. The groups have been built on the 
principle of pooling relatively cognate concepts together, although there will inevitably be a high 
level of cross-pollination. The first section will focus on concepts grouped under the term 
'biopolitics', the second on concepts grouped together beneath the rubric of 'the exception', and 
finally, the remaining elements will be discussed under the moniker of 'foundations/futures'. 
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Each section in this chapter will be divided by sub-headings, as an aid to quick navigation, and 
each key concept being considered wi11 be italicised at its first appearance in its own sub-section, 
for purposes of subject clarity and navigability. This chapter will conclude with a very brief 
summary of the concepts and the schema presented here, before the first substantial topic of this 
investigation is opened in Chapter Two. 
1.1 Biopolitics 
The natural starting point of our analysis here is with the eponymous figure of homo 
sacer. Described by Agamben as 'an obscure figure of archaic Roman law', homo sacer, or the 
sacred man, functioned in its ancient Roman context as a specific legal status conferred upon 
those found guilty of certain kinds of crime.1 The unique attribute of homo sacer is that he is 
banished from the protection of the community, to the extent that he may be killed without his 
death being classed as homicide - his constant exposure to death only mitigated by the 
seemingly contradictory proviso that his status prevents his being killed as a sacrifice.2 In this 
way, Agamben perceives a figure cast into an indeterminate area between life and death, set at 
the intersection of human and divine law. The relationship of homo sacer to the human and 
divine realms is one of a double exception, both sets of law relate to him only in the fotrn of their 
suspension; whilst his being made 'sacred' implies a conferral to divine jurisdiction, the 
impunity with which he may be killed makes the death of homo sacer immune from notions of 
sacrilege, a suspension of the typical religious code; simultaneously, whilst his exposure to the 
constant threat of death is enforced by a human legal code, the ban on his sacrifice sets him 
1 G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life; Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1998, p.8., and 
p.85. (Henceforth, all page references in the footnotes to this chapter will be from Homo Sacerunless otherwise 
stated, or abbreviated to HS when following ref~nce to another work) 
2 p.72. 
17 
outside of the traditional realm of juridically sanctioned ritual punishments. 3 In short, his 'life is 
included in the juridical order ... solely in the form of its ... capacity to be killed' .4 Of course, 
Agamben's interest in homo sacer is as a compelling metaphor for a series of phenomena he is 
attempting to lay bare, rather than as a historical case study in Roman law. The paradoxical 
structure of the double exception finds echoes in Agamben 's understanding of the challenging 
relationship of natural and political life and in his theory of sovereignty, both of which will be 
discussed shortly. At the same time, the status of homo sacer as an exile from political society, 
whose only remaining attribute is the mere fact of his biological existence, is the prime catalyst 
for Agamben's opening analysis ofthe phenomenon he refers to as 'bare' life. 
The concept of bare life forms the cornerstone of Agamben's analysis within Homo 
Sacer. At the outset of the book, Agamben relates the significance of the ancient Greek 
distinction between two forms of life; zoe, the natural, biological life that all human beings share 
with each other and with the animal kingdom, and bios, a qualified, civic, form of life that can 
only be lived amongst fellow members of a political community.5 Each form of life finds an 
appropriate realm in the Greek division between the oilws, the household, within which the 
necessities of natural life are taken care of, and the polis, the political realm, within which the 
foundations and conditions of political life are instituted, discussed, and redefined.6 Agamben 
observes the way in which the political realm itself is founded upon the exclusion of zoe, 
indicating the contours of a problematic relationship insofar as natural life simultaneously 
constitutes the condition of possibility for any kind of civic or political life. 7 
3 p.82. 
4 p.8. 
s p.l-2. 
6 p.2. 
7 !bid 
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At this point, however, it is necessary to add a brief note of critique, and a clarification 
regarding the use of the term 'bare life'. A careful reading of Homo Sacer reveals that Agamben 
uses the term 'bare life' to refer to two distinct phenomena, the elision of which adds an 
unnecessary level of ambiguity to parts of the text. The first use of 'bare' life in Homo Sacer 
places it in contradistinction to bios/political life during Agamben's opening remarks on Michel 
Foucault's notion of 'biopolitics', arguing that one of the key characteristics of modernity is the 
inclusion of care for the biological life of its citizens within the remit of state action. 8 In this 
example, therefore, 'bare' life remains synonymous with zoe, the most basic form of natural life. 
Agamben's second definition of 'bare life' is a little more complicated, and related to the 
conceptual structure of the 'exception', which will be discussed momentarily. In the chapter 
'The Ban and the Wolf, Agamben discusses the Hobbesian 'state of nature' and its relation to 
the zone of indistinction that exists at the threshold between nature and society, animal and man, 
a zone inhabited by the legendary figure of the werewolf, and the outlaw figure ofhomo sacer.9 
In his reading of Hobbes, Agamben discerns that 'the state of nature is not a teal epoch 
chronologically prior to the foundation of the City' but is rather a state attained upon the 
dissolution of the City.10 The state of nature, and the life that inhabits such a space, must 
therefore be understood as internal to, and predicated upon, the structures and nature of a 
previously existent political association: 
8 p.3-4. 
9 p.105. 
10 /bid 
Far from being a prejuridical condition that is indifferent to the law of the city, the 
Hobbesian state of nature is the exception and the threshold that constitutes and 
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dwells within it. It is not so much a war of all against all as, more precisely, a 
condition in which everyone is bare life and a homo sacer for everyone else11 
In this construction, therefore, we encounter a form of life 'which is neither simple natural life 
nor social life but rather bare life' 12, existing as a third term beyond both zoe and bios, and a 
product of a definitive set of political circumstances. Whilst common ground exists between 
these two underStandings of bare life, our biological existence being the sole remainder of our 
formerly civic lives when the political order is dissolved or suspended, they are by no means the 
same phenomenon, and Agamben here is guilty of a level of a conceptual slippage which begs 
clarification. In terms of this investigation, we have chosen to employ the first of Agamben's 
two definitions, 'bare life' as a synonym of natural zoe, for two reasons; firstly, that it is this 
understanding of bare life that Agamben shares with Foucault's understanding of 'biopolitics' 
and Hannah Arendt's work on the colonisation of political power by biological 'life processes', 
both of which form the central topic of our investigation in Chapter Two; and secondly, because 
we are satisfied that, throughout Homo Sacer, Agamben's references to 'bare life' are made more 
frequently in reference to the naturally existing biological life of the individual than they are to 
the specific legal status contained within his second definition. 
Having established the definition of bare life with which this project is going to concern 
itself, it remains to examine the precise nature of the problematic relationship of bare life to the 
polis mentioned earlier. The term used by Agamben to characterise this relationship is the 
inclusive exclusion, a paradoxical motif which finds echoes in Agamben's understanding of 
sovereignty, to which we will turn shortly. In this context, Agamben picks up on the Hellenic 
exclusion of natural life from the political realm, and establishes that, pace Foucault, bare life 
11 p.l 06. (Italics in original) 
12 /bid 
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has always been at the centre of Western politics.13 Using Aristotle's fonnulation "born with 
regard to life [zoe], but existing essentially with regard to the good life [bios]", Agamben 
discerns that political life, whilst disavowing the abject nature of bare life, must simultaneously 
maintain zoe at its centre, both as the fundamental material precondition of any civic life, and 
also as the location in which the transition between fonns of life can be made.14 Bare life enjoys 
what Agamben describes as the 'peculiar privilege' of being the entity 'whose exclusion founds 
the city of men', yet also remains concealed at its very centre. 15 For Agamben, the defining 
aspect of modernity is not the entry of biological life into the political realm, but rather the 
revelation, the making explicit, of this most ancient configuration of life, politics, and the 
inclusive exclusion of the fonner in the latter. 
The changing relationship between the state and the biological life of its citizens is at the 
heart of the concept of biopolitics itself. The definitions and distinctions made by Agamben to 
this concept, which originated with Foucault, will be explored at some length in Chapter Two, so 
all that is required here is a brief description. In his work the History of Sexuality Vol. /., 
Foucault observes a distinct change in the nature of human politics, from the Aristotelian animal 
whose political capacities fonn a defining additional aspect of our existence, to a species of such 
power and technological ability that our lives, individual and collective, have become dependent 
upon our politics.16 Further, in his lecture series published as Society Must be Defended, he 
notes the way in which the care for the biological life and health of its citizenry has increasingly 
become the central concern of the state. 17 This aggregation of political power over life, coupled 
13 p.6. 
14 Ibid., including Aristotle citation, p.7. 
IS fbid. 
16 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. I.; London; Alien Lane, 1978. p.I43 
17 M. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended; London; Alien Lane The Penguin Press, 2003. p.242. 
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with the increasing state involvement in the care of the collective life of itS population, combine 
to form the traditional Foucauldiail concept of biopolitics. Whilst one of Againben's principle 
objectives in Homo Sacer is to enact a correction, 'or, at least, complet[ion]' 18, of Foucault's 
understanding of biopolitics, it would risk a degree of repetition to go into detail regarding the 
modifications Agamben makes to Foucault's thesis. Rather, the description we have given of 
Foucault's original notion functions as a satisfactory preparation for the more detailed analysis to 
follow. 
1.2 The Exception 
Agamben's principle objective is to map the previously obscured terrain of biopolitics, 
making clear the links that exist between bare life and the phenomenon of sovereign power, in 
order to f~cilitate a lasting escape from the latter. Early on in Homo Sacer, Agamben makes 
clear his appropriation of Carl Schmitt's model of sovereignty. For Schmitt, '[s]overeign is he 
who decides on the exception' 19; the ability to create and impose the boundaries, both spatial and 
juridical, of an order, and to decide upon what exists within and what is to be cast outside of its 
borders, remains a crucial component of Agamben's sovereign in Homo Sacer. As in Schmitt, 
the sovereign power straddles the border of the constituted legal and political order, creating and 
maintaining an order of which it is not wholly a part.2° Further, Agamben attributes to the 
sovereign power the function of 'produc[ing] ... a biopolitical body' which then becomes the 
object of its power.21 As with the concept ofbare life discussed previously, Agamben offers two 
potential readings of this process of production; firstly, in-keeping with our understanding of 
18 -HS,p.9. 
19 C. Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Tr. G. Schwab); Cambridge 
(Mass.); Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1985. p.5. 
20 HS, p.l5. 
21 p.6. 
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bare life as a synonym for our natural lives, Agamben asserts that a society built upon zoe, as all 
societies necessarily are, involves an intrinsic politicisation of the biological life that remains at 
their centre?2 Secondly, and related more closely to the rendering of bare life as a specific legal-
political status, we can see the way in which sovereign power 'produces' the biopolitical body of 
homo sacer, as the sovereign power is the sole authority capable of deciding to suspend the 
existing legal order and civic protections of bios-life and cast the individual into the zone of 
indistinction which marks the sovereign exception.23 Whilst the two readings of 'bare life' 
produced a degree of confusion, both understandings of the role played by sovereign power in 
the production of a biopolitical body are compatible and their reasoning compelling. Finally, the 
notion of this body becomin~ the object of sovereign power stems from the sovereign's ultimate 
ability to sanction the death of any individual 'without committing homicide and without 
celebrating a sacrifice' ?4 Agamben traces this right back to the ancient Roman right of a father 
to put his sons to death, and argues for the logic of sovereignty following a similar rationale. 25 
The status of the sovereign power as a power defined by its ability to kill will be picked up again 
in Chapter Two, as we compare Agamben's schema with the work ofFoucault. 
The relationship between sovereign power and bare life is characterised by Agamben as 
the sovereign ban. As we have seen, homo sacer gains his status not by his expulsion from a 
juridical order, but rather by that order's choosing to suspend its application to his particular 
case. In this way, homo sacer finds himself beyond the protection of the legal order by virtue of 
the sovereign deciding the order no longer applies to him, a relationship properly characterised 
22 p.7. 
23 p.83. 
24 /bid 
25 /bid, p.87-88. 
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by Agamben as one of abandonment?6 The importance of this distinction is that, by abandoning 
as opposed to expelling bare life, the sovereign can keep the object or subject of the ban within 
its control. The reasoning behind this is that an expulsion forces something beyond the 
boundaries of that which expels it; whilst the sovereign ban merely suspends itself in relation to 
him, and by doing so continues to apply to the subject insofar as the decision on application or 
non-application is inherently a sovereign decision and, as a being constantly subject to that 
decision, homo sacer is still subject to the jurisdiction of the sovereign power. 27 This ability to 
suspend its own application is granted the sovereign by means of Agamben's appropriation of 
Schmitt's model of sovereignty and, most importantly, his notion of the exception, which forms 
one of the most crucial components of Agamben's work. 
It would be impossible to fully grasp Agamben's understanding of the sovereign power, 
and the bulk of Agamben's biopolitics, without paying special consideration to the notion of the 
exception, and the ways in which its logic underlies many of Agamben's most critical insights. 
For Schmitt, the exception was a declared state of emergency in which, for the preservation of a 
legal order, the order itself was suspended.28 The sovereign power, which alone has the capacity 
to decide upon and declare an exception, is then free to act without any potential legal 
impediment whilst it deals with the threat and restores the normal order.29 In this way, the 
sovereign may not only suspend but also violate the very laws it seeks to defend. Agamben's 
interest in the exception is twofold; firstly, with the Schmittian exception itself as an existing and 
expanding legal-political phenomenon; and secondly, with the underlying logic ofthe exception, 
the suspension of existing norms and forms of status, the dissolution and growing indistinction of 
26 p.28. 
27 p.29. 
28 Political Theology, p.7. 
29 /bid, p.l2-13. Agamben's appropriation of this schema is to be found in HS Ch.l. 'The Paradox of Sovereignty' 
and p.lS-19 in particular. 
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conceptual thresholds, and the paradoxical nature of the exception as the instrument by which an 
order applies itself precisely in the process of its own non-application. The remainder of this 
section will be taken up by Agamben's first concern, his historical account of the growing state 
of exception governing Western politics and his explanation of the causes and consequences of 
the destabilisation of the Western political order. Here, it remains to briefly examine how the 
logic of the exception applies to a number of Agamben's concepts and categories. For example, 
Agamben's concept of the inclusive exclusion shares the logic of the exception insofar as the 
exclusion of bare life30, the suspension of the application of the norms of bios-life to natural zoe, 
has the paradoxical effect of ensconcing tbe excluded phenomenon at the centre of political life, 
thus effecting the application of politics to life precisely by the suspension of its formal 
application.31 The same logic applies to the historical figure of homo sacer, as discussed earlier, 
who finds himself in his own paradoxical status as a result of a legal order that applies to him by 
deciding to suspend its own application in his particular case, by allowing him to be killed, in 
stark contradiction to the norms and traditions of the order itself, without any juridical 
recognition of such an act as a homicide. A final example of how the logic of the exception 
concerns Agamben is his treatment of the collapse into indistinction of our contemporary 
concepts of life and death.32 Agamben notes that recent advances in technology are beginning to 
bring about cases of people who inhabit an indeterminate zone between life and death, such as 
the coma patient kept alive on life support.33 The link to the logic of exception here is twofold; 
firstly, that a previously clear boundary has dissolved into an ambiguous hinterland; and 
secondly, that the zone of indistinction thus created demands a sovereign decision on life: 
30 Agambeo emphasises the etymological root ofthe word 'exception' is from 'ex-capere' or a 'taken outside'. HS, 
p.l8. 
31 HS, p.ll. 
32 p.l62-163. 
33 p.160-161. 
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today .. .life and death are not properly scientific concepts but rather political 
concepts, which as such acquire political meaning precisely only through a 
decision34 
Further, in the case of life and death, the decision is made not by the traditional legal sovereign 
but increasingly by doctors and scientists, and conditioned by the level of technological 
advancement itself.35 Many of Agamben's concepts within Homo Sacer share elements of this 
motif, and the general expansion of p<U"adox, zones of indistinction, and the dissolution or 
suspension of established orders in Agamben's work is directly related to his historical narrative 
of the decline of Western politics into emergency rule, and the growth of the permanent state of 
exception, to which we will now turn. 
In his own notion of biopolitics, Foucault refers to the transformation of man from the 
Aristotelian politikon zoon to a species whose life is at stake in their politics as our threshold of 
modernity. Agaroben appropriates Foucault's phrase, but points to two other phenomena which, 
he argues, constitute our own threshold. Firstly, and in-keeping with his modification of 
Foucault, he refers to a threshold of modernity being crossed 'upon the entry of zoe into the 
sphere of the polis - the politicization of bare life as such' .36 Taking his cue from Waiter 
Benjamin' s observation that 'the "state of emergency" in which we live is not the exception but 
the rule', Agamben's second criterion of our entry into modernity is the rapid proliferation of 
states of exception, to the point where Western politics appears to face a general, permanent state 
of emergency. 37 In Agamben 's historical analysis of the initial destabilisation of the European 
34 p.l64. 
35 lbid 
36 p.4. 
37 W. Benjamin,. 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', in. R/uminations; London; Random House, 1999. p.248. 
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political order, and the gradual expansion of the state(s) of exception, it is the problematic 
relationship of bare life to the political order of societies which again plays the crucial role. 
Key to understanding Agamben's account of our modern history is the concept he refers 
to as the birth-nation link. The birth-nation link is the mechanism by which the bare lives of 
citizens are 'inscribed', or taken into, the state order. Agamben explains that the need for such 
an inscription did not exist in the classical world, when our biological existence was excluded, as 
animalistic zoe, from the political realm; nor was the relation of bare life to the political 
community a problem in the mediaeval and Feudal worlds, in which our biological life belonged, 
as with the bare life of all other animals, to God.38 However, this state of affairs was disrupted 
by the events of the French Revolution, which removed from authority a divinely-appointed 
sovereign monarch and declared the people themse_lves to be sovereign. The dissemination of 
sovereign power into each and every individual 'irrevocably united' the principles of nativity and 
sovereignty, creating the paradoxical figure of the 'sovereign subject' and necessitating a new 
understanding of the relationship that existed between the individual and the state order. 39 When 
the 'Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen' w~ proclaimed, it awarded men their political 
rights based upon the fact of their birth, and in doing so immediately tied the powers and 
privileges of political community to the 'bare' lives of individuals.40 In short, with the fact of 
simple birth came the conferral of rights, and those rights were linked not to the state but to the 
nation, which the 'Declaration .. .' had proclaimed a sovereign territorial entity.41 In this way, the 
bare life of individuals was written into the new nation-state order inaugurated by the French 
revolution; birth was the condition of citizenship within the nation, the bare life of man was 
38 HS, p.l27. 
39 p.l28. 
40 /bid 
41 Ibid. 
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transformed into the bios-life of the citizen, and the gap that exists between the simple fact of 
birth and the complex nature of citizenship was obscured by a doctrine of civic rights predicated 
on the immediacy of the passage from birth to nation 'such that there can be no interval between 
the two term_s' .42 
The birth-nation link succeeded in regulating the relationship between life and the 
political-:juridical order for over a century, until the European nation-state system was presented 
with the limit case, or ultimate exception to th~ rule, in the form of the refugee. Agamben's 
understanding of the challenge posed by the refugee to the political order is based upon Hannah 
Arendt's observations in On the Origins of Totalitarianism, an appropriation which will be 
examined further in Chapter Two. Agamben and Arendt both concur that the refugee presents a 
unique challenge to human rights discourse as they are 'the figure ... par excellence' of such 
rights, they have nothing more than their bare human lives, and their rights are guaranteed by no 
state or political association.43 Both theorists therefore find it instructive that, as tbe purest 
example of human rights, refugees are also the most right-less and oppressed of groups, leading 
Arendt in particular to con~lude that human rights as such are essentially a fiction disguising the 
civic rights of a constituted political community in the garb of an abstract universalism.44 For 
Agamben, the refugee also destabilises the birth-nation link, the tie that had held Western 
political societies together for the preceding century. As we have just seen, the birth-nation link 
is predicated on the notion that there is no gap between the fact of birth and the enjoyment of 
citizenship, yet the refugee demonstrates precisely the opposite, that man may indeed be born 
without immediately becoming a citizen, allowing 'bare life ... to appear for an instant in [the 
42 Ibid. 
43 p.l26. 
44 /bid 
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political] domain' .45 Of course, the phenomenon of the refugee is nothing new, the truly 
destabilising development comes, for Agamben, at the close of the First World War when a spate 
of 'denationalisations' occurred in which European governments declared millions of members 
of minority communities within their borders to no longer be citizens oftheir nation.46 The rash 
of denationalisations, and the general dislocations of the War, created the refugee as a mass 
phenomenon, a problem too huge for nations to deal with as they had dealt with refugees in the 
past. In forcing open the implicit gap between birth and nation, the bare life of the refugee 
presented the state order itself with an exception, a life inside the borders of the state yet not 
inscribed into the order of the state, and it is the method by which Agamben sees the state order 
attempt to re-inscribe this exceptional life into its order that forms the keystone of his account of 
the descent of the Western world into catastrophe. 
When presented with the massive exception of bare life inside the borders of the nation-
state, the previous method of regulating the relationship of life and politics, the birth-nation link, 
failed in its historical function. The response of the state order was to create a new mechanism 
to govern the exception of bare life, and to re-inscribe bare life into the political order, in the 
form of the concentration camp. From their inception, dated by Agamben to the Spanish War in 
Cuba in the last years of the nineteenth century, concentration camps have been governed not by 
criminal law, but by laws regarding states of siege and, ultimately, states of exception.47 When 
the German National Socialist movement came to power, they suspended the Weimar 
constitution indefinitely, creating a sense of permanent exception which, according to Agamben, 
began to become confused with the rule.48 This sense of permanent exception partially accounts 
45 p.l31. 
46 p.l32. 
47 p.I66-167. 
48 p.l68. 
29 
for the brutal apogee of the camp under Nazi rule; insofar as the camps themselves fortned an 
attempt to create a permanently exceptional space, within the territory yet outside the legal order 
of the state, within which the exception of bare life, the declared homines sacri of the political 
order can be contained. Agamben finds it instructive that all those condemned to the camps 
within Nazi Germany had to be officially stripped of their citizenship and civic rights before 
being detained, reduced entirely to their bare biological existence, the quintessential declaration 
of homo sacer.49 Inside the camps, Agamben finds a pervasive zone of indistinction in which 
fact, law, and life become indistinguishable, a space in which the decision on bare life is 
constantly demanded and thoroughly irnpossible.50 As a new regulator of bare life and political 
order, the camp 'has now added itself to - and so broken - the old trinity composed of the state, 
the nation (birth), and land'.51 In addition, the camp's attempt to eradicate the destabilising 
failure the birth-nation link has, according to Agamben, expanded far beyond its original borders. 
The logic of the camp, the need to create exceptional spaces to capture the bare life which cannot 
be tolerated inside the state order, now works in myriad different settings in Western political 
spaces, from special zones in airports dealing with immigrants to the legal black hole of 
Guantanamo Bay, and its effects so ubiquitous as to be considered the 'paradigm of the modem' 
in Agamben's terminology. 52 
1.3 Foundations/Futures 
As mentioned at the opening of the previous section, Agamben's main aim is to modify 
our understanding of our current political situation, in order that this new understanding may 
49 p.170-17l. 
so p.l73. 
SI p.l76. 
52 p.174-176. Agamben does not, of course, reference Guantanamo Bay in Homo Sacer, but the logic is the same, 
and his take on the link is made clear in his State of Exception; Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 2005. p.3-4. 
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enable an eventual escape from sovereign power, and the biopolitical impasse of its creation. In 
doing so, Agamben traces the origins of sovereign power not to the political associations of the 
classical world, but rather to an originary ontological foundation, buried deep in human pre-
history. Following the work of Antonio Negri, Agamben argues that out understanding of 
'constituting power', the power that creates political associations or social orders in the first 
place, should be conceived not as a political phenomenon, but as a philosophical one.53 The 
reason behind this argument is that constituting power- and sovereign power which, pace Negri, 
Agamben argues shares the attributes of constituting power - is a power governing "'the 
constitution of potentiality"' and, as such, is rightly conditioned by the metaphysical relationship 
between potentiality and actuality in Western thought.54 Agamben's critique ofNegri is that he 
fails to find a theoretically satisfactory way to separate constituting power from sovereign power, 
a separation which forms the essential precondition of founding any legal-political order freed 
from grasp of sovereign power. 55 For as long as potentiality and actuality maintain themselves in 
any form of relation, that is, share any relational boundary, it will be impossible to escape from a 
sovereign power predicated upon the imposition and decision on these borders: 
... only if it is possible to think the relation between potentiality and actuality 
differently - and even to think beyond this relation - will it be possible to think a 
constituting power wholly released from the sovereign ban. Until a new coherent 
ontology of potentiality ... has replaced the ontology founded on the primacy of 
53 p.44. 
54 Ibid., (Quote is Negri, I/ Potere Constituente, Cited in HS, p.44.) 
55 p.43. 
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actuality and its relation to potentiality, a political theory freed from the aporias of 
sovereignty remains unthinkable. 56 
The task, then, if we are to escape the depredations of sovereign power is not simply to 
restructure our politics, but to re-negotiate the nature of human ontology, of our very way of 
being, by dissolving the conceptual borders which form the breeding ground of the sovereign 
exception and positing an essential non-relationality which evades all attempts to call forth a 
sovereign decision.57 Whilst this aspect of Agamben's analysis is subject to further exposition 
and substantial criticism in Chapter Three, this brief glimpse of the ontological foundation of 
sovereign power should be sufficient to paint a picture of the task Agamben sees before us if we 
are to escape ever greater biopolitical disaster. 
Agamben often describes the potential of future action to found a political order freed 
from sovereign power as the new politics. Whilst Homo Sacer is designed primarily to reveal the 
true contours of the present problem, rather than attempt a programmatic exposition of any 
radical alternative, Agamben does include a number of gestures toward what this new politics 
may look like. Firstly, we have already seen the importance of the new politics taking place on a 
profoundly new ontological footing. We have also seen that, for Agamben, the problematic 
relationship of bare life to the political order is a critical aspect of all historical political 
settlements. Agamben recognises that the new politics will be unable to return to any separation 
of zoe and bios that may have been known in previous epochs, as '[t]here is no return from the 
camps', a paradigm of modernity whose sheer dislocating force has rendered it impossible to 
trace our way back to a time of clearer distinctions. 58 Rather, in the political order to come, the 
56 p.44. 
57 p.47. 
58 p.l87-188. 
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relationship between bate life and bios-life must become one of virtual indistinguishability, for 
as long as bare life remains as an element that can be identified and isolated within the 
individual, there remains the potential for sovereign power to capture it and hold it as an object 
of its power. 59 In Agamben's words, the new politics must struggle toward 'a bios that is only its 
own t6e', a new 'form-of-life' based upon the new human ontology, capable of rendering the 
operation of the sovereign ban redundant and our millennia-long struggle with the phenomenon 
biopolitics a thing of the past.60 
The aim of this introductory chapter has been to briefly explore some of the key themes 
and motifs of Agamben's Homo Sacer. In addition to uncovering the historical figure of homo 
sacer, it provided readings of key elements of Agamben's biopolitics; the phenomenon of 'bare 
life', including Agamben's oscillation between two distinct readings of the term and our 
adoption of 'bare life' as synonym of natural zoe; the notion of the 'inclusive exclusion' as a 
description of the problematic relationship of biological life to the constituted state; and 
'biopolitics' itself, as a Foucauldian term for the gradual intervention of the state into the 
biological life of its citizens. Further, we sought to provide a glimpse of Agamben's 
understanding of the exception; Agamben's appropriation of Schmitt's monolithic 'sovereign 
power' whose power of decision, and ability to kill with impunity, continues to dominate our 
model of politics; of the 'sovereign ban' as a description of the way in which the sovereign 
power can decide to suspend its application to a subject, and thereby abandon him to an 
indeterminate area on the borderlands of fact and law; and of 'the exception' itself, both as an 
existing historical phenomenon, and as a form of logic governing a number of Agamben's key 
59 p.l88. 
60 /bid 
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categories. We encountered Agamben's 'threshold of modernity' as a situation in which the 
exception had grown beyond its bounds and begun seeping out into a state of general emergency, 
catalysed by the failure of the 'birth""nation link' to successfully incorporate the lives of its 
residents into the state order when faced with the limit-case of the 'refugee', who gives the lie to 
Western human rights discourse. We also saw Agamben's account of the state order's reaction 
to this failure, its attempt to contain this exceptional bare life within a space of exception made 
permanent within a territory, the 'concentration camp', and the diffusion of the logic ofthe camp 
to the point of its becoming 'the paradigm of the modern. Finally, a brief look at the 
foundations/futures of Agamben's analysis gave us sight of; the ancient and complex nature of 
the 'ontolqgical foundations' of sovereign power and biopolitics, rooted as they are in a tradition 
of Western thought stretching back into deep pre-history; and, finally, the necessity, therefore, of 
conceiving a 'new politics' on the basis of a renegotiated human ontology, and an amalgamation, 
or perhaps reconciliation, of zoe and bios, such that the isolation of bare life will henceforth 
become an impossibility. 
The remaining chapters intend to use these concepts as a foundation for a detailed 
investigation into the relationship between Agamben and his named intellectual interlocutors, 
and also between Agamben's concept of bare life and a Marxian critique of capitalist political 
economy. Many of the concepts covered here will be explained in further detail and many of 
them subject to modification or criticism as this investigation progresses. Having established 
some of the key categories of Agamben's thought, our next chapter intends to take one specific 
element of Homo Sacer, Agamben's claim to have built his own concept of 'biopolitics' upon an 
appropriation and articulation of the works of Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt, and subject 
his claim to more detailed scrutiny. 
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Chapter Two: 
Inheritance: Biopolitics in the Work ofFoucault and Arendt 
Our first general objective in the course of this investigation is to explore the theoretical 
foundations of Agamben 's biopolitics. In order to achieve this objective, this Chapter sets out to 
outline the way in which Agamben attempts to appropriate and articulate the work of Michel 
Foucault and Hannah Arendt in the construction of his own distinctive concept of 'biopolitics'. 
This Chapter will be subdivided into six sections, over the course of which the precise nature of 
the interaction ofFoucauldian 'biopolitics', Arendt's concerns with totalitarianism and the rise to 
prominence of collective 'life processes' in society will be established, and their points of 
intersection and contradiction, with each other and with Agamben, will be identified and 
discussed. The first section will set out from a description of the interaction of Agamben and 
Foucault, the original author of the term 'biopolitics', and will set out the nature of Foucault's 
project and the themes and concerns of Foucault's that facilitated Agamben's attempted 
articulation. Having set out the elements of Foucault's schema most conducive to Agamben's 
biopolitics, this Chapter will move on to its second section, which will identify a number of 
points at which the theories of Foucault and Agamben diverge and seek to establish whether 
these divergences pose enough of a challenge to prejudice Agamben's attempt at founding his 
concept of biopolitics on the work of the former. Our intention here is to deiJlonstrate that 
Agamben's use ofFoucault is a permissible one, despite a number of differences in the form and 
scope of their arguments. 
The third section of this Chapter will introduce the reader to the work of Agamben' s 
second pole, political philosopher Hannah Arendt. It will begin by outlining her account of the 
historical development of the phenomenon of totalitarianism and identifying elements of her 
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work On the Origins of Totalitarianism that are of most importance to Agamben's appropriation 
of her work. It will also establish a number of key concepts from her later work The Human 
Condition, which also informs Agamben's biopolitics to a large extent. Whilst the focus of the 
third section is on a brief exposition of Arendt's work, section four examines the precise 
mechanics of Agamben's articulation of Foucault and Arendt - positing the term 'mutual 
supplementarity' to describe the ways in which Agamben uses each theorist to balance, and 
counteract, the elements of each theory least conducive to his own work. The fifth section 
moves on to explore the theoretical convergences present in each author with various 
combinations of the others, grouped into 'historical' and 'theoretical' convergences depending 
upon their precise construction. Our aim here is to provide an overview of the manifold 
intersections that govern Agamben's articulation, and our own attempt to fully grasp the 
conceptual co-ordinates of Agamben's own theorisation. The final section moves on to identify 
and discuss the points of divergence, dissonance, and contradiction that exist between the works 
of each theorist. It will establish three areas of divergence; 'methodological-perspectival', 
'analytic', and 'speculative', and examine the nature and implications of these disagreements. 
Ultimately, this Chapter aims to have provided the reader with a schematic by which to read the 
Agambenian appropriation of Foucault and Arendt, and to have established the solidity of 
Agamben's theoretical foundations. It will also indicate the way in which most of the 
divergences identified can be resolved, or not, without detriment to Agamben's overall project, 
whilst also noting any disagreements substantial enough to warrant further research beyond the 
bounds of this particular investigation. 
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2.1 Mapping Biopolitics: Agamben and Foucault 
Homo Sacer's use of Michel Foucault as a starting-point for an investigation into the 
relationship between sovereign power and human life is itself indicative of the increasingly 
political tenor of Agamben's thought in the 1990s. Andrew Norris, a key voice in Agamben 
scholarship, has noted how the analysis in Homo Sacer returns to, and expands upon, many of 
the concerns and motifs present in Agamben' s 1993 work Language and Death; a philosophical 
investigation into negativity, language and the voice. 1 Interestingly, the latter work contains no 
references to any of Homo Sacer's key intellectual influences2; rather than Foucault, Arendt, 
Schmitt, and Benjamm, Agamben co-ordinates his exegesis predominantly between Heidegger 
and Hegel, with contributions from Schelling, Benveniste, and Aquinas.3 Agamben's shift in 
emphasis, his explicitly political tack from the mid-1990s, may best be seen as an intervention 
into contemporary political events. Agamben himself describes the creation of Homo Sacer as a 
reaction to 'the bloody mystification of a new planetary order' and 'problems ... which the author 
[Agamben] had not, in the beginning, foreseen' .4 
The priority accorded to Foucault's analysis in Homo Sacer is testified to in his rapid 
appearance m the text. Preceded only by mentions of Plato and Aristotle, it is with Foucault's 
engagement with Aristotle's famous definition of man as the 'political animal' that the 
conceptual work of Homo Sacer truly begins.5 Foucault's 'biopolitical threshold of modernity'; 
the new coincidence of a politicised 'bare life' (in the re-creation of the individual as a statistical 
part of a regulated and medicated population) and the systematic production of 'docile bodies' 
1 A. Norris, 'Giorgio Agamben and the Politics of the Living Dead', in, Diacritics, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Winter, 2000), 
f.43. 
Ibid. (Excepting Heidegger, whose part in Homo Sacer is relatively peripheral when compared to Foucault, 
Arendt, et al.) 
3 See, for example, comparative number oflndex entries in, G. Agamben, Language and Death: The Place of 
Negativity (Tr. K. Pinkus and M. Hardt); Minneapolis; University of Minnesota Press, 1991; p. 111-112. 
4 Homo Sacer (Hereafter, HS),, p.l2. 
5 /bid, p.3. 
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(as a result of the ever-increasing efficiency and brutality of sovereign power's disciplinary 
structures), provides an immediate reference point for the contemporary application of 
Agamben's homo sacer concept.6 However, whilst Agamben establishes Foucault's analysis of a 
'bare life' whose politicisation is indeed indicative of a distinctly modern state of affairs7, the 
latter's treatment of 'biopolitics' is consistently read through the former's 'recognition that the 
biopolitical structure of power has [pace Foucault] archaic roots'. 8 Before exploring the 
consequent differences between these two seminal expositions on the theory of biopolitics, it 
remains to outline tile lines of complementary intersection that govern Agamben's attempted use 
ofFoucault in the creation of Homo Sacer. 
It is within the final chapter of his History of Sexuality (Vol. I), that Foucault stakes out 
the ground of a contemporary biopolitics by placing the current relationship of human life and 
political power into a stark juXtaposition with Aristotle's canonical conception of man as 
politikon zoon: 
... what might be called society's ''threshold of modernity" has been reached when 
the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, 
man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional 
capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places 
his existence as a living being into question.9 
6 E.Vogt, 'S/Citing the Camp', in, A. Norris (ed.), Politics, Metaphysics, and Death: Essay on Giorgio Agamben's 
Homo Sacer; Durham, N.C.; Duke University Press, 2005; p.77. See also, HS, p.lll. 
7 HS, P.4.; Norris, p.39. 
8 K. Nikolopoulou, 'Untitled Homo Sacer Review', in, SubStance, Vol. 29, No. 3, Issue 93 (Pierre Bourdieu Special 
Edition, 2000), P.l31.), p.l29. 
9 M. Foucault, The History ofSexuality, Vol. 1.; London; Alien Lane, 1978; p.143 (My emphasis) 
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The transformation of man from a being in possession of an 'additional capacity' for politics, to 
a species whose very survival can be placed into jeopardy through their politics is one which, for 
Foucault, has 'considerable consequences' when attempting to map the relationships between 
history, life, science, and power, it is a development which throws into uncertainty 'the whole 
space of [our] existence' .10 
Foucault's cognizance of the deficiencies of traditional modes of thought in the face of 
biopolitical modernity is essential to understanding Agamben 's re-examination of the entire 
history ofthe Western tradition; bringing to light the operations that have governed its unfolding, 
and led it into the very zones of indistinction and ambiguity that Foucault sees plaguing attempts 
to conceptualise 'biopolitics' in a traditional frame 11 , and Agamben sees as constitutive of the 
exploded 'exception', leitmotif of the emerging planetary order.12 An equally significant 
function of Foucault's theorisation here is that it explicitly opens up a path back to Aristotle and 
the ancient world, providing Agamben not only with the vital motif of 'biopolitics', but also with 
the ability to transport the Foucauldian components of his analysis back to the very founding of 
the Western political (and metaphysical) traditions he seeks to expose. The Foucault-Aristotle 
link has a double significance to Agamben's historico-philosophical project; contributing a 
substantive concept ('biopolitics'), and providing further support for the retroactive location of 
Agamben's analysis back into deep political history. 
Foucault's analysis finds the dawn of biopolitics in a dramatic transformation of power 
beginning in the seventeenth century 13, in which the biological life of individuals is taken, for the 
first time, into the remit of state power - and thereby opened up as a realm of political 
10 /bid, p.l43-144. 
11 Ibid. 
12 See, G. Agamben, State ofExceptiorr, Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 2005. p.86-87. 
13 M. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended; London; Alien Lane The Penguin Press, 2003. p.242. 
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intervention. Beginning with new forms of discipline, which treat the individual as a body to 
drilled, exercised and made efficient, this evolution of power reached a further level of 
development in the transition to technologies of regulation, whose object was the population as a 
whole, and sought to map and care for their general health. 14 At this point, we witness the birth 
of Foucauldian 'biopolitics': 
What does this new technology of power, this biopolitics, this biopower that is 
beginning to establish itself, involve? ... a set of processes such as the ratio of 
births to deaths, the rate of reproduction, the fertility of a population and so on. 15 
This extension of state power also fundamentally changes its foundation in the classical theory of 
sovereignty, whose former modus operandi of wielding the threat of death over its subjects, 
typified by Foucault in the phrase 'take life or let live' 16, finds itself replaced by the biopolitical 
compunction to care for, and extend as far as possible, the life of its citizens, to 'make live or let 
die'. 17 
Foucault's theorisation of the emergence of biopolitics also pays a great deal of attention 
to the role of capitalism (whose gradual emergence between the fifteenth and eighteenth 
centuries certainly appears to dovetail the chronology of Foucault's analysis) in this sea-change 
of power. In his collection of lectures Society Must Be Defended, Foucault traces disciplinary 
technologies to an effort to harness the full 'productive forces' of individual bodies; he locates 
the regulatory focus on treating the common, low-level, recurrent diseases ('endemics') in a 
concern to eliminate ailments which 'sapped the population's strength, shortened the working 
14 /bid 
15 /bid, p.243. 
16 History ofSexuaUty ... , p. 138. 
17 Society Must Be Defended, p.241. 'Take life or let live' has the same formulation in both works, the biopolitical 
injunction in The History ... is formulated as 'to foster life or disallaw it' (p.l38.). 
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week, wasted energy, and cost money'; he also demonstrates how both the disciplinary and 
regulatory systems of the new order could only have been achieved through the growth of 
'system[s] of surveillance, hierarchies, inspections, book-keeping and reports' .18 It is certainly 
fair to conclude that Foucault's biopolitics is intimately bound up with a study of capitalism, and 
processes akin to Weber's 'rationalisation', as Agamben briefly acknowledges in the 
introduction to Homo Sacer. 19 
A significant point of convergence between Agamben and Foucault exists in their 
common reading of the classical theory of sovereignty, as both recognise that the traditional 
sovereign's right ovet life and death is, primarily, a power focused upon death. 20 The 
sovereign's asymmetric power over death leads Foucault, in Society Must Be Defended, to an 
intriguing moment of analysis: 
... to .say that the sovereign has a right of life and death means that he can, basically, 
either have people put to death or let them live, or in any case that life and death are 
not natural or immediate phenomena which are primal and radical, and which fall 
outside the field of power. If we take the argument a little further ... it means that in 
terms of the relationship with the sovereign, the subject is, by rights, neither alive 
nor dead.21 
This passage forms a double conjunction with Agamben's analysis in Homo Sacer; firstly, it 
prefigures Agamben's position that sovereign power's control over 'bare life' is responsible for 
18 !bid, p.242-244. See also, History of Sexuality, p.l40-l4l. 
19 HS, p.3. 
20 /bid, p.88-89. ('There is no clearer way to say that the first foundation of political life is a life that may be killed, 
which is politicized through its very capacity to be killed.'), and Society ... , p.240 ('the right of life and death is 
always exercised in an unbalanced way: the balance is always tipped in favour if death'). 
21 Foucault, Society ... , p. 240. 
41 
life and death themselves entering into a 'zone of indistinction', they are captured within the 
'field of [sovereign] power', at which point they cease being solely natural or 
anomic/autonomous phenomena, but become subject to definition and adjudication by sovereign 
decision. 
The second intersection of Agamben with the above passage is the coincidence of a 
subject that is 'neither alive nor dead' in the eyes of the sovereign.22 Foucault's subject here is 
neither alive nor dead because the power of the sovereign to inflict death perpetually hangs over 
the subject; even (or especially) when not exercised, its suspended presence suspends the status 
of the subject himself- he remains a pure neutrality in his relation to the sovereign.23 Of course, 
homo sacer himself is presented as neither alive nor dead as the process of making 'sacred' is 
revealed as one of 'setting apart', or abandoning, the subject. The entire legal and social order is 
suspended in relation to homo sacer, hence his seemingly paradoxical ability to be killed without 
the commission of homicide and the further prohibition on his use as a sacrifice.24 
The second point of interest to be considered here is a structural similarity surrounding 
Foucault's intentionally brief, and explicitly curtailed, treatment of sovereign power and social 
contract theorists. Whilst one of Agamben's political objectives is to do away with social 
contract theories of society, which he sees as responsible for 'condemn[ing] democracy to 
impotence every time it had to confront the problem of sovereign power' and preventing modem 
democracy's ability to conceive of a politics freed from the state25 ; a further passage from 
Foucault's Society ... again opens up a potentially fascinating conceptual parallel. Investigating 
22 This coincidence of Foucauldian subject and homo sacer has previously been noted by Paul Patton, 'Agamben 
and Foucault on Biopower and Biopolitics', in, Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life, M. Carlaco and S .. DeCaroli 
(eds.); Stanford; Stanford University Press, 2007. p.213-214. 
23 Foucault, Society ... , Loc. Cit. 
24 HS, p.S.,.and p.73-74. 
25 /bid, p.l09. 
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seventeenth and eighteenth century juridical thought concerning the foundations of a social 
contract, Foucault elaborates on why a people would choose to 'delegate absolute power over 
them to a sovereign': 
They do so because they are forced to by some threat or need. They therefore do 
so in order to protect their lives. It is in order to live that they constitute a 
sovereign. To the extent that this is the case, can life actually become one of the 
rights of the sovereign? ... Mustil't life remain outside the contract to the extent 
that it was the first, initial, and foundational reason for the contract itseld6 
It is possible to discern within this passage shades of one of Agamben's most important 
theoretical motifs: the inclusive exclusion. Here, Foucault is questioning the inclusion of life 
within a contract based on life; more specifically, he is questioning whether life itself should be 
excluded from the contract because it is the very object of the contract. It is common knowledge 
that even that most sovereign-centric of social-contractarians, Thomas Hobbes, excluded an 
absolute right over life from his 'mortal god', the Leviathan?1 In Agamben's analysis, it is 'bare 
life' that is excluded from the City, yet, as both the foundation upon which the City is built, and 
the ultimate object of the sovereign power which resides there, remains included (via its 
exclusion) at the secretheart of the legal and political order.Z8 
26 Society ... , p.241. 
27 Hobbes steadfastly maintains the right to resist anY violence to be inflicted upon your person, even if it is to be 
inf)icted by the sovereign; see, T. Hobbes, Leviathan (Oakesbott ed.); Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1946; p.86. ('Not all 
Rights are Alienable') and p.202 ('Right to Punish Whence Derived'). 
28 HS, p.ll0-111 . 
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2.2: Points of Divergence: Agamben and Foucault 
Despite the lines of convergence we sketched here, elements of Agamben's appropriation 
of Foucault remain problematic. Agamben is quite clear that his use of Foucault is intended as a 
'completion' or 'correction' of the latter's wor~9, and Agamben sketches out some theoretical 
lines that diverge sharply from the shape, and intent, of Foucauldian biopolitics. Foucault's 
theorisation remains an essential foundation of Agamben' s re.,. interpretation of Western political 
history, and so any successful challenge to his modified reading of Foucault threatens to 
destabilise the entire biopolitical edifice built upon it. 
Scattered throughout Homo Sacer, Agamben makes reference to Foucault's death (in the 
early 1980s) as preventing the further development of his research into biopolitics.30 However, 
Paul Patton presents evidence that implies Agamben may be slightly disingenuous in this 
interpretation of events, and locates Foucault's interest in biopolitics to a selection of lectures in 
the late 1970s, before he began involving himself much more deeply within the concept of 
'governmentality' .31 Patton's suggestion that 'the concept of biopower does not play a major 
role in Foucault's work' is supported by Foucault's own statements of intent in the 'biopolitical' 
works so often quoted. Firstly, the purpose of his 17 March 1976 lecture in Society ... (the only 
one to feature 'biopolitics') was not to expose the insidious grip ofbiopower upon the population 
but to 'raise the problem of war' and to account for the development of 'State racism' 32, he refers 
to his excursus into biopolitics as a 'long digression' before returning 'to the problem [he] was 
trying to raise' .33 Foucault's analysis of biopolitics in the History of Sexuality is similarly thin 
on the ground; extending to ten of the 159 pages, in the first half of the final chapter, 
29 /bid, p.9. 
30 Ibid., p.4, p.ll9. 
31 Patton, 'Agamben and Foucault .. .',in, Carlaco and DeCaroli, p.206-208. 
32 Foucault, Society ... , p.239. 
33 /bid' p.254. 
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immediately succeeded by the words '[t]his is the background that enables us to understand the 
importance assumed by sex as a political issue'.34 Relative, therefore, to its significance in 
Foucault's own works, it certainly appears that much of the literature surrounding Foucault's 
'biopolitics' gives it a disproportionately high profile. 
However, the fact that biopolitics appears to take the fonn ofa side-issue, or theoretical 
excursion, in Foucault's works, never the main topic of diScussion and not 'one of [his] 
meticulously grounded notions'35, does no damage to Agamben's ability to use what was there. 
The lines of convergence sketched earlier identified; a concrete concept (the politicisation of 
biology), a route back to Aristotle, a common conception of classical sovereignty, a subject 
neither alive nor dead (subject to the sovereign's unmediated decision), and a prototype 
exposition of the inclusive exclusion that characterises the relationship between life and the City. 
Whilst the importance of biopolitics to Foucault, and his intention to continue developing the 
theme, may have been oversold by Agamben, the instruments furnished by the fonner's 
fragmentary biopolitical analysis are more than sufficient for Agamben's appropriation. 
A second potential divergence centres upon the timeframes within which each theorist's 
'biopolitics' works. Homo Sacer itself begins in ancient Greece indicating, from the first pages 
onwards, that Agamben's concern stretches back to the birth of politics as such.36 Foucault, 
meanwhile, locates his 'biopolitics' finnly in the modem era; setting up his analysis of our 
current situation in explicit juxtaposition to the 'classical age' ofthe West.37 We also encounter 
two distinct conceptions of 'modernity'; Foucault's biopolitics are set in motion by the twin 
pressures of demographic expansion and industrialisation in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
34 Foucault, The History ... , p.l45. 
35 P. Fitzpatrick., 'Bare Sovereignty', in, Norris (ed.), Politics, Metaphysics, and Death ... , p.56. 
36 HS, p.l.; Also, Vogt, 'S/Citing the Camp', in Norris (ed.), p.77. 
37 History ofSexua/ity ... , p.36. 
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centuries38, whilst Agamben's 'modernity' coincides with the post-First World War explosion of 
'states of exception' and the exceptional pressures of mass denationalisations in shattering the 
traditional birth.,.nation link.39 At best, Agamben's analysis of modernity could be stretched back 
to 1789; the French Revolution's replacement of the absolute monarch with the 'sovereign 
subject'40, and the first articulation of 'state of siege' principles with emergency provisions for 
the suspension of the constitution, whose gradual convergence created the 'state of exception' 
which is now expanding to engulf the world.41 There cail be no doubt that both theorists have an 
entirely different time-frame in mind, the remaining question is whether Agamben's construction 
of 'biopolitics' on such a vastly different historical scale is prejudicial to his ability to 
appropriate the concept 
In this respect, it is Foucault's own treatment of the 'neither alive nor dead' subject of 
classical sovereignty that problematises his own chronology. Whilst Foucault seeks to situate 
biopolitics outside of traciitional sovereignty (a point we will return to momentarily), his own 
treatment of classical sovereignty creates a theoretical equivalent of homo sacer: 
The life of the subject in the terms of the classical theory of sovereignty, as 
Foucault defines it, is structurally identical to the bare life of the homo sacer: it is 
biological existence doubled by its exclusive inclusion [sic] within the political 
sphere.42 
38 Society ... , p.249. 
39 HS, p.37-38, p.IJI-132. 
40 /bid, p.l28. 
41 State of Exception, p.4-5. 
42 Patton, 'Agamben and Foucault ... ', p.214. The 'Sic' refers to the fact that the relationship of bare life/biological 
existence to the Po/is/political sphere is formulated by Agamben as an 'inclusive exclusion', see HS, p.7. 
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This aspect of Foucault's own theorisation simultaneously creates a sacer-esque subject and 
opens up the space to backdate him, alongside his sovereign, to the birth of classical sovereignty 
in antiquity; a movement which allows Agamben to perform the same operation without 
detriment to his later work. 
The third difficulty in articulating each theory is a problem of terminology itself; both 
theorists maintain a different interpretation of 'biopolitics'. In-keeping with Foucault's 
reputation as a theorist of the 'micropolitical', concerned with the operation and distribution of 
power across 'horizontal' social axes, we find the term 'biopolitics' to be used in a very wide 
focus.43 Foucault's concern is with the biopolitics of population, and the way in which 
administering populations grew to become a. problem of state power.44 Foucault himself 
adumbrates the vital cornerstones of his conception of biopolitics as 'mechanisms with a certain 
number of functions ... includ[ing] forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures' of 
reproduction, death rates, public health. concerns and so on.45 Followers of Foucault have 
comfortably extended his analysis into concepts of 'risk' and statistical analyses. 46 Agamben, 
meanwhile, operates a much more 'vertical' conception of power, pulled into a far tighter 
focus. 47 Hussain and Ptacek remark that 'with the central focus on the conditions of living and 
dying and on the threshold figure of bare life, [Agamben's] biopolitics takes on a more narrow 
(even literal) and sinister guise' .48 Agamben 's biopolitics remains fixated upon sovereign power, 
bare life, and the concentration camp as the governing paradigm of the modem; the camp is seen 
to have a much greater significance than the traditional Foucauldian subjects ofthe clinic, prison, 
43 Nikolopoulou, 'Untitled Homo Sacer Review', p.l30. 
44 Society ... , p.245. 
45 /bid, p.246. 
46 N. Hussain and M. Ptacek. 'Thresholds: Sovereignty and the Sacred', in, Law & Society Review, Vol. 34., No. 2 
(2000), p.512-513., p.508. 
47 Nikolopoulou, Loc. Cit. 
48 Hussain and Ptacek, Loc. Cit. 
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etc., as only the concentration camp is founded upon the pure 'state of exception', the emerging 
nomos of the new planetary order.49 
The differences in interpretation of the term 'biopolitics' may very well make for some 
ambiguity in the attempt to put the theories together, but, given Agamben and Foucault's 
differing conceptions of political power ('vertical' vs. 'horizontal'), and the differences in their 
aims and scope discussed earlier - it should come as no surprise that the two terms are not quite 
congruent. We would also maintain that each theorisation is equally valid in their use of the 
moniker 'biopolitics' if for different reasons; for Foucault, as a marker of distinction between 
anatamo-politics (focus on individual bodies; discipline) and bio-politics (focus on population; 
regulation); and, for Agamben, given the absolute centrality of bare biological existence as a 
political, philosophical, and, ultimately, ontological phenomenon. Therefore, despite the mutual 
exclusivity of each interpretation, once we are beyond the very basic notion of a politicised 
biology, the divergence in meaning of the two does not undercut the conceptual ground of either. 
The penultimate challenge to an Agamben-Foucault articulation is generated by their 
differing conceptions of the status of sovereignty in the biopolitieal age. Foucault's amllysis 
situates biopoliticslbiopower outside of the realm of sovereign power; its growth was stimulated 
by the growing inability of classical sovereignty to maintain control of the political and 
economic body of a society entering modemity.50 Growing alongside sovereign power, Foucault 
perceives a 'transformation in the sense of a "supplanting" of older juridical models of power 
with new politico-discursive constructions; namely, biopolitics'.51 In fact, Foucault thinks a 
biopolitics that is locked into a struggle with sovereign power, they have 'permeated' each other, 
and are now engaged in combat to discover whether the sovereign impulse towards death can be 
49 HS, p.l74-176. 
50 Society ... , p.249. 
51 Hussain and Ptacek, p.498. 
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replaced by the biopolitical compunction towards life.52 In Foucault's analysis, biopolitics is 
already emerging as the likely victor of this confrontation, although he maintains that the 
sovereign power over death is never exhausted by biopolitics' ascendance.53 Of course, 
Agamben's view of events is dramatically opposed to any schema which under-privileges the 
key role of sovereign power in the 'production of a biopolitical body' .54 Sovereign power looms 
large over Agamben's biopolitics as arbiter of the final decision on life and death, and as a 
quagmire-like confluence of power which drags the victim further down with each move they 
make to escape: 
It is almost as if, starting from a certain point, every decisive pOlitical event were 
double-sided: the spaces, the liberties, and the rights won by individuals in their 
conflicts with central powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit but 
increasing inscription of the individuals' lives within the state order, thus offering 
a new and more dreadful foundation for the very sovereign power from which 
they wanted to liberate themselves. 55 
Whilst Foucault posits a counter-power to sovereignty in the form of biopolitics, Agamben 
subordinates biopolitics to yet another function of, to quote Vogt, 'a persistent and illimitable 
sovereign power' .56 
Again, this is a divergence which cannot be easily resolved and any resolution on this 
ground may prove impossible. This controversy does, however, open up two very important 
questions for further research. Firstly, we must seek to establish whether Foucault can be 
52 Society ... , p.253-254. 
53 Fitzpatrick, p.57. 
54 HS, p.6. 
55 HS, p.l21. 
56 Vogt, p.77-78. (Italics in original). 
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charged with making a theoretical false-step, or outright error, by positing biopower outside of 
the structure of sovereign power. However, ifthis is not the case, we will have to investigate the 
equally interesting proposition that Agamben has taken a properly anomic locus of power, a base 
for a potential challenge to the sovereign power he seeks to defeat, and has gone about its forced 
re-inscription into the very sovereign/juridical order he opposes. 
The final divergence to be treated here, and, for our purposes, the most instructive 
controversy between the two, surrounds their differential treatments of economics, and the 
effects of capitalism in generating 'biopolitics'. The delicate inter..,relationship of Foucault's 
analysis ofbiopolitics and capitalism has been laid out previously, it will suffice to recall that the 
two share an almost symbiotic historical development and Foucault identifies biopolitical 
mechanisms as essential contributors to the continuing development of the capitalist economy.57 
The relationship between Agamben's biopolitics and the capitalist economy is perhaps the major 
omission from Homo Sacer; the only treatment it receives is in relation to the Nazi regime's aim 
of synthesising biology and economy, and accounting for the biological commodities of their 
citizens when establishing their national wealth. 58 
Agamben's omission here might reflect his philosophical orientation, however, given the 
crucial importance of capitalism to Foucault's analysis, it seems bizarre that it should be so 
neglected in Agamben's treatment. This particular challenge, although 'lacuna' may be more 
apt, is not capable of an easy resolution, and the effect of capitalist economics upon the 
phenomenon Agamben refers to as 'biopolitics' forms the subject-matter of our investigation in 
Chapter Three. 
57 History of Sexuality ... , p.l4l. 
58 HS, p.144-145. 
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To quickly recap, Agamben's use of Foucault as the starting-point for his analysis of 
'biopolitics' is a complicated, and ultimately successful, operation. Foucault provides Agamben 
with a crucial treatment of politicised biology from which to begin; furnishes him with a 
conceptual link back to Aristotle, from whom Agamben's critique commences; shared a 
conception of sovereignty as predicated on the power of death; traced the history of a subject 
'neither alive nor dead' in relation to that ancient sovereign power; and used a crude form of 
inclusive exclusion argument to critique social contract theory. These common grounds 
provided Agamben with enough material to embark on his re-conception of Western history, 
under the label of 'biopolitics', despite Foucaulfs own involvement with biopolitical discourse 
remaining tangential at best. Of the five potential challenges to the operation of this articulation; 
we found two to be substantive enough to threaten his project and require further treatment; the 
divisions between Foucault and Agamben on the (non)opposition of biopolitics and sovereign 
power - leading to the tantalising alternatives of a Foucauldian diagnostic slip or Agamben's 
mistaken inscription of a free power into an oppressive order; and Agamben's suspicious 
reticence on the role of capitalist economics m the foundation of modem biopolitics, despite 
Foucault's explicit treatment of their historical synchronicity. 
2.3 Contours of Catastrophe: Hannab Arendt 
Whilst Agamben's use ofFoucault's 'biopolitics' relies upon an intensive excavation of a 
fragmentary element of the latter's work, his engagement with Hannah Arendt involves the co-
ordination and analysis of two substantial pieces, The Origins of Totalitarianism and The Human 
Condition. After briefly discussing Arendt's account ofthe historical motors behind the rise of 
modem totalitarianism and examining the key concepts involved in her later philosophical work, 
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this section will move on to examine in detail the ways in which Agamben seeks to deploy, and 
in some cases correct, elements of Arendt' s theorisation in relation to F oucault' s work and 
Agamben's concept ofbiopolitics. The discussion will then progress to an analysis of a number 
of specific convergences between various combinations of Agamben, Arendt and Foucault, 
broadly grouped into 'historical' and 'theoretical' convergences, before sketching the divergent 
aspects of their theories, grouped into 'methodological-perspectival', 'analytical', and 
'speculative' differences between each. 
The Origins of Totalitarianism59 (hereafter, Origins ... ), Arendt's first major work, 
founded her reputation as an incisive and highly original theorist, whose attempt to unpick the 
'catastrophic experiences' oftotalitarianism underwrote the majority of her oeuvre from the late 
1940s until her death.60 In tracking a number of distinctive historical developments, which 
crystallised into the specific conditions that gave rise to totalitarian movements in Gennany and 
Russia, Arendt offers an intricate and complex account of totalitarianism, which will be 
summarised here. This summary will begin by separating Arendt's account into two 'streams'; a 
'material stream', examining the role of modem economic development in catalysing 19th 
century bourgeois imperialism, and an 'ideological stream', charting the evolution of race-
thinking from aristocratic reaction in pre-revolutionary France, to the solidly racist foundations 
of Western imperialism and the pan-Gennanic and pan-Siav movements of the late nineteenth 
century. Of particular interest, when viewed in the context of Foucault, Agamben, and the 
question of 'biopolitics', will be my argument that both 'streams' share a common historical root 
in the rise of capitalist economics in the early-modem period. These two 'streams' will then 
converge at the critical juncture of the First World War and its aftennath, before offering a final 
59 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism; London; George Alien & Unwin, 1967. 
60 M. Canovan, 'Arendt's Theory of Totalitarianism: A Reassessment', in, D. Villa (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Hannah Arendt; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2000. P.25. 
52 
summary of Arendt's examination of the establishment of the Nazi and Stalinist regimes. 
Finally, it will remain to examine three key Arendtian motifs present in Origins ... ; namely, the 
paradoxical nature of 'human rights', the distinctive notion of 'ideology' used by Arendt in her 
exploration of totalitarian power, and the role of concentration camps as 'laboratories' aimed at 
the annihilation of human nature itself. 
The 'material' element of Arendt's account of the rise of totalitarianism begins with the 
destabilisation of previously entrenched property relations by the advent of the capitalist system, 
in which wealth becomes ever more mobile, fluid, and geared toward the endless generation of 
further wealth61 , and the rise to economic pre-eminence of the bourgeoisie.62 One result of the 
release of this endless dynamic of wealth generation is the double-generation of superfluity; the 
over-accumulation of monies generated by increased domestic productivity and profits formed 
superfluous capitaf3, whilst the section of the labouring classes rendered idle by the 
expropriation of previously worked land, the 'human debris ... [ofl .. .industrial growth', became 
superfluous people64, both of which formed potential obstacles to the process of unending 
economic expansion.65 The bourgeois drive to competition and expansion worked to provide an 
overseas outlet for both superfluous men and money, as investment opportunities in far-flung 
corners of the globe opened the floodgates for investments, emigration, and continuing economic 
expansion.66 In Arendt's analysis, it was at this point in their development that the bourgeoisie 
61 M. Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of her Political Thought; Cambridge; Cambridge University 
Press, 1992. p.29. 
62 Arendt, Origins ... , p.l23-124. 
63 /bid, p.134. 
64 /bid, p.l50. 
65 Canovan cites Arendt a5 placing the initial dislocation here to the expropriation of monastic properties during the 
Reformation, transforming a large amount of stable property into fluid wealth, which could then be deployed in the 
services of creating further wealth, thus letting loose the process which culminates in the bourgeois pathology of 
infinite expansion. This analysis, and particularly its specific (and convincing) chronology, is fascinating. See, 
Canovan, 'Hannah Arendt: ... ', p.82-83. 
66 Origins ... , p.l38-139. 
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chose to expand upon their established economic pre-eminence, and use their financial power to 
take over the machinery of the state. The impetus behind this move was that overseas 
investments were so inherently risk-laden, that only the material power of an established state 
would be sufficient to guarantee the substantial investments being made across the world. 67 In 
material terms, therefore, Arendt sees the origins of nineteenth century imperialism in the 
already established economic imperatives of bourgeois capitalism; 
The reason for [imperialism's] surprising originality .. .is simply that this concept 
is not really political at all, but has its origin in the realm of business speculation, 
where expansion meant the permanent broadening of industrial production and 
economic transactions characteristic of the nineteenth century.68 
Therefore imperialism, the result of the bourgeois hijack of the nation-state and the application 
of their particular values of ruthless competition and unceasing expansion to the public realm, 
became a dynamic political fact of the late nineteenth century. In order to fully understand 
Arendt's analysis of totalitarianism, imperialism must be read in relation to the development of 
another phenomenon, whose simultaneous development, and ultimate convergence, with 
imperialism would culminate in the genocidal disasters of the twentieth century totalitarian 
dictatorships. 
The 'ideological' stream of Arendt's narrative, the evolution of 'race-thinking' into 
racism, a distinction of some importance to Arendt69, also appears to be traceable to the advent of 
capitalist relations of production and the concomitant rise ofthe bourgeoisie at the expense ofthe 
feudal aristocracy. Arendt traces the origin of modern race-thinking to the Comte de 
67 /bid, p.l36. 
68 /bid, p.l25. 
69 Ibid., p.l83. 
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Boulanivilliers who, in the face of the upstart bourgeois class (under the protection of the French. 
monarch) developed a theory of the French aristocracy being descended from an international 
'race' of aristocrats who had, in times past, conquered and enslaved the 'Gaullish' general 
population of France.70 With the advent of the French Revolution, this notion of racial 
difference was used as a political instrument for the attempt of dispossessed French nobles to 
forge alliances with the aristocracies of Germany and Great Britain, against the 'barbarian' 
hordes of each respective population.71 It was in Germany, according to Arendt, that race-
thinking mutated from a political weapon of aristocratic reaction into ~ instrument for national 
unity and liberation. 72 The German experience of a fragmented a,rray of feudal principalities 
required an organising theme to underpin the development of a national-consciousness, and this 
principle was provided by the development of a Germanic ra(;e-thinking which, in contrast to the 
French model, placed an intense emphasis on notions of tribal loyalties, organicism, nationhood, 
and blood - although Arendt makes very clear that, whilst these elements of race-thinking did 
indeed carry over to become synonymous with later racism, at this point they operated under a 
notion of the 'equality of peoples', governing principle of the nation-state, and were therefore 
elements of a legitimate theory of national unity.73 The next step in the development of race-
thinking into racism came about with the confluence of race-thinking with two important new 
nineteenth century phenomena. Firstly, the emphasis upon blood and tribal loyalties began to 
take a more sinister aspect with the explosion of Darwinism across many areas of nineteenth 
century thought, including imperial politics, a development also noticed by Foucault.74 The final 
development of race-thinking into racism occurred at the moment that Western imperialists were 
70 Ibid., pJ62-163. 
71 /bid 
72 /bid, p.l65. 
73 /bid, p.166-167. 
74 !bid, p.l78-179; and, Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, p.257. 
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faced with seemingly uncivilised populations in the African interior, which prompted a practical 
application ofthe Darwinian struggle in the forms ofmassacres.75 
Also of interest here is the development of the pan-German and pan-Slav movements 
from the imperialist and racist milieu of the nineteenth century, which developed a 'continental 
imperialism' combining a racist Weltanschauung with a demand for land-based expansion and 
the discriminatory treatment of racial populations located not overseas (as in the British and 
French imperial examples) but as constituent populations inside the European continent itself.76 
The rapid development of these movements from the 1880s onwards provided perhaps the 
bleakest omen of future developments in Europe. The ultimate collision of the 'material' and 
'ideological' streams in the imperialism of the early twentieth century led to what forms an 
unmistakeable focal point in Arendt's Origins ... , the disintegration of the European political 
order in the aftermath of the First World War. 
It is dif{icult to over-estimate the sheer destructiveness of the First World War upon 
Europe in Arendt's historical analysis: 
The first World War exploded the European comity of nations beyond repair, 
something which no other war had ever done. Inflation destroyed the whole class 
of small property owners beyond hope for recovery or new formation, something 
which no monetary crisis had ever done so radically before ... [u]nemployment 
reached fabulous proportions ... [and]. .. [c]ivil wars ... were not only bloodier and 
more cruel that all their predecessors; they were followed by migrations of groups 
who ... were welcomed nowhere and could be assimilated nowhere.77 
75 Origins ... , p.\85-186. 
76 Ibid., p.224. 
77 /bid, p.267. 
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The importance of the destruction of the 'comity of nations' centred upon Arendt's perception 
that national sovereignty relies on the recognition and implicit co-operation of surrounding 
sovereign entities, this 'spirit of unorg~ized solidarity' between sovereign nations had imploded 
by the time governments began forcing denationalised populations across shared borders. 78 The 
rash of denationalisations of populations across Europe in the wake of the war created a tide of 
'stateless' peoples, forced out of all the communities to which they belonged, and stripped of all 
civic (i.e. state-protected) rights, these refugees presented a new and disturbing phenomenon in 
European history. In addition to the formally stateless, the post-war peace settl~ments created a 
number of nations whose official ethnic 'minorities' often totalled between 30 and 50 percent of 
the overall population and put further pressures upon the fragile nation-state system built from 
the ruins of the great multinational empires of Central and Eastern Europe. 79 As questions of 
nationality and race became central preoccupations of all European countries, Arendt maintains, 
'nation' had finally won out over the concept of 'state', paving the way for the racist German 
nationalism of the Nazis. 80 The combination of atomised and dislocated masses, further buffeted 
by the privations of the Great Depression, marshalled by a pervasive and self-abnegating 
ideology (to be discussed shortly) finally produced the exact coincidence of conditions necessary 
to produce successful totalitarian movements in Germany and Russia. Arendt's Origins ... goes 
on to give an impressive account of the structures and dynamics of totalitarian movements in 
power. Although elements of this analysis may be dealt with subsequently, our primary concern 
here is to recount Arendt' s exegesis of the conditions which created the totalitarian movements, 
78 Ibid., p.278. 
79 Ibid., p.271-274. 
80 /bid, p.275. 
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and to examine three particular elements of her theorisation of great importance to Agamben' s 
own appropriation. 
The first of Arendt's key motifs to be discussed, and arguably one of her most famous, 
concerns the paradoxical nature of 'human rights', revealed when the universalist rights doctrine 
actually comes into contact with its ultimate bearer, the stateless refugee. Despite the liberal 
rhetoric of 'inalienable' and 'natural' rights, Arendt sketches the way in which 'the moment 
human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon their minimum rights, no 
authority was willing to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them'.81 
Advocated only by well-meaning yet marginal figures on the periphery of politics and with 
declarations worded like the manifestos of animal welfare charities, Arendt notes that 
contemporary human rights discourse is dismissed as intensively by the victims of oppression 
and abuse as they are by the abusing parties.82 The hollowness of 'human rights' discourse, 
demonstrated by its collapse into paradox at the very moment it met its purest bearer, did not 
simply serve to discredit the liberal attempt to ground fundamental political rights outside of the 
context of the nation-state, the abject failure of 'human rights' to offer substantive protections 
also allowed totalitarian regimes to present their absolute disregard for all conceptions of 
individual right as a reflection of a deeper truth in the ideological arena. 83 
The second key analytical element of Arendt's Origins ... is her distinctive definition of 
ideology, and the specific function of ideology within totalitarian movements. Setting out with 
an elegant etymological analysis of the word 'ideology', Arendt uses the scientific emphasis of 
the suffix '-ology' to demonstrate that ideology itself, as a 'science' of ideas, is more concerned 
with the coherent application and logical consistency of a given premise, than it is with the actual 
81 Ibid., p.291-292. 
82 Ibid., p.292-293. 
83 Ibid., p.269. 
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content.84 This shift onto the formal construction of ideologies aHows Arendt to puB Nazism and 
Stalinism into the proximity required of her thesis, despite their appearance as polar opposites. 
A further important distinction in the definition of an ideology is its scope and purpose, 
according to Arendt: 
... an ideology differs from a simple opinion in that it claims to possess either the 
key to history, or the solutions for all the "riddles of the universe", or the intimate 
knowledge of the hidden universal laws which are supposed to rule nature and 
man. ss 
These laws, however, are anything but static. Totalitarian ideology, and totalitarianism in 
general, also embodies a need for perpetual motion closely related to the one Arendt first 
obserVed in the bourgeois compulsion to unlimited expansion. In this case, however, the reason 
behind the totalitarian drive toward endless movement is to forestall any possibility of the 
movement itself stabilising into a definite (state-) forms as such movements 'remain in power 
only so long as they keep moving and set everything around them in motion'. 86 
The remaining element of Arendt's analysis to be raised here is her understanding of the 
role of concentration camps within totalitarian systems. We have seen that, for Arendt, 
totalitarian ideology predicates itself upon the logical consistency with which it advances from 
its central premise, whether 'survival of the fittest' or 'class-war', disregarding and often 
destroying those elements of the existing social reality that do not conform to its predictions. We 
have also seen how the central premises of both Nazism and Stalinism are based upon a law of 
movement in which an inhuman force, 'nature' and 'history' respectively, plays out its internal 
84 /bid, p.468-469. 
85 /bid, p.l59. 
86 /bid, p.306. 
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logic unto the very end, 'rac[ing] freely through mankind', and using human beings as fodder for 
its progress.87 When these two observations are brought together, it becomes clear why Arendt 
considers the ability of each and every human being to create something absolutely new and 
unpredictable to be the greatest possible threat to the totalitarian imperative. In other words, as 
long as each and every human being born on the Earth maintains the capacity to embark upon a 
new beginning, whose ends cannot be foreseen in advance, then every human being creates a 
potential 'spartner-in-the-works', a stubborn refusal to conform to the arbitrary presuppositions, 
of the totalitarian world-project. It is in order to combat the threat of human spontaneity, 
therefore, that Arendt describes a concentration camp system designed to dominate the 
individual so totally that it becomes possible to destroy every hint of individuality. The 
unprecedented rai$on d'etre of the camp is to reduce human beings to simple 'bundle[s] of 
reactions', Pavlovian animals, practically devoid of sentience. 88 In short, Arendt sees the role of 
concentration camps as laboratories, experimenting in the extermination of human nature. 89 
These three analytical moments; the 'human rights' paradox, the definition of totalitarian 
'ideology', and the role of concentration camps in totalitarian systems will be returned to when 
Arendt's work is placed in relation to Agamben and Foucault later in this Chapter. In terms of 
explication, all that remains is to identify and elaborate upon the key concepts contained within 
Arendt's philosophical work The Human Condition. Unlike Origins ... which required a detailed 
analysis of the development of her theory, the focus in The Human Condition can be limited to 
certain key notions, which maintain a direct bearing upon Agamben's deployment of Arendt in 
his own theory of 'biopolitics'. 
87 /bid, p.465. 
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The Human Condition90, published almost a decade after Origins ... seeks to grapple with 
deep philosophical concerns surrounding what it is, and what it means to be, human, and the 
vicissitudes of the central categories and characteristics of human experience. This shift in 
orientation has been enough for some, such as Stephen Whitefield, to see Arendt as embarking 
upon an entirely new project, relegating her concerns with totalitarianism into the background 
and engaging primarily in traditional philosophical enquiry.91 However, Margaret Canovan 
convincingly locates the missing link between the two works in Arendt's concerns with 
totalitarian elements present in Marxist thought. The reason for her concern was that, whilst she 
considered totalitarianism itself to be unprecedented in history, she recognised that the discovery 
of totalitarian elements in Marx would implicate the entire Western philosophical tradition in the 
catastrophe of the twentieth century. Arendt's concerns led her to begin reconsidering the entire 
philosophical canon of the West, resulting in a new set of questions, concepts and categories, on 
a more fundamental philosophical level.92 The first fruit of these new speculations was The 
Human Condition, which, pace Whitefield, remains thoroughly consistent with her previous 
work and concerns. 
Of most interest to this particular project are four key concepts and distinctions 
developed in The Human Condition; Arendt's distinction between zoe and bios; her own 
particular construction of the concept of 'labour', including her notions of Homo Faber and 
Animal Laborans; her theory of mass society and the 'rise of the social'; and, finally, her 
distinction between the 'public' and 'private' realms. Each of these elements of Arendt's theory 
play a key role in Agamben's attempt to appropriate Arendt's work to his own conception of 
90 H. Arendt, The Human Condition; Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1958. 
91 S. Whitefield, Into the Dark: Hannah Arendt and Totalitarianism; Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1980. 
p.l34. 
92 Canovan, Hannah Arendt ... , p.67. 
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'biopolitics', and also in his attempt to deploy Arendt against some apparent overSights within 
the Foucauldian biopolitical schema. 
We have already seen the importance of the distinction between toe, the natural, animal 
life of the human being, and bios, the qualified, political life of the individual in the political 
community, to both Aristotle, who first wrote on this distinction, and Agamben, who sees it as 
the foundational biopolitical fracture of Western civilisation. This is a distinction shared by 
Arendt, who notes that both Plato and Aristotle refused to class as truly human a fact of physical 
existence which man shares with all the creatures of the animal kingdom.93 Further, she notes 
the crucial linkage between bios and language, insofar as it is bios that forms the stuff of 
biographies, events that can be told as stories.94 Alongside Plato and Aristotle, Arendt awards 
priority the artificial and constructed elements of human life, a priority which runs through her 
entire corpus and conditions much of her critique of modem society. 
The second element of Arendt's work to be discussed here is her distinctive concept of 
'labour'. Here we find an excellent example of how Arendt's concern with totalitarianism 
evolved, via her investigation into Marx and the philosophical tradition, into an innovative re-
conception of a fundamental philosophical category. Arendt sees in the Marxist concept of 
labour a conflation of two distinct phenomena, which she labels 'labour' and 'work' .95 'Labour' 
spans all activities based upon the material reproduction of biological life, physical subsistence, 
and is, as such, determined by base necessity. Labour itself is also an isolating activity, even in 
groups working on the same task, because the satisfaction of a body's physical needs keeps the 
individual 'imprisoned' within the horizons of their own bodily existence and its unique 
93 The Human Condition, p.24. 
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'metabolism with nature' .96 The blind subjection of man to the realm of necessity involved in 
labouring is the germ of the corruption Arendt detects in Marx's own construction, Canovan 
notes her heavy criticism ofMarxism's imperative towards: 
... a society entirely geared to the labour that is necessary to serve biological life, 
in which human individuality would be submerged in a collective life process, 
and human freedom sacrificed to that process's inexorable advance.97 
This emphasis on 'collective life processes' and Marx's assault on individual freedom is drawn 
from the same ground as Arendt's concurrence with the Hellenic dismissal of z6e as 
insufficiently human; in the same way as physical life is shared by all members of the animal 
kingdom, labour, in the Arendtian sense, is interchangeable- one person engaged in a labouring 
activity can be exchanged for another with no substantial difference to the outcome of the 
activity itself.98 Further, the products of labour are designed for the purposes of rapid 
consumption, and make no lasting alteration or addition to the human world. The fact that 
'labour' spans those activities which are biologically determined, atomistic, and geared toward 
short-term consumption, leads Arendt to distinguish 'labour' from the superior concept of 
'work', which Arendt describes as the crafting of durable objects designed to add an element of 
stability to the artificial human world.99 The mistake ofMarx in combining the two into his own 
theory of 'labour', and attempting to liberate this 'labour' and found a utopia upon its central 
premise, is a key part of Arendt's train of thought tracing the mutation of Marx's 'socialized 
mankind' (or 'mass society of labourers') into the Stalinist conversion of human beings into 
96 The Human Condition, p.ll5. 
97 Canovan, Loc Cit. 
98 /bid, p.l23. 
99 The Human Condition, p.l37. 
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mere labouring animals through the totalitarian assault on spontaneous human action.100 As a 
result, modern society is the society of the Animal Laborans, a creature labouring under the 
burden ofblind biological necessity, 'imprisoned in the privacy ofhis own body', and bound to 
the endless repetition and futility of true 'labour' .101 
The evolution of the Animal Laborans occurred alongside a process of societal change, 
termed by Arendt 'the rise of the social', which created the modem mass societies that form the 
object of her studies in both The Origins ... and The Human Condition. The 'social' is, for 
Arendt, a pervasive force set in contradistinction to the 'political', instead of focussing upon 
matters related to the polis, the 'social' orients itself more toward the conditions and concerns of 
the oilws, in Arendt's own words: 
Since the rise of society, since the admission of household and housekeeping 
activities to the public realm, an irresistible tendency to grow, to devour the older 
realms of the political and private ... has been one of the outstanding 
characteristics of the new realm.102 
The colonisation of the public realm by the forces of the 'social' creates a new economy of 
values in which, according to Norris, the venerated public-political sphere becomes 'overrun by 
concerns more appropriate to the private realm, such as household management and gossip' .103 
This usurpation ofthe public space coincided with the birth of modem 'mass societies' which, as 
we have already seen, Arendt attributes to industrial capitalism's double production of 
supetfluous men and money. Mass societies' tendency towards social atomisation cort1pounds 
100 Ibid., p.ll8. 
101 !bid, p.IIS-119. 
102 The Human Condition, p.45. 
103 Norris, 'The Politics of the Living Dead ... ', p.38. 
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the general disintegration of populations into an amorphous mass of isolated and lonely 
individuals, whose virtually solipsistic political situation erodes the possibilities for collective 
political action. 104 
Arendt's critique of modem mass society is founded upon her strict definition and 
delineation of 'public' and 'private', and her conceptions of the activities appropriate to each. 
The properly 'public' realm, the polis, is the home of political activity, in which each citizen 
meets the other upon strict condition of political equality. 105 The 'private' realm, the oikos or 
household, was the place of biological subsistence, the proper location for the activity of 'making 
a living', in which there was no fundamental rule of equality as nature and blind necessity do not 
know the artificial human principle of equality. For Arendt, the polis therefore remains 'the 
sphere of freedom', and the compelling biological necessities of the household, whose pre-
political nature allows for the practice of violence and institutions such as slavery, remains 
justified as the condition of possibility of political freedom in the public realm. 106 The most 
important point, for Arendt, was the inviolability of this boundary, in which '[n]o activity that 
served only the purpose of making a living, of sustaining only the life process, was permitted to 
enter the political realm'. 107 The consequence of the 'rise of the social' is that concerns proper to 
the private sphere have been allowed to becor:ne central to our political lives and, as a result, the 
principles governing the private sphere begin to colonise the public sphere to which they are 
antithetic, as Dana Villa makes clear: 
... the more we think of the political realm as concerned with matters of 
subsistence and material reproduction, the more likely we are to accept hierarchy 
104 Whitetleld, Into the Dark ... , p.91. 
105 The Human Condition, p.32. 
106 /bid, p.30-31. 
107 /bid, p.37. 
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in the place of civic equality; the more likely we are to see rule by elites ... as the 
quintessential political activity. Arendt's point is that, strictly speaking, ruling 
has nothing to do with genuine politics, since it destroys civic equality - the 
equality of rights and participation ... that is the hallmark of political relations and 
a democratic public realm. 108 
Arendt perceives a political realm under attack from the forces of the 'social', infringing upon 
our civic rights and transplanting the blind dictates of nature and necessity into the egalitarian 
institutional space created by mankind during the course of its separation from nature. As we 
will see momentarily, Arendt's proposed solution is for a return to older conceptions of 'public' 
and 'private', in an attempt to redress the democratic imbalance released by the elevation of the 
'social' to the pinnacle of modem political concerns. 
Having established the key elements of Arendt's work, as they relate to our present 
enquiry, it remains to discuss Arendt's role in the creation of Agamben's own sense of 
'biopolitics'. To achieve this objective, the remaining three parts of this chapter will attempt, 
firstly, to establish exactly how the mutual supplementarity of Foucault and Arendt works in 
Agamben's schema, secondly, to identify the important points of convergence between the 
theorists' works, and finally, to explore points of divergence and assess their impact upon 
Agamben's stated aim ofusing Foucault and Arendt as a starting-point for his own biopolitical 
investigation. 
2.4 Foucault, Arendt, and 'Mutual Supplementarity' 
Agamben's objective in Homo Sacer is to bring together the Foucauldian and Arendtian 
analyses with the two, related, aims; Agamben explicitly aims to demonstrate that Arendt and 
108 D. Villa, 'Introduction: The Development of Arendt's Political Thought', in, D. Villa (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Hannah ArendJ; Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2000. p.l 0. 
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Foucault are attempting to map the same phenomenon from radically different perspectives, thus 
proving the difficulty of the conceptual terrain that Agamben seeks to lay bare. 109 Secondly, it 
will be argued that Agamben also deploys Foucault and Arendt against one another in such a 
way that elements of each theory which militate against Agamben's particular interpretations can 
be undermined or undone. By playing areas of mutual contradiction in each theory against the 
other, Agamben can argue for exactly the kind of aporias, oversights,. and ambiguities he requires 
in order to prepare the ground for his own distinctive use of each. 
There are three key ways in which Agamben uses Arendt to supplement Foucault's 
theory of biopolitics. The first centres upon the Arendtian focus on totalitarianism in general, 
and upon the overwhelming significance of concentration camps to totalitarian systems. 
Agamben notes that Foucault's analysis failed to make the transition from the schools, hospitals 
and prisons of Western societies to the concentration camps of totalitarian states, 'the exemplary 
place of modem biopolitics'. 110 By moving Foucault into a relation with Arendt, Agamben 
hopes to reveal totalitarianism as the ultimate horizon of all biopolitics. 111 
A second important factor in assessing their co-ordination is the distinctive 'model of 
power' conceived and used by each theorist. In the earlier section on Foucault, we noted 
Nikolopoulou's distinction between the 'horizontal' model of power favoured by Foucault, and 
Agamben's 'vertical' orientation. 112 This analysis is supported by Amy Alien's investigation 
into the Foucauldian and Arendtian conceptions of power; she notes Foucault's interest in the 
'capillary' aspects of power, power at its lowest levels, the inter-personal interstices at the 
109 Homo Sacer, p.4., and p.l20. 
110 !bid, p.l19. 
111 Nikolopoulou, 'Untitled HSReview', p.130. 
112 See p.47-48, and Nikolopoulou, Loc. Cit. 
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periphery of organised mass-'society.113 She also notes Foucault's criticism of the way in which 
the focus on the more 'traditional' conceptions of power, centralised, juridical models, have 
essentially obscured the nature and significance of power relations at this most intimate of 
levels. 114 It is easy to see, therefore, that the tise of Arendt, with her focus on totalitarian 
institutions and the depredations of higher economic, social, and political powers upon the 
individuals below, closely complements Agamben's own 'vertical' construction of power 
relations in society. 
The third dimension to Agambeil's supplement is less explicit, but nonetheless 
significant. In her assessment of the nature and role of 'temporality' in the work ofFoucault and 
Arendt, Kathrin Braun locates the point at which the Foucauldian and Arendtian treatments of 
time and process, for the most part complementary, necessarily diverge. As Arendt's thought 
moves beyond the fact of totalitarianism's subjugation of individuality to supra-human processes 
and attempts to unravel the 'appeal' of totalitarianism in terms of the loneliness and isolation of 
modem individuals, she enters into a speculative arena which exceeds Foucault's strictly 
analytical horizon.m Foucault's insistence upon remaining rooted in the analysis of existing 
institutions, his penchant for tracing the evolution of certain questions as opposed to positing 
potential answers116, leaves him at odds with the more 'transcendent' ambitions of Agamben's 
philosophical projeet. Arendt's own concern to move beyond the phenomenon at hand toward 
greater questions, with normative implications, further complements Agamben's aims and 
mitigates the otherwise glaring dissonance which exiSts between the theoretical horizons of 
113 A. Alien, 'Power, Subjectivity, and Agency: Between Arendt and Foucault', in, International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2. (2002), p.l32-133. 
114 Ibid. 
115 K. Braun, 'Biopolitics and Temporality in Arendt and Foucault', in, Time & Society, Vol. 16., No. 1. (2007); 
p.l2. 
116 Ibid. 
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Agambenian biopolitics and its Foucauldian namesake. Whilst they may disagree upon the 
nature of any solution to contemporary political problems, both Arendt and Agamben share a 
strong impetus toward the construction of a viable political-philosophical alternative, Arendt in 
her bid to rescue the public realm from being swamped by 'hostile social and political forces' 117 
and Agamben in his attempts to use the concept of homo sacer and his analysis ofbiopolitics as a 
signpost on a journey towards the construction of an entirely 'new politics' .118 
Agamben's use of Arendt to compensate for potential oversights and lacunae within the 
Foucauldian schema is not, however, one-directional. Agamben also uses Foucault as a 
supplement to Arendt's thought in two key areas. The first shortcoming Agamben perceives 
within Arendt's texts is her failure to establish a clear link between sovereign power and the 
human body. 119 We have already seen Foucault's account of the intimate relation between 
sovereign power and the human body in his analysis of the historical development of biopolitics 
from disciplinary and regulative techniques imposed by authorities upon their subjects from the 
sixteenth century. 12° For Agamben, the 'original activity' of sovereign power is the 'production 
of a biopolitical body' 121 , a relationship which becomes infinitely more pervasive when the 
concept of popular sovereignty succeeded, via the French Revolution, in taking the very object of 
sovereign power, 'bare' life, and 'disseminat[ing] it into every individual body, making it what is 
at stake in political conflict' .122 The body-sovereignty nexus is of paramount importance to 
Agamben's theorisation and, whilst Arendt's concerns with biology and power remain in very 
117 D. Villa. Introduction: 'The Development of Arendt's Political Thought', p.15. 
118 Homo Sacer, p.1 0-11 and p.l87. 
119 Hussain and Ptacek, 'Thresholds .. .', p.508. 
120 See p.39-40. 
121 Homo Sacet, p.6. 
122 /bid, p.I24. (Emphasis added). 
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close proximity to this theme, it is only with the co-ordination of her works with Foucault that 
Agamben can bring her analysis to bear on this central connection. 
The second, closely related, element of Foucault used by Agamben to supplement 
Arendt, is the Foucauldian notion ofbiopolitics as the process whereby 'power ... takes life under 
its care' .123 Agamben notes that the centrality of bare life to sovereign power dictates that 
political structures are now based only upon the criterion of which structure provides the best 
organisation, management, and care, of its subjects' biological lives. 124 This is the reason for the 
collapse into indistinction of previously stable political labels such as 'left' and 'right', it is also 
the motor behind the ease of transition from democratic to totalitarian states as, in Agamben' s 
analysis, they share the same essential raison d'etre, although their instruments and solutions 
remain distinct. 125 The development of the 'care for population' discourse, and its institutional 
counterparts across Europe in the nineteenth century, is a noticeable gap in Arendt's account 
which Agamben compensates for in his use ofFoucault's historical analysis. 126 
Before. moving on to sketch the areas of convergence and divergence between all three 
theorists, it remains to address the question of the extent to which Arendt' s Origins... and The 
Human Condition actually engage in what could be termed 'biopolitical' (in either Foucauldian 
or Agambenian senses) analysis. As we have Seen, the heavy biological emphasis of Arendt's 
concept of 'labour', and her historical account of the political degeneration of the West once 'the 
new social realm transformed all modem communities into societies of laborers' 127, certainly 
indicate that The Human Condition contains essentially biopolitical themes. Braun 's description 
123 Foucault, Society ... , p.253. 
124 Ibid., p.l22. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Hussain and Ptacek, Loc. Cit. 
127 The Human Condition, p.46. 
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of Arendt as ~ 'theorist of biopolitics avant la lettre' 128 concurs with Agamben's praise for 
Arendt as a theorist who clearly perceived 'the process that brings ... biological life as such -
gradually to occupy the very centre of the pot itical scene of modernity'. 129 
Of some interest, however, is Agamben's subsequent critique of Arendt's failure to bring 
a biopolitical perspective to bear on totalitarian states and their concentration camp systems in 
her earlier Origins... work, 'in which a biopolitical perspective is altogether lacking' .130 Yet 
ijraun notes Arendt's Origins ... is deeply concerned with 'how totalitarianism reduces persons to 
mere specimens' via the 'political z5eification of humans' 131 , whilst Hussain and Ptacek 
challenge Agamben's position by establishing the inherently biopolitical nature of Arendt's 
treatment of the worthlessness of bare human life in her exploration of the paradox of human 
rights discourse. 132 In addition to these substantial examples, Origins ... alsO explicitly argues for 
Nazism as attempting to 'change man into a beast' 133, and the camps as laboratories for the 
creation of 'Pavlovian' creatures, devoid of sentience, mere 'bundles of reactions' where once 
there were autonomous human beings. 134 Each of these examples demonstrate an awareness of 
themes which would, rightly, later be termed biopolitical. Whilst Arendt may not have been 
operating a biopolitical analysis in the strictly Foucauldian or Agambenian senses, Agamben's 
reluctance to acknowledge any biopolitical motifs within Origins ... remains somewhat puzzling, 
and clearly open to challenge. 
128 Braun, 'Biopolitics and Temporality ... ', p.7. 
129 Homo Sacer, p.3. 
130 Ibid., p.4. 
131 Braun, 'Biopolitics and Temporality ... ', p.6. and p.l3-l4. 
132 Hussain and Ptacek, 'Thresholds ... ', p.507. 
133 The Origins ... , p.l79. 
134 Ibid., p.438. 
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2.5 Mapping Biopolitics ll: Lines of Convergence 
In addition to the various intersections surrounding the concept of biopolitics, there are a 
number of other nodal points at which the theories of Agamben, Foucault and Arendt converge. 
These points have been broadly grouped into two categories; 'historical' convergences and 
'theoretical' convergences. 
The first of four key 'historical' convergences is located within Agamben's and Arendt's 
treatment of the First World War~ the pivotal destructive and disruptive locus of modernity. 
For both theorists, the Great War figures as a historical focal point, whose aftermath sets in 
motion the forces which ultimately led to concentration camps, genocide, and the totalitarian and 
biopolitical disasters of the twentieth century. For Arendt, the 'explosion' of 1914-1918 laid 
bare the 'hidden framework' of European civilisation, and set in motion a 'chain reaction' which 
led to the all-out assault upon European civilisation that characterised the totalitarian 
movements. 135 In addition, the mass denationalisations which occurred in the aftermath of the 
First World War, and their generation of the 'stateless' as both quantitatively and qualitatively 
new phenomena, exposing the paradox of human rights and providing unwitting ideological 
support to totalitarian rhetoric ofthe irrelevance of human rights discourse, marks the 1914-1918 
conflict as the crucial destabilising factor in Arendt' s account of the descent of Europe into 
barbarism. In Agamben's treatment, the Great War generates a series of unprecedented 
geopolitical dislocations which expose the difference between 'birth' and 'nation' (or, 'man' and 
'citizen'), concealed at the heart of the European conception of citizenship since 1789. 136 Mass 
denationalisations and racist totalitarian regimes were founded, according to Agamben, as 
attempted solutions to the biopolitical problem stemming from the failure of the birth-nation link 
135 The Origins ... , p.267. 
136 Homo Sacer, p.129. 
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to successfully regulate the relations of life, territory, and sovereign power. 137 These two 
accounts converge on three distinct levels; firstly, they share the notion of the war as destroying 
a stable and crucial component of pre-war civilisation, for Arendt, the European 'comity of 
nations', for Agamben, the regulatory link between birth and nation. Secondly, both agree that 
the effects of the war involved an exposing of a previously hidden condition, for Arendt, the 
'hidden framework' of European civilisation, the implicitly mutual nature of inter-state 
sovereignty and the ambiguities of minority- and human rights, for Agamben, the secret birth-
nation link embedded in the French Revolution's position of popular sovereignty. Finally, both 
see the significance of the post-War denationalisations in provoking the geo- and bio-political 
crises which led to totalitarianism, concentration camps, and genocide. 
The second of the 'historical' convergences, briefly mentioned previously, is the 
agreement between Agamben and Arendt on the central importance of concentration camps to 
twentieth century totalitarian regimes. In addition to compensating for Foucault's lack of 
emphasis upon the camp systems, Arendt's position of the camps as 'the true central institution 
of totalitarian organizational power' 138, awCifdS the camps 
a level of ubiquity and gravity equal to that of Agamben's creation ofthe camps as the 'hidden 
paradigm ofthe political space of modernity' .139 Whilst, for Arendt, the camp is the crucial front 
for the totalitarian assault upon human nature, for Agamben, the essence of the camp has now 
disseminated itself into myriad modem settings and disguises, which remain to be identified and 
fought. 14° For both theorists, therefore, the camps do not simply exist as the most important 
137 /bid, p.129-l30. 
138 The Origins ... , p.438. 
139 Homo Sacer, p.123. 
140 . Loc Cit., and p.l74. 
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institution of a particular power system, they also fonn living embodiments of the ongoing 
processes of disintegration which both theorists' works are designed as interventions against. 
A third area of convergence between Agamben and Arendt centres upon the relationship 
of the concentration camps to the concept of 'crime'. Arendt forcefully makes her case for the 
futility of attempting to register the camps on any criminal scale: 
... in their effort to prove that everything is possible, totalitarian regimes have 
discovered without knowing it that there are crimes which men can neither punish 
nor forgive. When the impossible became possible it became the unpunishable, 
unforgivable absolute evil which could no longer be understood and explained by 
the evil motives of self-interest, greed, resentment ... and cowardice; and which 
therefore anger could not revenge, love could not endure, friendship could not 
forgive. 141 
In addition to existing beyond 'crime', Arendt sees conditions within the camp as existing so far 
beyond any sense of reality that victims themselves begin to doubt their own experiences once 
liberated, and that to attempt to even imagine the camps without having experienced them would 
be futile. 142 The hennetically-sealed life of the camps was essential to the totalitarian assault on 
reality, which fonned a key weapon in its attempt to destroy whatever residual traces of 
humanity existed within its victims after they had been stripped of all judicial and moral 
trappings, and condemned to the 'Hell' ofthe camps. 143 
This sense of the camps as unprecedented, anomalous, of existing beyond common 
conceptions of both criminality and reality, also finds voice in Agamben's discussion of the 
141 The Origins, p.459. 
142 Ibid., p.444. 
143 /bid, p.445, and p.447-451 (Killing of 'Juridical' and 'Moral' persons in victims) 
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concentration camp system. The juridical elements of Agamben 's analyses of the camps within 
Homo Sacer were designed precisely because the events inside the German extermination camps 
were so far beyond any concept of crime that other theorists' accounts have failed to situate them 
within their proper juridico-political contexts, an omission which Agamben believes occludes the 
potential for meaningful study. 144 Agamben's legal analysis leads him to conclude that the key 
to understanding the camps is the correct understanding of their legal status, which. itself depends 
upon our correct understanding of the nature of the 'state of exception' .145 Unlike the state of 
exception envisaged within Article 48 of the Weimar constitution, or even the Ausnahmezustand 
as imagined by Schmitt, the Nazi 'exception' that governed the camps rested not upon any 
external stimuli or threat to the system, but existed as a self-imposed exception which the camp 
system attempts to make permanent within a demarcated physical space. 146 In his analysis of the 
legal structure of the camps, Agamben fleshes out an instrumental account of the isolation and 
unreality that Atendt detects within the camps, reflecting upon her notion of the camps as the 
place where 'everything is possible', Agamben declares: 
Only because the camps constitute a place of exception .. .in which not only is law 
completely suspended but fact and law are completely confused - is everything in 
the camps truly possible. If this particular juridical-political structure of th(! 
camps .. .is not understood, the incredible things that happened there remain 
completely unintelligible. 147 
144 Homo Sacer, p.l66. 
145 Ibid., p.168. 
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147 Ibid., p.170. 
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Whilst their approaches and emphases may differ, it is clear that both Agamben and Arendt 
conceive of the ambiguous criminality, and sense of legal and moral unreality, of the camps as 
defining characteristics of these institutions' existence. 
The fourth and final of the 'historical' convergences between Agamben and Arendt 
concerns a common critique of modem society as predicated upon labour, in the Arendtian sense, 
and in this concern, it will be shown, both theorists also converge with the concerns and critique 
of Foucault. We have already seen Arendt's criticism of a modem society which has levelled 
down all activities to the base common denominator of biological subsistence, and which calls 
itself a consumers' society, oblivious to the fact that, as consumption is simply the second stage 
in the production process imposed upon us by the dictates of natural necessity, the consumers' 
society is in fact nothing more than a synonym for a labourers' society.148 Whilst Agamben's 
homo sacer is not as dependent upon the concept of labour as the Arendtian Animal Laborans, 
the similarity in perspective is clear in Agamben's disdain for the 'perfect senselessness' of 'the 
society of mass hedonism and consumerism' within which the Western homines sacri are 
caught. 149 In his otherwise problematic review of Homo Sacer, James Burtchaell makes the 
point that the analysis of modem society as predicated upon economic production/consumption 
is common to Agamben, Foucault, and Arendt. 150 Although it is important not to overstate this 
element of convergence, given the overwhelming priority assigned to economic production in the 
political organisation of Western societies and the awareness of this fact across a swathe of 
148 The Human Condition, p.126. 
149 HomoSacer,p.11. 
150 J. Burtchaell, 'Unpersons' (HSReview), in, The Review of Politics, Vol. 62., No. 3. (Summer 2000), p.626. (I 
have described the review as problematic given the author's fixation upon the historical figure of homo slicer, his 
relative lack of discussion of Agamben's treatments of sovereignty and the sacred, and his fixation upon Nazism and 
the camps at the expense of Agamben's investigations into the more contemporary manifestations ofbiopolitical 
power. Nevertheless, his discussion of Arendt and Foucault's influence upon Agamben's biopolitics is well made). 
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modem political thought, it is nonetheless, another point at which we can locate a conceptual 
intersection between Agamben and his two cited biopolitical forebears. 
In addition to commonalities contained within each theorist's historical schema, it is 
possible to sketch lines of 'theoretical' convergence between Agamben, Arendt, and Foucault. 
The first such convergence to be discussed relates to a critique of a certain understanding of 
time, described by Kathrin Braun as 'processual temporality'. In her work Biopolitics and 
Temporality in Arendt and Foucault, Braun discerns that the central targets of each theorists' 
critique, totalitarian ideology and biopower respectively, maintain an understanding of time as a 
medium for the flow of unending, supra-human processes. 151 As well as flowing through time, 
both Arendt and Foucault note the way in which these processes run through individual human 
beings, who become fodder for the inhuman forces of History and Nature in Arendt's analysis, or 
a simple statistical subset of the all-important population at the centre of Foucault's biopolitical 
paradigm. 152 These processes are endless, Arendt is correct in her analysis of totalitarian 
ideologies which, based upon laws of perpetual motion, must always fmd a new target; Nazism's 
'Nature' could not exist if it did not constantly find a new weakest group to eliminate in its quest 
for evolutionary perfection, Stalinist 'History' could not eliminate one class without creating the 
next in line for liquidation. 153 As she maintained, the importance of the process is matched by 
the superfluity of humliil beings that is both its inherent objective and its inevitable result. 154 
Echoes of this assertion are also found in Agambenian biopolitics, and his notion of an endless 
process of elimination attempting, unsuccessfully, to finally heal the originary biopolitical 
151 Braun, 'Biopolitics and Temporality .. .', p.5. 
152 /bid., p.ll-12. 
153 The Origins ... , p.464. 
154 The Origins ... , p.457., and Canovan, HannahArendt ... , p.60. 
77 
fracture of Western politics. 155 In Agamben, it is the attempt to negate the biopolitical fracture 
which exists between the 'People' (capitalised, representing political community, bios) and the 
'people' (uncapitalised, the poor and excluded, unrepresented, z6e), that led to the genocidal 
excesses of the twentieth century, as Nazism 'darkly and futilely' attempted to destroy the 
biopolitical divide by destroying every group that could not be integrated into the bios of the 
German Volk. 156 Concurring with Arendt and Foucault on the endlessness of such processes, 
Agamben points out that every attempt to destroy the biopolitical divide has only succeeded in 
reproducing it with the resulti~ng creation of new 'excluded' groups and classes. 157 
A second point of theoretical convergence shared by Agamben and Arendt is an 
indictment of Marxism as complicit in the development of biopolitics and totalitarianism 
respectively. For Arendt, Marx's objective of a 'socialized mankind' is corrupted from within by 
his failure to distinguish between 'work' and 'labour', and ultimately leads to the 
universalisation of the Animal Laborans and a society 'consist[ing] of worldless specimens of 
the species mankind'. 158 The reduction of man to a 'worldless specimen' is, on Canovan's 
reading of Arendt, the logical result ofMarxism's 'anti-humanist materialism' 159, a philosophical 
orientation conducive to totalitarian excesses if placed at the heart of an ideology. Whilst this 
line of attack works to cement a relationship between Marx and the, totalitarian and biopolitical, 
mass society of labourers perceived within The Human Condition, Arendt offers a further, and 
decidedly more nuanced, piece of analysis in her earlier Origins ... work. In her examination of 
the status of 'Nature' and History' to Nazism and Stalinism respectively, Arendt excavates an 
important theoretical convergence between the, more overtly, biopolitical concept ofNature and 
155 Homo Sacer, p.179. 
156 Ibid., and p.l76-180 (People/people distinction in Western politics) 
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the somewhat reified concept of History, in the form of class struggle, which occupies a central 
location in the Marxist canon: 
Marx's class struggle ... as the driving force of history is only the outward 
expression ofthe development of productive forces which in turn have their origin 
in the "tabor-power'' of men. Labor, according to Marx, is not a historical but a 
natural-biological force - released t:hl'ough man's "metabolism with nature" by 
which he conserves his individual life and reproduces the species. 160 
Arendt's analysis here primarily disrupts the apparent antipathy of History and Nature, adding a 
further layer to her own position ort the convergence of Nazism and Stalinism beneath the 
'totalitarian' banner, but also identifies a biopolitical critique of the Marxian concept of labour 
and argues for its complicity the disaster of modernity. This is a remarkably similar form of 
argument to Agamben's double attack upon Marxism in Homo Sacer. The first element of 
Agamben 's attack is to argue for Marxism's failure to recognise the fundamental biopolitical 
structures of Western politics, and that this failure of recognition has led to Marxism predicating 
its revolutionary theory upon theories of the State, and the 'state of exception', which themselves 
form the ultimate infrastructure of modern biopolitics and against which 'revolutions of our 
century have been shipwrecked'. 161 Agamben's second attack upon Marxism is that the central 
concept of 'class-conflict' is simply another exercise in healing the People/people biopolitical 
fracture, whose attempted solutions have always degenerated into civil wars and 
exterminations.162 For both Agamben and Arendt, therefore, Marxism is afflicted with a central 
theoretical flaw, and for both theorists that flaw is one of failing to recognise essential conceptual 
160 The Origins ... , p.463-464. 
161 Homo Sacer, p.l2. 
162 /bid, p.l78. 
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structures - the dual-structure of labour for Arendt, and the sovereign power/state of exception 
structure of modernity for Agamben. 
Agamben and Arendt share a further connection in their frustration with the modern 
tendency towards non-, and even anti-political humanitarianism. In her discussion of the 
paradoxical nature of human rights, Areildt identifies a central problem of human rights 
discourse as its lack of concrete political support Those publicising and pressing for the 
adoption of declarations of rights in the interwar years were 'marginal figures ... jurists without 
political experience ... philanthropists ... [and] professional idealists', their calls were ignored by 
the politicians, statesmen, and political parties whose support would have been necessary to give 
such declarations teeth. 163 The reason for this apparent neglect is the fact that, for the majority of 
nineteenth and early twentieth century political parties, the 'Rights of Man' were treated as 
inherently civil rights, i.e. rights guaranteed by membership of a political community. 164 As the 
concept of universal human rights began to separate the rights of rnan quo human being from the 
rights of man quo citizen, a lacuna opened up into which the waves of twentieth century stateless 
would falL The formation of this gap between 'man' and 'citizen', between 'human' and 'civic' 
rights, is, for Agamben, the beginning ofthe divorce ofhumanitarianism from politics.165 Whilst 
its protestations of political neutrality are feted as ethically superior, Agamben sees in 
humanitarianism's focus upon lives without politics, or upon toe without bios, an indication of a 
'secret solidarity' between Western humanitarian and charity organisations and state power.166 
The isolation of a 'sacred life', which becomes the object of humanitarian organisations' 
interventions, repeats the isolation of 'bare' life, the originary product and target of sovereign 
163 the Origins ... , p.292-293. 
164 Ibid., p.293. 
165 Homo Sacer, p.133. 
166 Ibid. 
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power, and therefore fails to overcome the biopolitical structure of the sovereign state order(s) 
they appear to set themselves against. 167 
An important convergence between Arendt and Foucault is contained within their 
analyses of the impact of the theory of evolution upon nineteenth century paradigms of thought 
and action. For Foucault, it was the form rather than the content of evolutionary theory, which 
he labelled evolutionism, that quickly gained a hold upon European political thought in the 
nineteenth century. 168 As Western political elites began to view developments through a prism 
of hierarchies, fights for survival, al1d the extinction of those unfit or unable to adapt, the 
traditional care-of-life 'biopower' of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries evolved into the 
'evolutionary racism' that generated murderous imperial colonisations and the Nazi and Stalinist 
atrocities. 169 Further, Foucault draws the historical link betwee11 evolutionism, 'colonizing 
genocide', and the birth of modem racism. 170 Each of these points finds an echo in Arendt's 
treatment of the birth of modem imperialism and racism in the nineteenth century. For Arendt 
too, the theory of evolution proved a catalyst in the development of race-thinking into racism, the 
murderous tendencies of which materialised in the 'scramble for Africa' 171 , at whiCh point: 
... [i]mperialism would have necessitated the invention of racism as the only 
possible "explanation" and excuse for its deeds, even if no race-thinking had ever 
existed in the civilized world172 
167 /bid, p.l34. 
168 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, p.256. 
169 !bid, p.257 and, Braun, 'Biopolitics and Temporality ... ', p.l4. 
17
° Foucault, Loc. Cit. 
171 Canovan, Hannah Arendt, p.37. 
172 The Origins ... , p.l83-184. 
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Arendt also noted that way in which DarWinian theory provided the basis for the development of 
biological eugenics, a further element of the potent historical cocktail eventually distilled by 
circumstance into the Nazi judebcide.173 For both theorists, therefore, it is possible to identify 
the dawn of political evolutionism as a paradigm-shifting event, which changed both the 
theoretical and practical outlook of Western political elites and led to the lethal imperial 
expansions ofthe latter nineteenth century. Both theorists also highlight the significance of these 
developments for the eventual emergence of eugenicist politics in twentieth century 
totalitarianism. 
The final theoretical convergence, again between Arendt and Foucault, centres upon a 
common recognition of the central importance of capitalist economics in shaping the phenomena 
they seek to explain. As we have seen, Foucault accounts for the birth of biopolitics from the 
techniques of 'biopower', both disciplinary and regulative, which developed alongside capitalism 
and whose care-of-life perspective attempted to alleviate a wide variety of health-related 
impediments to each individual's economic productivity. For Arendt, it was the birth of 
capitalism, and its transformation of previously stable property into volatile and fluid wealth, that 
bore primary responsibility for the chain of events leading from the double-production of 
superfluity, via late nineteenth century imperialism, to totalitarian rule in Germany and Russia. 
The primacy of capitalist economics in the creation of the Animal Laborans and our modem 
'society of laborers' -a public space transformed into a collective oikos, whose political leaderS 
campaign on their suitability as national housekeepers - further embeds the complicity of 
capitalism into Arendt's narrative of the vertiginous decline of Western civilisation. Further, 
Dana Villa notes how the role of such housekeeping, in terms of caring for and maximising the 
173 !bid, p.\78-179. 
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potential of the household's resources, provides a direct conceptual bridge between Arendt's 
oikos and Foucault's biopower, once population itself is accepted as a resource.174 Again, this 
line of argument is not explicitly treated by Agamben, although his relationship to the Arendtian 
and Foucauldian critiques of capitalism, to be discussed in the next Chapter, constitutes one of 
the central questions of this investigation. 
2.6 Points of Divergence 11: Agamben, Arendt, and Foucaudt 
Before making some preliminary concluding remarks on this section, it remams to 
examine significant points of divergence between the theorists, in order to fully grasp their inter-
relation. The divergences to be argued for here will be grouped into three broad categories; 
'methodological-perspectival', 'analytic', and 'speculative'. 
The first methodological-perspectival divergence exists between all three theorists, and 
centres upon the objects of their study. Placed upon a register based on their focus up()n specific 
institutions and events, Foucault retains a strict focus upon the tangible objects of his studies. 
We mentioned earlier that Braun discerns the separation that occurs between Foucault and 
Arendt when she leaves the firm ground of institutional analysis and begins to speculate upon 
intangibles such as the 'appeal' of totalitarianism to the modem individua1. 175 Foucault's studies 
on biopower have remained focussed upon institutions such as prisons and clinics and resist any 
expansion onto unstable/unreliable, theoretical ground, perhaps a factor in explaining his 
reticence to engage fully in a biopolitical analysis of the concentration camp system. At a mid-
point on this particular spectrum, though marginally closer to Foucault than Agamben, comes 
Arendt's analysis of totalitarianism. As noted, her work contains a certain transcendent element 
174 D. Villa, 'Postmodemism and the Public Sphere', in, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 3. 
(Sept. 2003), p.718. 
175 Braun, 'Biopolitics and Temporality .. .', p.l2. 
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and massive normative implications, yet the groundwork for her analysis is firmly historical. In 
assessing the birth of racism, and rise of totalitarianism and the camps, Arendt is careful to 
consistently emphasise the sheer historical contingency of these developments. 176 Richard 
Bern stein laments how ' [ o ]ne of the greatest sources of misunderstanding of Arendt results from 
the misreading of her as proposing explanatory theories ... [with] ... universal scope'. 177 Her 
attack upon the universalist claims of ideologies, in the distinctive Arendtian sense, is sufficient 
to support Bemstein's point. 178 Finally, toward the other end of this spectrum, Agamben's entire 
project in Homo Sacer proposes an alternative narrative of the totality of Western political 
history from the age of the ancient Greeks. Whilst he engages in some accomplished and 
detailed analysis of the specific institutions of the camps179, his an~ysis of the institutions in 
Homo Sacer is neither self-contained, along Foucauldian lines, or part of an investigation into a 
contingent component of a particular historical moment, as in Arendt. Agamben proposes the 
camps as the unrecognised 'paradigm' of the contemporary age, ties them to a historical 
narrative of millennia-long biopolitical undercurrents, and seeks to expose this process in order 
to fmd a 'new politics' based upon 'a field of research beyond the terrain defined by the 
intersection of politics and philosophy, medico-biological sciences and jurisprudence' .180 
Without endorsing any particular theorist's approach here, it is clear that each occupies a 
distinctive methodological-perspectival position, and that clear blue water exists between all on 
the possible extent of study beyond the definite events and institutions involved. 
176 On constellation distilling 'race-thinking' into 'racism'; p.178-184. On constellation creating camps; The 
Origins ... , p.447. 
177 R. Bemstein, 'Are Arendt's Reflections on Evil Still Relevant?', in, The Review of Politics, Vol. 70., No. 1 
(2008); p.65. 
178 See above, p.58-60. 
179 HomoSacer, p.166-l71., in particUlar. 
180 Homo Sacer, p.l66 (Camp as 'hidden matrix' of modem politics), and p.189. 
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The second, and closely related, methodological-perspectival divergence concerns the 
question ofnormativity in each theorist's work. In this case, the divergence is between Foucault, 
whose work does not emphasise the position of norms beyond the strict analysis of phenomena, 
and the work of Arendt and Agamben, both of which seek to open up a normative horizon 
beyond the objects of their study. Using their approaches towards politics to highlight this 
distinction, in the case Foucault and Arendt, Braun maintains that: 
Whereas ... Foucault takes a non-normative view, simply stating the substitution of 
one unappealing understanding of politics for another, Arendt takes a decisively 
normative perspective, mourning the loss of the public sphere and referring to an 
emphatic idea of pot itics as an activity that forms an end in itself. 181 
Agamben is also engaged in an explicitly normative project, insofar as he makes it clear that his 
intention is to 'find solid ground on which to oppose the demands of sovereign power' .182 
Although the details of their alternatives differ widely, both Agamben and Arendt explicitly aim 
their work toward achieving a definite political end, and such explicit commitment to an 
alternative political project marks a tangible note of dissent between their efforts and the more 
detached timbre of Foucault. 
The first of the 'analytical' divergences to be discussed here looks at differences in regard 
for both the concept of power and for the nation-state; in particular, it will be Arendt's positive 
regard for both power and the nation-state which will distinguish her analysis from those of 
Foucault and Agamben. Whilst power, for Foucault, remains at all times something to be 
181 Braun, 'Biopolitics and Temporality ... ', p.lO. 
182 Homo Sacer, p.l87. 
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suspicious of 83 , and for Agamben, remains an object to be fought, Arendt's defmition of power 
is different. For Arendt, power is inherently linked to action, and is in fact constituted as the 
potential for collective action. As such, any group of people seeking to act in the public sphere 
have, and use, power, power for Arendt is therefore key to reclaiming the political sphere from 
the depredations of the social. 184 Of course, Arendt recognises that power plays a role in the 
oppression of individuals, but she certainly does not conceive of it as synonymous with 
oppression, as is arguably the case for both Agamben and Foucault. Secondly, Arendt's 
treatment of the nation-state sets her further apart from both other theorists. Despite not giving 
an extensive treatment of the nation-state in his 'biopolitical' works, it is reasonable to 
extrapolate that, for Foucault, the nation-state forms the current centre of biopolitical power, 
which has taken control of human biology into its remit and keeps the individual as a relatively 
expendable component of its greatest resource, the population. 185 For Agamben, the nation-state 
is the geographical unit associated with the birth of popular sovereignty during the French 
Revolution, and its descent into crisis following the First World War is the trigger for the 
development of the concentration camps as new regulators of the birth-nation link. 186 In both 
cases, the approach to the nation-state is one of ambivalence, if not hostility. For Arendt, 
however, the nation-state is viewed as a positive institution for two reasons; firstly, she sees the 
nation-state as founded upon consent, a consent which is inimicable to the bourgeois lust for 
endless imperial expansion. 187 Secondly, Arendt sees the foundation ofthe nation-state as being 
the assertion of political equality between all citizens in the public sphere, an important principle 
183 Braun, 'Biopolitics and Temporality ... ', p.6. 
184 Alien, 'Power, Subjectivity, and Agency .. .', p.l37-138. 
185 Foucault, Society ... , p.239-241. 
186 Homo Sacer, p.129-133 (French Rev. and birth-nation link), and p.l74-176 (Birth-nation crisis and campsas 
regulator). 
187 The Origins ... , p.l25. 
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which is under threat in modern states. 188 In fact, Arendt's analysis discerns an inner-tension 
between the 'nation' and the 'state' and argues that it was the success of the 'nation' over the 
'state' that destroyed the nation-state189, and opened up the route toward racism and genocide in 
its naturalistic and ethnically discriminatory Weltanschauung. Arendt's positive regard for the 
nation-state puts some distance between her conceptions and those of her biopolitical successors. 
The remaining areas of 'analytical' divergence to be discussed centre upon the place of 
the camps within each theorist's work and therefore excludes Foucault, who made little mention 
of the camps in his 'biopolitical' works. The crucial difference between Agamben and Arendt 
surrounds the role of the camps within the totalitarian systems. Arendt famously characterises 
the concentration camp as a 'laboratory' in which the totalitarian belief that 'everything is 
possible' is put to the test The test itself is an experiment in total domination which, whilst it 
can only ever be truly effective in a totally dominated world, can at least be approximated in the 
hermetically sealed environs of the camp. 190 The purpose of the camp was the creation of 
something 'not quite human' from the human fodder that enter, the perfect citizen of the new 
totalitarian empires, denuded of spontaneity, plurality, and space for independent thought and 
action, the role of the camps was to perfect the assault upon human nature fundamental to 
totalitariail ideology. 191 For Agamben, Arendt's emphasis on totalitarian domination inverts the 
correct order of events; only because politics had already been 'transformed into biopolitics was 
it possible for politics to be constituted as totalitarian politics to a degree hitherto unknown' .192 
In addition to seeing domination as the condition of possibility ofthe camps, Agamben maintains 
the position of the camps as 'regulators' of the birth-nation link, sprung up in the wake of that 
188 /bid, p.290. 
189 /bid, p.275. 
190 The Origins ... , p.456. 
191 Bemstein, 'Are Arendt's Reflections on Evil...', p.69. 
192 HomoSacer,p.I20 
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link's destabilisation in the aftermath of post-World War One denationalisations. Both theorists, 
therefore, offer a different account for the central role of the camps within the totalitarian 
systems, and the chances of arguing for an articulation of the two are badly damaged by 
Agamben's attack upon the 'hypocritical' nature of asking 'how crimes of such atrocity could be 
committed against human beings' when the legal instruments which had stripped them of their 
rights and created the camps system had already ensured that 'everything was possible' .193 
The final, 'speculative', divergence concerns the question of alternatives or solutions to 
the phenomena in each theorist's work, and sketches a division between Arendt's solution, its 
dismissal by Agamben, and Agamben's own considered solution. Foucault's lack of concrete 
alternatives to biopolitical modernity, whilst theoretically consistent with his refusal to transcend 
the concrete phenomenal into areas of speculation, renders him divergent from both at the outset. 
For Arendt, the ultimate goal remains a reassertion of the traditional public sphere against its 
colonisation by 'the social' and the concomitant decline of Western civilisation into a society of 
labouring animals. Key to this objective is to assert our capacity for collective political 'action', 
which is itself dependent upon the theorist's ability to 'recover key distinctions ... which have 
been lost or obscured' 194, such as the 'public-private' distinction discussed previously. Attempts 
to engage in such action are aided by Arendt's distinctive conception of temporality; living in the 
gap 'between past and future', in what Kathrin Braun describes as the 'temporality of the 
interval' 195, human beings are able to introduce spontaneity, innovation and instability into a 
historical order, aware of and yet partially unchained from the long ties of tradition. 196 It is this 
unlimited huma:n potential for novelty, the fact that 'freedom .. .is identical with the fact that men 
193 !bid, p.l71. 
194 Villa, 'Introduction: The Development of Arendt's Political Thought', p.I2. 
195 Braun, 'Biopolitics and.Temporality .. .', p.5. 
196 Canovan, Hannah Arendt, p.68-69. 
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are being born and that therefore each of them is a new beginning ... [and] begins ... the world 
anew' 197, that forms the core of the Arendtian concept of 'natality', and her hope that the 
confluence of novelty with theory, shaped into 'action', may yet uncouple civilisation from its 
increasingly catastrophic trajectory. 
For Agamben, these ancient conceptual distinctions, such as between zoe and bios, have 
become so obscured as to be lost to political memory, and their restoration, pace Arendt, 
rendered impossible. 198 Agamben, therefore, insists upon the necessity of a forward motion, in 
Hussain and Ptacek's terms 'a working through of the indistinction between bios and zoe' .199 
This alternative relies upon a philosophical revolution, in which ancient ontological linkages, 
potentiality-actuality and zoe-bios amongst others, are severed in an attempt to negate the very 
existence of the conceptual borders upon which sovereign power, the power of decision, 
thrives.200 The breaking of relational boundaries, according to Agamben, form a first step in the 
creation of a 'new politics', an alternative in which 'bare life' becomes impossible to isolate 
from the political life, 'a bios that is only its own zoe', thus preventing its appropriation as the 
ultimate object of sovereign power.201 Agamben's project does little to elucidate the actual 
mechanics or structures of potential alternatives, he remains committed only to sketching the 
terrain of the problem to be overcome, in the hope that the accurate mapping of such terrain will 
work as signpost toward the conceptual ground upon which we call begin to theorise our future. 
To briefly recap, Hannah Arendt's political thought remains an expansive, nuanced, and 
relevant body of work whose concerns have only increased in prescience over the course of the 
197 The Ofigins ... , p.466. 
198 Homo Sacer, p.l87-l88. 
199 Hussain and Ptacek, 'Thresholds ... ', p.508. 
200 Homo Sacer, p.44-47. 
201 /bid' p.l88. 
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three decades since her death. Painting an intricate picture of the historical collisions and 
constellations that created the phenomenon of twentieth century totalitarianism, and expanding 
upon those roots to create a reflection on the deeper philosophical foundations of modern 'mass' 
societies, Arendt's contributions continue to inspire thinkers from a variety of disciplines and 
shades of political theory. For Agamben, Arendt is a key pole in his attempt to map a new 
conception of 'biopolitics', complementing, and occasionally correcting, the work of Foucault. 
Agamben balances each theorist against the other in an attempt to forge a reading of both that 
leads naturallY onto the terrain of Homo Sacer. Agamben uses Arendt's focus upon totalitarian 
systems, and concentration camps in particular, to counter Foucault's omission of the camps 
from his surveys of the institutional manifestations of 'biopower', a crucial step toward 
Agamben's own position that the camps represent the biopolitical 'paradigm' of modernity. In 
addition, her use of a 'vertical model' of power counteracts Foucault's interest in the 'capillary' 
level of power providing support for Agamben' s own juridical-institutional, and therefore highly 
centralised, concern with sovereign power and its hold on human life. Finally, by going beyond 
the discrete phenomena at the centre of her study, Arendt introduces a transcendent element to 
her analysis that complements Agamben's own orientation toward constructing a political 
alternative. 
Agamben's use of Arendt, to dull some of the edges of Foucault's analysis prior to his 
own appropriation, also worked in reverse. Foucault provided two key supplements to Arendt's 
theorisation which allowed for a closer fit to Agamben's fmal use. Firstly, Agamben sees in 
Foucauldian biopolitics an identification of the pivotal link between sovereign power and the 
human body, which is missing in Arendt. Secondly, Arendt's vast historical panoramas missed 
the tangible development of a 'care-of-life' perspective in nineteenth century European states. 
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This perspective, documented by Foucault in both of his 'biopolitical' works, had a huge role in 
the development of totalitarian eugenics and other forms of twentieth century biopolitics, and is a 
crucial element in understanding Agamben's own account of the developments leading to the 
holocaust. 
On the question of Arendt's own 'biopolitical' credentials, accepted by Agamben in 
relation to The Human Condition yet challenged as 'lacking' in The Origins of Totalitarianism, 
we found enough evidence to concur with Braun' s description of Arendt as a biopolitical theorist 
'avant la lettre'. In addition to her work on biological necessity, animallaborans, and the 'rise 
of the social' in the former work; her positions on the reduction of individuals to a level of 
'Pavlovian' specimens in the camps, and her analysis of the futility of human rights discourse 
when confronted by the individual who is only his own zoe, i.e. the stateless, demonstrate a 
profound concern with themes which can rightly be described as 'biopolitical' throughout her 
earlier Origins ... work. Agamben's failure to recognise this dimension of The Origins ... remains 
open to question. 
To investigate the success of Agamben's interpretation, this chapter moved on to sketch a 
number of convergences and divergences between the three theorists, in each case attempting to 
assess the plausibility of Agamben' s attempted co-ordination. The convergences were divided 
into 'historical' and 'theoretical'. The first three 'historical' convergences knitted Agamben and 
Arendt's analyses together. Firstly, both shared a conception of the First World War as a 
catastrophic focal point in modem history. Both theorists see 1914 as the year in which an 
'explosion' took place that destroyed the previous order of European civilisation and set in 
motion a train of destructive processes which are continuing in the contemporary age. Secondly, 
both agreed upon the centrality of the concentration camp to totalitarian systems, treating the 
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camp as the keystone institution of the Nazi and Stalinist regimes. Finally, both Agamben and 
Arendt recognised the events within the camps as being beyond any normal concept of 'crime', 
and noticed a key component of the camp systems being the sense of manufactured unreality that 
places the experience of the camps outside of any previous register of human knowledge. The 
final of the 'historical' convergences united all three theorists in a critique of modern society as 
being predicated upon mass organisation and 'labour' in the Arendtian sense. Although a 
critique of capitalist production relations is not exactly a unique attribute in twentieth century 
political theory, it provides an important intersection between all three theorists, and opens the 
way for the more substantial analysis of Agamben's relation to Marxian economic critique in 
Chapter Three. 
In terms of 'theoretical' convergence, we found all three theorists operating a critique of, 
in Braun's terms, 'processual temporality'. Arendt criticises totalitarian ideology on the grounds 
of its sacrifice of individuals to the supra-human processes of 'nature' and 'history'; for 
Foucault, 'biopower' itself is established in the attempt to map and take control of phenomena, 
such as disease, which move through individuals, who form an irrelevant subset of the 
population; finally, Agamben's 'biopolitics' is also a supra-human process which works its way 
through millennia without any end in sight, as each purifying purge of the collective body only 
creates a new layer of imperfection requiring elimination. Secondly, Agamben and Arendt share 
an indictment of Marxism; for the former, Marxism fails to ultimately grasp the reality of 
biopolitics and continues to build its emancipatory projects upon the very sovereign structures, 
such as the state of exception, that guarantee their continued failure; for the latter, Marx's pivotal 
mistake of conflating the distinct phenomena of 'labour' and 'work' within his concept of 
'labour' has doomed Marxism's emancipatory project to the creation of a mass labouring society 
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based upon blind necessity and unable to achieve true political freedom. Agamben also joins in 
Arendt's critique of humanitarianism divorced from politics; where she sees the sheer lack of 
effect of marginal figures, promoting human rights with the same gravitas and meaningful 
political support as fringe groups promoting animal welfare, Agamben sees a hidden complicity 
between the sovereign power responsible for the degradation of human beings to the state of 
'bare' life, and hypocritical Western humanitarian organisations, whose efforts are predicated 
upon, and bouild to maintain, their targets' status as mere 'bare' life. Finally, there are two 
'theoretical' convergences shared between Arendt and Folicault. The first centres on their 
acknowledgement of Darwin's theory of evolution as a vital political catalyst in the development 
of the nineteenth century. Arendt sees evolutionism as providing the key for the transformation 
of race-thinking into racism and providing justification for imperial atrocities in Africa in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century. Foucault sees evolutionism as the ingredient that allowed 
the care-of-life biopower of the preceding two centuries to turn into the bloody racisms of the 
twentieth century. The final convergence between the two centred upon a common 
acknowledgment of capitalist economic as the framework and prime mover of the historical 
developments they chose to map, Agamben' s apparent lack of such a perspective being the main 
concern ofthis project's final chapter. 
The divergences that exist between the different theorisations were divided into 
'methodological-perspectival', 'analytic', and 'speculative'. In the first category were two 
distinctions; firstly, in the objects of their study, we found a different level of transcendent 
analysis in each theorist. On one end of the scale, Foucault's work remained rooted to the 
excavation of questions or the focussed study of a particular institution; Arendt's work, whilst 
emphasising historical contingency and institutional study, also contained elements beyond the 
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initial objects of her analysis, moving into the ethereal realms of the 'appeal' of totalitarianism to 
the lonely, and attempts to undo the damage wrought by the 'rise of the social'; finally, at the 
other end of the scale, Agamben uses his institutional analysis to exhume a vast underground 
flow of 'biopolitics' that has conditioned Western politics for millennia, and attempts to pave the 
way for an entire renegotiation of human ontology. The point of stressing the divergence here is 
not to assert a value judgement as to which approach is best, but simply to point out that all three 
theorists are working within distinctly different theoretical horizons. Secondly, Arendt and 
Agamben's use of political theory toward a normative end, a political alternative to a failed 
modernity, puts clear blue water between themselves and Foucault who, at best, appears as a 
'crypto-normative' theorist who did not seek to posit any concrete political agendas through his 
work. 
The first ofthe 'analytical' divergences set Arendt apart from Agamben and Foucault in 
her positive regards for the nation-state, which she saw as founded upon a principle of equality 
and inimicable to imperialist expansion, and power itself, which she saw as constituted through 
collective political action and therefore able to enact positive change. Secondly, Agamben and 
Arendt diverge, and Foucault evades, on the question of the role of concentration camps in 
totalitarian political systems. For Arendt, a 'laboratory' set up to test whether 'everything is 
possible' and to destroy human nature; for Agamben, an institution designed to inscribe life into 
the territorial order once the FirSt World War had finally destroyed the traditional regulator of 
the birth-nation link. 
Finally, the 'speculative' divergence involves all three theorists. Foucault, Of course, did 
not posit any positive political solution to the phenomena he chose to study in his 'biopolitica\' 
works, choosing instead to focus on opening up areas for mapping which had previously been 
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uncharted. Arendt's proposal involved a rediscovery of the old political distinctions, particularly 
of 'public' and 'private', which had served the ancient democracies well enough until the 
economy made its transition into the political sphere and effaced the previous boundaries. 
Agamben critiques Arendt's proposal, arguing that the boundaries have been so long obscured 
that they are no longer accessible to our collective memory. Rather, Agamben argues, we must 
move through the current biopolitical morass and attempt to reconceive a politics freed from the 
tyranny of the sovereign decision, by creating an entirely new ontological horizon within which a 
new political subject will be able to operate. 
The success of Agamben's use of Arendt and Foucault as a launch pad for his own 
biopolitics will not be established by the strength of their convergences, but by the extent and 
significance of the divergences that exist between them. It is clear that neither Foucault nor 
Arendt alone would be a sufficient foundation for Agamben's analysis, and his delicate 
counterbalancing of each theorist allows him to take the concept of 'biopolitics' and marry it to a 
study of totalitarianism, sovereign power, and modem mass societies. Whilst their 
disagreements over the roles of concentration camps within totalitarian societies, and their 
widely divergent views on power and the nation-state, make for some uneasiness in the 
articulation, these elements alone are not substantial enough to undermine the fundamental 
similarity of perspective shared between Agamben and Arendt, taking place, as they do, outside 
of the 'biopolitical' paradigm we are seeking to explore. The dissonance that exists between all 
three on the possibility, and nature, of a political solution also fails to dent the concurrence of 
their analyses on the specific issues of biology, politics, and power. Whilst Arendt would 
certainly dispute Agamben' s rejection of her distinctions and his contention of modem historical 
amnesia, and Foucault would see Agambenian 'biopolitics' as extended beyond its own tangible 
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theoretical base, it is the role of each in allowing Agamben to construct his analysis of the 
problem, not the solution to that problem, that is important. On that account, Agamben's use 
remains valid, although, as with every appropriation of one thinker by another, somewhat 
stretched. 
In sum, Agamben's use of Arendt and Foucault benefits from its specificity, their purpose 
is to open a route by which Agamben can access the biopolitical terrain upon which he seeks to 
build his own theory. Foucauldian biopower and Arendtian totalitarianism do not sit 
comfortably together, but are proximate enough for Agamben to achieve their necessary 
articulation. One compelling question, however, remains. Agamben's apparent reticence in 
discussing the role of capitalist economics in his biopolitical schema, despite its explicit and 
repeated importance to the analyses of both of the theorists Agamben bases his biopolitics upon, 
becomes an ever more conspicuous absence from his scheme. Establishing some form of 
relation between Agamben's biopolitics and the economic structures and developments of 
Western history has become a paramount concern if we are to successfully evaluate the 
construction, application, and potential development of Agamben's concept of biopolitics. It is 
to these particular concerns, the next chapter will turn. 
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Chapter Three: 
Homo Sacer's Spectre of Man: 
The previous chapter attempted to map the grounds upon which Agamben brings 
Foucault and Arendt together in order to create the foundation of his own biopolitics. We have 
noticed both the theoretical confluences between each theorist and, of equal significance, the 
way in which areas of dissonance between Foucault and Arendt ate played off against each other 
by Agamben in order to achieve their articulation on his own terms. 
It is therefore relatively surprising to note Agamben's apparent omission of one level of 
critique common to both of his predecessors. We have already seen how Foucault's historical 
account of the rise of biopolitics implicates the rise of capitalist economics at the very inception 
of the phenomenon, its 'care of life' perspective essentially veiling an 'extension of labour' 
imperative. 1 Similarly, we have found Arendt's account of the historicl:ll currents which led to 
totalitarianism intricately bound up with capitalist development. From the origins of superfluous 
monies in the destruction of the feudal monastic order in Tudor England and superfluous people 
as casualties of the industrial division of labour, to the 'perpetual competition and expansion' 
mindset that fuelled nineteenth century imperialisms and the bourgeois hijack of the imperial 
state as insurer against commercial losses in the colonies, Arendt distinguishes herself in her 
nuanced treatment of the interaction of the economic logic of capitalism and the political and 
social developments that form the core object of her study.2 Given that Agamben's aim is to 
create a topography of biopolitics based upon the twin poles of Foucauldian biopolitics and 
1 See p.40-41. 
2 See p.53. 
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Arendtian totalitarianism3, the presence of a critique of capitalism in each respective work makes 
the absence of an explicit treatment of capitalism within Homo Sacer all the more puzzling. 
The aim of this final chapter is to establish the points at which Agamben's concept of 
biopolitics will benefit from a renewed emphasis upon the critique of capitalist economic 
relations, and the consideration of the question of labour as a central aspect of both Agamben' s 
historical analysis and prescriptions for future action. This investigation will be divided into 
three sections; firstly, this chapter will investigate Agamben's diagnosis of specifically modem 
biopolitics, suggesting a structural connection between his theorisation of 'bare life' and the 
Marxian notions of alienation, whilst also linking Agamben firmly into the Marxist tradition via 
his close relation to Guy Debord and his notion of the 'society ofthe spectacle' as the apogee of 
the commodity relation. Having argued for the inclusion of economic critique into Agamben's 
modem biopolitics, this chapter will then follow Agamben's narrative back to Aristotle and 
demonstrate that the exclusion of 'bare life' from the polis is as much a question of the 
problematic nature of labour as it is simply an exclusion of animalistic zoe from the bios of 
ancient Athenian democracy. This section will argue that Agamben's oversight of labour as a 
constitutive element of the excluded life at the heart of his study, and capitalism as a determining 
force in modem biopolitics, weakens his overall project and significantly hinders his ability to 
create a compelling theory of political action. The final section of this chapter will suggest how 
the inclusion of labour and capitalism as objects of analysis, can supplement Agamben' s call for 
a renegotiation of human ontology with a material focus that will ultimately provide Agamben 
with a feasible framework for concrete political action and, perhaps, fulfil a necessary 
precondition for the philosophical transvaluation at the heart of his project. 
3 Homo Sacer (hereafter, HS), p.3-4. 
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3.1 Labour and Life 1: Agamben, Marx, and Modern Biopolitics 
The question of Agamben's reticence in opening up his theory of modern biopolitics to 
an explicit analysis of its relationship to the dominant mode of production is deepened by his 
brief treatment of the work of Hans Reiter and other Nazi eugenicists toward the end of the book. 
At the opening of the chapter 'Politics, or Giving Form to the Life of a People', Agamben 
documents how many in the Natiomtl Socialist science establishment began to explicitly account 
for the biological lives of their citizens in terms of their monetary value to the state.4 Using 
concepts such as 'living wealth' and calling for a 'budget to take account of the living value of 
people', Reiter and others took up 'a logical synthesis of biology and economy' as their 
objective.5 However, the explicit economisation and commodification6 of human life in the 
thought of the world's 'first radically biopolitical state'7 is not then explored in any detail by 
Agamben, despite its obvious importance to the foundations and application of National Socialist 
biopolitics. The recommendations delivered by Reiter and others within these articles gain a 
deeper currency when we consider how Agamben himself considers the assumption of powers 
previously available only to the juridical sovereign by members of the state's medical-scientific 
establishment as a defining characteristic of the biopolitical age. 8 Therefore, when a rising force 
of biopolitical authority, in the most extreme example of a biopolitical state, explicitly 
acknowledges the economic context within which their conception of biological life is to be 
framed, it would not be unreasonable to assume such a development would lead into a substantial 
4 !bid, P.l44-145. 
s /bid, (Quotations are from Reiter, writing in 0. Vei'Schuer (ed.), Etat et Sante ... , Cited in Homo Sacer, p.145.) 
6 In these articles, each human life is treated as a possession of the state. Further, their worth, calculated in dollar 
terms, seems to pay no attention to individual attributes, but rather places monetary value on their biological 
existence in such a way as draws a direct parallel with the Marxian view of the commodity as ultimately defined by 
its abstract value as an interchangeable unit of economic exchange. 
7 HS, p.143. 
8 Ibid., p.122, and p.159. See also, Norris, 'Giorgio Agamben and the Politics of the Living Dead', p.52. 
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new line of enquiry. Unfortunately, Agamben eschews the opportunity to further explore the 
relationship of Nazism and biopolitics with their respective economic contexts, a move which 
would have drawn his analysis of totalitarianism into much tighter step with Foucault's 
understanding of Nazism as the 'paroxysmal development' of modem biopower.9 
This particular line of enquiry, tracing the economic contours of Agambenian biopolitics, 
also throws up a striking structural parallel between the notion of 'bare' life in its modem setting 
and the Marxist conception of alienated labour. It is possible to discern four points of 
intersection between both theories that may indicate a potentially unobserved connection, and 
should at least demonstrate the importance of considering labour as a factor in the constitution of 
homo sacer. Firstly, we have already seen that, for Agamben, 'bare' life exists within each and 
every individual 10, and that it is produced, isolated, and held as an object of sovereign power. 11 
For Marx, it is the workers' labour, or rather their abstract and interchangeable labour-power12, 
which becomes virtually a separate entity, a commodity they must sell for an equivalent 
monetary price13, and therefore a part of themselves which, to use Agamben's description of 
'bare' life, man 'separates and opposes [to] himselr 14 in order to survive. Further, Agamben's 
identification of 'bare' life as a product of the governing sovereign power is echoed in the 
Marxist position that capitalist production relations themselves are responsible for the production 
of 'man as a commodity, the commodity-man' .15 In both cases, therefore, we see the 
phenomenon of a governing framework of power producing an internal division within each and 
9 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, p.259. 
10 -Homo Sacer, p.124, and p.l40. 
11 /bid, p.6. (production), and p.9. 
12 K. Marx, Capital: A New Abridgement (D. McLellan, ed.); Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1999. p.20. 
13 K. Marx, Grundrisse (Tr. M Nicolaus); London; Penguin Books, 1993. p.281-282. 
14 HS, p.8. 
15 K. Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Tr. M. Milligan); New York; Prometheus Books, 
1988. p.86. (Italics in original) 
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every one ofits subjects, before isolating one element resulting from this division and holding it 
as an object of its continuing control. 
The second point of intersection between bare life and alienated labour centres around the 
effect each has had on the societies built upon their foundations. For Agamben, modern society 
has predicated itself upon the 'liberation of zoe', making biological life its leading value. 16 
However, the result of this 'liberation', in the West at least, has been to reduce the population to 
the animalistic nihilism of ma_ss consumption and hedonistic excess, a situation of 
'unprecedented ruin' .17 The decadence Agamben sees at the heart of the modem democratic 
project also finds an analogy in Marx's observation that the alienation of man from his own 
higher capacities, insofar as his labour is expropriated and his product denied him, leads the 
worker to find freedom only in the most base of human activities: 
A_s a result [of the alienation of labour], therefore, man (the worker) no longer 
feels himself to be freely active in any but his animal functions- eating, drinking, 
procreating, or at most in his dwelling and in dressing up, etc,; and in his human 
functions he no longer feels himselfto be anything but an animal. 18 
Therefore, beyond the production and capture of an integral part of every man, we also see the 
governing powers in Agamben and Marx, the sovereign exception and the capitalist mode of 
production respectively, set man's political development on a trajectory which results in the 
bestialisation of man and the valorisation of his most animal traits. 
16 HS, p.9-10. 
17 !bid 
18 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts ... , p.74. 
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The third structural convergence that takes place between these two phenomena centres 
upon the way in which both bare life and alienated labour enter into a dialectical relation with the 
powers that produce them, and become the central threat to their respective powers. To begin 
this comparison with Marx, whose position is most famously distilled into Capital's Chapter 32; 
the logic of capitalism leads to a centralisation of economic resources in the hands of a dwindling 
number of bourgeoisie, the corollary of which is the ever-increasing socialisation of labour, 
which produces an organised, unified proletariat, whose expropriation of the capitalist 
expropriators socialises both property and production, allowing for the end of the coerced 
alienation of man from his own labour. 19 For Agamben, the product of sovereign power, bare 
life, is also the bacillus responsible for infecting and fatally undermining the birth-nation link, 
which had functioned for millennia as the locus of sovereign power?0 Bare life is an 'exception' 
which sovereign power attempts to contain, yet every attempt to contain and eradicate the 
problem only reproduces it anew and leads us still further into universalised emergency.21 This 
has been recognised by Jenny Edkins in her essay Whatever Politics, which points to bare life as 
'the constitutive outside of sovereignty', arguing for its problematic nature as 'the excess that 
threatens to disclose the paradoxical instability and impossibility of sovereignty in its claim to be 
a form of governance or ad.ministration of life' .22 In both examples, then, we see a common 
thread in the process whereby the unfolding logic of the dominant power leads to its creation of 
an entity which simultaneously destabilises the very order that called it into being. 
The final point at which Agamben's bare life and Marx's alienated labour show signs of a 
distinct structural similarity is in terms of the eschatological prescriptions each author 
19 Capital, p.378-380. 
20 HS, p.\31-133. 
21 !bid, p.l74-176. 
22 J. Edkins, 'Whatever Politics', in M. Carlaco and S. DeCaroli (eds.), Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life, 
p.86. 
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extrapolates from their respective conditions. For Agamben, his prescription for emancipation 
from sovereign power centres upon the creation of a 'bios that is only its own zoe'23 , a life in 
which it is impossible to isolate anything corresponding to a 'bare' life, in order to prevent the 
formation of any sovereign power, which holds bare life hostage to its constant decision. This 
new 'form-of-life', an inseparable unity of a life previously subjected to internal fracture, is an 
image again reminiscent of the Marxian endpoint of the abolition of alienated labour. The fmal 
expropriation of the capitalists' property and means of production allows man to re-connect with 
his species-being as free producers, working toward his own, and his society's, full development 
through 'free, conscious activity', and the non-alienated production that forms 'his active species 
life' .24 The important convergence here is that, in both theories, the key to success is a form of 
unity which does not permit the introduction of caesurae, and the isolation, alienation, or 
colonisation of any part ofail individual's life in the interests of a hostile system of power. 
These four convergenCes between the Agambenian notion of bare life and the Marxian 
notion of alienated labour are certainly not designed to reduce one to the other, or even to posit 
any strict equivalence. The fact that such similarities exist undoubtedly add to the call for the 
deeper consideration of the relation of labour to the problem of bare life in Agamben's 
biopolitics; whilst neither concept exhausts itself in the other, it would be equally erroneous to 
conceive of the two as entirely unrelated. In fact, the only theoretical step necessary to positing a 
more substantial relationship here would be to argue that the powers responsible for the 
production of these phenomena are convergent, or coextensive, an argument which was taken up 
by Agamben himself in the early 1990s. 
23 HS, p.l88. 
24 Economic and Philosophic Mariuscfipts, p.76-77. 
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Whilst positing a structural proximity between Agambenian 'bare' life and Marxian 
alienated labour remains a speculative gesture towards a modified understanding of the condition 
of homines sacri in the Western world, the proximity of early Agamben to the continental legacy 
of Marx is much clearer cut. ln the essay 'Notes on Politics', Agamben notes an ongoing 
transition in the post-Cold War world typified by the expansion of the 'integrated spectacle' as 
the dominant condition of govemment(s).25 Agamben takes the term 'integrated spectacle' 
directly from Guy Debord's 1988 work Comments on the Society of the Spectacle?6 The 
Comments revisit and reassess aspects of Debord's Society of the Spectacle, published two 
decades previously. The eponymous 'spectacle' is described by Debord as the 'result and the 
goal of the dominant mode of production'27 ; it stands for the totality of economiC and social 
relations in a society in which the apogee of commodity fetishism, the ultimate eclipse of all use-
values by abstract exchange-value28, has not only colonised social life, but has rendered 
humanity incapable of seeing anything beyond the commodity itself and the unreal world of 
images and representation generated around it.29 People are reduced to role of alienated 
spectators, incessantly exposed to 'the ruling order's non-stop discourse about itself, its never-
ending monologue of self-praise' which is transmitted across a media newly concentrated into 
the hands of a ruling elite, and working to sustain and strengthen the grip of the commodity 
economy as a whole. 30 
ln the 1967 work, Debord makes the distinction between two forms of contemporary 
spectacle, the concentrated and the diffuse. The relative lack of commodities in countries of the 
25 G. Agamben, 'Notes on Politics', in, G. Agamben, Means Without End: Notes on Politics (Tr. V. Binetti and C. 
Casarino); Minneapolis; University of Minnesota Press, 2000. p.l09. 
26 G. Debord, Comments on the Society of the Spectacle (tr. M. Imrie); London; Verso, 1988. 
27 G. Debord, Society of the Spectacle (tr. K. Knab); London; Rebel Press, 2004. p.8 
28 Ibid., p.23 
29 !bid, p.21. 
30 Ibid., P.l3. 
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Second and Third World leads to a concentration of production and consumption in the domestic 
bureaucratic elites, the enforcement ofthe system by permanent police-state terror, and a fixation 
on a dictatorial leader as the 'master of everyone else's nonconsuinption' .31 In the affluent West, 
meanwhile, the material abundance of commodities leads to an order in which individual 
commodities vie with each other for consumption within the 'unified spectacle' of a society of 
'total commodity production', the apex of modem capitalism. 32 Debord's major innovation in 
his Comments was to diagnose the development of a third form, the integrated spectacle, which 
combines elements of each, predicated upon the general historical victory of the diffuse33 , though 
each form had noticeably evolved: 
As regards concentration, the controlling centre has now become occult: never to 
be occupied by a known leader, or clear ideology. And on the diffuse side, the 
spectacle has never before put its mark to such a degree on almost the full range 
of socially produced behaviour and objects34 
It would be impossible for Agamben to appropriate the Debordian notion of the 
'integrated spectacle' as an element of his political analysis without taking on the myriad Marxist 
presuppositions with which it is suffused, and Agamben attempts no such thing. In an essay on 
Debord's 1988 work, he describes the author's output as 'the clearest and most severe analysis of 
the miseries and slavery that by now has extended its dominion over the whole planet' 35, asserts 
the centrality of the commodity fetish in the work of Marx, and criticises influential structuralist 
31 /bid, p.Jl-32. 
32 Ibid., p.32. 
33 /bid, p.8. 
34 /bid., p.9. 
35 Agamben, 'Marginal Notes on Commentaries on the Society ofthe Spectacle', in Means Without End. .. , p.73. 
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Marxist Louis Althusser's injunction to disregard the opening of Capital as demonstrating the 
contagion of scientific Marxism with residual traces ofHegelian philosophy.36 Later in the 
same collection of essays, Agamben argues that the collapse of communism around the globe has 
hastened the expansion of the 'integrated spectacle' as the dominant, and universalising, 
trajectory of contemporary power. 37 Regardless of their prior political structures, Agamben sees 
the whole gamut of state forms across the globe succumbing to the imperatives of 'spectacular 
capitalism' and undergoing radical change. 38 This transformation, equivalent to the upheaval in 
antediluvian social and political structures during the first industrial revolution, has so 
transformed the traditional categories of political theory (sovereignty, people, democracy, etc.), 
that they have become unusable without radical re-conception.39 Echoing Debord's analysis of a 
'spectacular' reality that has divorced itself from its material bases in society and colonised every 
manner of institution, cultural tradition, and mode of communication, whilst maintaining the 
facade of their former appearance as a mask, Agamben describes contemporary politics as a 
'devastating experiment that disarticulates and empties institutions and beliefs, ideologies and 
religions, identities and communities all throughout the world' .40 It is clear that, in the early 
Agamben, Debord's analysis, and its Marxist underpinnings, were central to his understanding of 
contemporary political phenomena, and for theorising potential courses of action. The shift 
between the Agamben of Means Without End to the Agamben of Homo Sacer, excoriating 
Marxist political theory for its failure to recognise the essential structure of sovereign power and 
thereby working unknowingly to perpetuate it4 \ appears to be a dramatic departure. 
36 /bid, p.74-76. 
37 
'Notes on Politics', p.l 09. 
38 /bid 
39 Jbid, p.l09-110. 
40 /bid, p.llO. 
41 HS, p.l2. 
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The apparent divergence between Agamben's works is a central point in Paul Passavant's 
essay The Contradictory States ofGiorgio Agamben.42 Passavant's critique is twofold;. firstly, he 
argues that Agamben employs two contradictory theories of state in his earlier and later works, 
and secondly, that Agamben's prescriptions for resistance and radical political action are 
rendered inoperable by the transition from his earlier state theory to his later formulation. 
According to Passavant, Agamben's use of Debord and Marx in tracing the deepening 
integration of state and economy, and his assertion of exchange value's attainment of 'absolute 
and irresponsible sovereignty over life in its entirety'43, demonstrate the determining power of 
the economy over the state in Agamben's earlier works. Passavant goes so far as to declare that, 
in Agamben's early theory ofthe state, it is the economy which is ultimately sovereign.44 In fact, 
the state itself is being eroded and weakened by the expansion of the spectacle, which is forcing 
an unprecedented uniformity of experience around the world45, a development upon which 
Agamben builds a theory of action based upon an emergent worldwide class of 'global petty 
bourgeoisie' whose common experience of spectacle provides the basis of their transition to a 
new fortn of political community.46 Passavant therefore detects an about-turn in Agamben's 
state theory when faced with his later works, such as Homo Sacer and State of Exception, in 
which Agamben accords the state not only supremacy over the economy, but also the power to 
define and to produce discrete forms of life itself.47 Here, the state figures as the determining 
actor, and Agamben criticises the economic fixation of modem Marxist and anarchist thought for 
their all too hasty marginalisation of the 'arcanum imperii', the ancient secrets of sovereign 
42 P. Passavant. 'The Contradictory State ofGiorgio Agamben', in, Political Theory, Vol. 35., No. 2. (April2007); 
pp.l47-174. 
43 Agamben, 'Marginal Notes on .. .', cited in, Passavant. p.150. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., p.l51. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., p.153. 
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power and the entity of the state, both of which pre-date capitalist relations of production by 
millennia. 48 
Whilst correctly identifying a change of emphasis, however, Passavant's charge 
overlookS an important piece of this particular puzzle, as does Agamben in his 'arcanum imperii' 
critique of Marxism. At the heart of both Agamben's concept of the state, and his theory of 
biopolitics, rests the Aristotelian distinction between two forms of life, zoe and bios, and the 
exclusion of 'bare' life from the political realm at the foundation of the polis. In order to fully 
explore Passavant's challenge, and foundations on which Agamben builds his arcanum imperii 
argument, it is necessary to transport our own analysis back to the Classical Age. 
3.2 Labour and Life 11: Agamben, Aristotle, and the Birth oftbe City 
According to Agamben, 'bare' life is excluded from the polis, and yet, as both the 
condition of possibility of the polis and as the 'life [that] had to transform itself into good life' 
through politics, remains implicated at its centre.49 The grounds upon which biological life was 
excluded from the public realm in ancient Athenian democracy is therefore of great importance 
to our understanding of the link between sovereign power and 'bare' life at its inception. In The 
Human Condition, the work cited by Agamben in his discussion of the foundations of his 
biopolitics50, Hannah Arendt argues that, for Plato and Aristotle, any form of life shared in 
common with other animals 'could not be fundamentally human'. 51 This point of analysis is 
echoed by Agamben in the essay 'Form-of-Life', where he argues for the Greek distinction 
between: 
48 /bid, also; HS, p. 12. 
49 Homo Sacer, p.7. 
so Ibid., p.3-4. 
SI H. Arendt, The Human Condition, p.24. 
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... zoe, which expressed the fact of living common to all living beings (ap.imal~, 
humans, or gods), and bios, which signified the form or manner of living peculiar 
to a single individual or group. 52 
Yet neither Arendt nor Aristotle exclude 'bare' life from the political arena solely on the basis of 
its animalistic simplicity or its commonality with other species, and Agarnben is only partially 
correct when he attributes to Arendt the argument that the 'primacy of natural life over political 
action' is responsible for the political decline of modernity.53 In fact, Arendt's account of both 
the original confinement of zoe to the oikos, and the proto-biopolitics of The Human Condition, 
become clearer when we remember that, for Arendt, 'bare' or 'natural' life is also inherently tied 
to that most problematic of human activities, labour. 
In her chapter on 'The Polis and the Household', Arendt makes clear that it is labour, and 
not the simple fact of natural life, that forms the basis for the exclusion of zoe from the polis: 
No activity that served only the purpose of making a living, of sustaining only the 
life process, was permitted to enter the political realm 54 
Labour, the activity of 'making a living', is confined to the oikos as a result of its coercive and 
unequal nature; labour is dictated by blind, biological necessity55, is typified by the relentless 
52 Agamben, 'Form-of-Life', in Means Without End, p.3. 
sJ HS, p.4. 
54 The Human Condition, p.37. (My italics) 
ss /bid, p.83-84. 
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repetition of futile tasks56, prevents individuals from engaging in meaningful, and fully human, 
activities57, and is geared only toward the destructive consumption of matter.58 Those who 
laboured under their master's command in the household had to be excluded from the public 
realm, lest the necessary iniquity of servitude undermine the essential equality which formed the 
sine qua non of political community.59 Arendt's critique of modernity is precisely that, having 
escaped its banishment to the household and invaded the public sphere, the principle 
characteristics of labour, necessity, futility, the 'eternal recurrence'60 of 'making a living', have 
colonised the political realm and destroyed the traditional foundations of the polis, the condition 
of free and equal citizens speaking and acting 'amongst one's peers' in the public realm.61 
Arendt's reading of the ancient banishment of 'bare' life from the political centre is, at its heart, 
a question of the problematic nature of labour, and Agamben's rendering of her critique in his 
narrative ofthe origins ofbiopolitics, would be more complete ifthis were taken into account. 
Taking a distinctly Agambenian track, and returning to Aristotle himself, it is also 
possible to discern the elementary importance of the question of labour at the foundation of the 
Athenian polis. In the introduction to Homo Sacer, Agamben uses Aristotle's The Politics to 
counterpose natural zoe and the politically qualified bios that takes inherent priority.62 In 
addition to the theoretical exclusions of 'bare' life found by Agamben and Arendt, the Athenian 
polis was famously marked by the physical exclusions of women, children, foreigners, and 
slaves. Each of these exclusions is described by Aristotle in The Politics; women, children and 
slaves find themselves excluded on the grounds of their nonexistent, or merely inadequate, 
56 /bid. p.98. 
57 lbid, p.84. 
58 /bid, p.IOO. 
59 Ibid., p.32. 
60 lbid, p.46. 
61 /bid, p.41. 
62 HS, p.2. 
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capacity for rational deliberation63, whilst the foreign-born fall afoul of the 'practical' 
requirement of citizen descent on both sides of any individual's ancestry. 64 In attempting to 
sketch further the problematic nature of labour, discerned by Arendt, the case of the slave's 
exclusion from the polis proves doubly instructive. Firstly, early on in The Politics, Aristotle 
founds his distinction between master and slave; ruler and ruled, on the material, and arguably 
biopolitical, criterion of the latter's physical capacity for labour: 
For the element that can use its intelligence to look ahead is by nature ruler and by 
nature master, whilst that which has the bodily strength to do the actual work is by 
nature a slave, one of those ru_led. 65 
It is true that, in Aristotle's argument, slavery is not linked to the process of economic production 
per se66, its purpose is rather to 'minister to action' and facilitate the good life of his master.67 
However, in his chapter introduction to 'The Slave as a Tool', Trevor Saunders challenges 
Aristotle's 'bias in favour of a "gentlemanly life'" and presents the historical counterfactual that 
slaves were, in fact, a central element of economic production 'in factories and mines and on 
farms'. 68 Therefore, it is possible to recognise the presence of labour, or rather physical labour-
power, as a defining characteristic of the excluded slave whilst, at the same time, locating the 
slave within the system of economic production that forms the material condition of possibility 
of the polis itself. 
63 Aristotle, The Politics (Tr. T. A Sinclair, revised by T. J. Saunders); London; Penguin Classics, 1992. Book 1, 
Ch.13; p.95. 
64 /bid, Book 3, Ch. 2; p.171-172. 
65 /bid, Book 1, Ch. 2; p.57. 
66 Arendt also advances this line of argument in The Human Condition, p.84. 
67 The Politics, Book 1, Ch. 4; p.65. Here we see an example of the distinction between 'labour' and 'action', of 
such importance to Arendt. 
68 Ibid., p.64. 
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The second echo of labour's difficult relationship to the political realm is found in the 
chapter 'Ought Workers to be Citizens?', in which Aristotle dismisses the argument that those 
engaged in labour can be included in the polis as citizens because the nature of their work is such 
that they would not have the time necessary to fulfil the civic duties of the citizen: 
But the best state will not make the mechanic a citizen. But even if he is to be a 
citizen, then at any rate what we have called the virtue of a citizen cannot be 
ascribed to everyone, nor yet to free meil alone, but simply to those who are in 
fact relieved of necessary tasks.69 
Whilst Aristotle makes his point with reference to free time, it should be clear that such free time 
is necessarily bought by the expropriation of the labour of others. Aristotle's position that it is 
'impossible, while living the life of a mechanic or hireling, to occupy oneself as virtue 
demands'70 is a corollary of the fact that the citizens of the Athenian polis enjoyed the freedom 
to occupy themselves 'as virtue demands' precisely insofar as they enjoyed the fruits of their 
mechaniCs' labour, of their slaves' 'minister[ing] to action' in the name of their master's 
comfort. 
In the same way in which bare zoe forms the condition of possibility of man's bios and 
yet remains excluded from it, the expropriated labour of the slave provides the material condition 
of possibility of the polis itself, in terms of quarried marble and paved roads amongst other 
things, and of the citizens within, of the food they eat, the clothes they wear and the houses in 
which they live, yet goes on to form the very criterion by which the participation of the worker in 
69 /bid, Book 3, Ch. 5.; p.l84. (My italics) 
70 /bid 
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the polis itself is disallowed. This compelling structural parallel is no coincidence. The 
management of the problem of labour, and the management of the expropriation of labour, have 
always been central concerns to the foundation and constitution of the polis. The aim of this 
argument is not to reduce the nature of Athenian citizenship to a crude economic foundation but 
rather, in the spirit of this entire project, to suggest that recognising the significance of the 
problem of labour to the foundation of the polis deepens our understanding of the issue, opens up 
an alternative answer to Agamben's arcanum imperii argument, and perhaps offers a new 
trajectory of escape from our current biopolitical impasse. 
By arguing for the centrality of the problem of labour to the original constitution of the 
Athenian polis, we achieve more than a simple vindication of a materialist historical analysis. 
One further consequence is that Agamben's references to the arcanum imperii of sovereign 
power become more complicated. In order to grasp the full nature and implications of this 
challenge, it is essential to understand the two main functions Agamben's atcanum imperii motif 
appears designed to fulfiL Firstly, it works to distance Agamben from what he sees as the fatal 
misdirection at the heart of Marxist and anarchist critiques of power, and their revolutionary 
strategies. By locating the nexus of sovereign power deep within the metaphysical conditions of 
Western politics, Agamben can argue for a division which precedes the conflict of opposing 
social classes and, by virtue of his more accurate analysis, avoids the associated theory of the 
state which Agamben describes as the 'reef on which the revolutions of our century have been 
shipwrecked.' 71 Secondly, Agamben's argument also allows him to open up a deep chronology, 
locating the headwaters of modern biopolitics within the ontological conditions of pre-historic 
humanity. This retrospective location forms the basis upon which Agamben makes the 
71 HS, p.l2. 
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transition, as discussed by Passavant, from his earlier economic determinism to a position in 
which the sovereign state gains a determining power over all within its boundaries. However, 
our previous excursus into the problem of labour at the foundation of the polis indicates that, 
pace both Passavant and Agamben, the distinction between each period of the latter's work may 
have been overstated. 
To the extent to which Agamben locates a determining cleavage in the zO'e/bios 
distinction, he does find a division both more basic and, given that its fault line runs through 
each individual human being, a more pernicious division than Marx's class distinction or 
Schmitt's friend-enemy divide. However, the alienation of man from his own labour, the sine 
qua non of the worker and therefore the basis of the class division of which Agamben speaks, is 
equally fundamental and pernicious. When Agamben argues for the biopolitical fracture 
preceding any class divide, he neglects not only the fact that the alienation of labour does so too, 
but also the fact that, if we are to follow Aristotle and Arendt, as he does in order to fully 
construct his analysis, then we are compelled to posit the connection of labour to 'bare' life, to 
which it is inseparably attached and, as a result, equally inadmissible to the polis. Whilst 
Agamben's chronology allows him to criticise Marxist analysis for casting aside the ancient 
secrets of the state too easily in relation to modem economic developments, he fails to mention 
that both theories share a common premise in the form of the problematic relationship of labour 
to the concepts of freedom and political community. Finally, in order to maintain the full 
autonomy of an ancient sovereign power when faced with the modem mode of economic 
production, Agamben would have to provide a distinctive account of the ability of an established 
power structure to resist encroachment, assimilation, or usurpation by another. Yet this very 
process forms a central component of his earlier theory of the state. Further, similar motifs can 
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be found within the work of each of Agamben's theoretical forebears; in Foucault's theory of 
biopower's encroachment onto the territory of sovereignty72 ; in Atendt's theorisation of the 
penetration of 'the social' into the pre-existing public realm73; in Debord's notion of the 
'spectacle' as a system that disguises the fact that it has 'only just arrived' 74; and 110t least in 
Agamben' s own later theory of growing assumption of sovereign power by the scientific-medical 
establishment. In short, there are substantial impediments to Agamben's deployment of the 
arcanum imperii argument as a critique of MarXism, and these also fonn the grounds for positing 
a deeper continuity between the early and later projects of Agamben, despite his assertions to the 
contrary. It now remains for us to draw the implications of the re-integration of the Marxian 
analyses ofthe problem oflabour for Agamben's understanding ofpossible political action. 
3.3 Potentiality, Power, and Praxis: Re-reading Agamben's 'New Politics' 
Agamben' s discussion of political action in Homo Sacer begins with an engagement with 
the notion of 'constituting power', the primary, anomic force which creates a legal-political order 
-as distinct from the 'constituted power' which, in Benjaminian parlance, struggles to preserve 
it.75 It is from Antonio Negri's notion of constituting power as an ontologiCal, rather than 
political, phenomenon that Agamben takes his cue to return to 'first philosophy': 
The strength ofNegri's book [R Potere Constituente] lies ... in the final perspective 
it opens insofar as it shows how constituting power, when conceived in all its 
radicality ceases to be a strictly political concept and necessarily presents itself as 
72 Foucault, Society ... , p.241. 
73 Arendt, The Human Condition, p.46-47. 
74 Debord, Comments ... , p.IO. 
75 HS, p.39-41. 
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a category of ontology ... [this] unresolved dialectic between constituting power 
and constituted power opens the way for a new articulation of the relation 
between potentiality and actuality 76 
Following this philosophical track, Agamben returns to Aristotle's treatment of the relationship 
of potentiality and actuality to find a formula for escape. Following Aristotle, Agamben 
acknowledges potentiality as both a force to be and simultaneously a force not to be, and 
challenges the pre-existing ontological priority of the actual over the potential which has formed 
the foundation of Western metaphysics.77 In doing so, Agamben is seeking to disrupt the 
conceptual boundaries between the material and the (im)potential, in such a way as to posit each 
as completely separate, and thus abolish the relational border which necessarily calls forth a 
sovereign decision upon its content.78 Agamben finds a model for the resulting concept of 
political action in the form of Herbert Melville's eponymous 'Bartleby', whose ultimate 
passivity and resistance to the sovereign decision, embodied in his repeated mantra of 'I would 
prefer not to' in answer to every demand made of him, retains the full power of his potentiality 
precisely in his suspension of deciding upon or enacting any possible application of it.79 Taken 
alongside his call for a new human ontology, Agamben's use of Bartleby and his radical refusal 
to perpetuate the sovereign decision, presents us with a distinctively philosophical model of 
resistance. However, whilst undoubtedly a seamless piece of thought, we must at this point 
question whether Agamben's notion of the emancipatory potential of first philosophy risks 
condemning his innovative biopolitical analysis to an insurmountable practical impotence. 
76 Ibid., p.43-44. 
77 !hid, p.45-46. 
78 Ibid., p .4 7. 
79 Ihid, p.48. 
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In his wide-ranging pluralist critique of Agamben, William Connolly argues that the 
foflller's theories only serve to create a 'historical impa5se', and that, devoid of any concrete 
proposal to overcome the logic of sovereignty, Agamben leaves the reader trapped in 'a paradox 
that [Agamben] cannot imagine how to transcend'.8° Connolly also notes the way in which 
Agamben's theoretical elegance is bought at the expense of a much messier, material reality.81 
Agamben's deployment of Bartleby as an instructive case is also swiftly disassembled upon its 
application to the realities of sovereign power by Paul Passavant, who notes the simplicity with 
which Agamben's sovereign can 'decid[e] to kill or otherwise incapacitate the recalcitrant 
Bartleby' .82 Whilst acknowledging the potential effectiveness of the Bartleby model in a 
Foucauldian system of dispersive/'decentred' power structures, Passavant correctly notes the 
incongruity between Agamben' s description of the architecture of contemporary sovereign 
power and his plainly inadequate model for political action. 83 
One way to account for the difficulties encountered by Agamben in his search for a 
means of resistance to power is to challenge the necessity ofits philosophical base. When faced 
with the abject existence of the bare life he describes, Agamben is forced to trace the roots of his 
phenomenon back into a primordial metaphysical riddle. Yet the aim of this Chapter has been to 
describe precisely the way in which Agambenian bare life is not so 'bare' at all, it is actually 
inextricably linked with the capacity and materiality of labour, and,. if we accept the 
(re)integration of labour into the concept of bare life, it becomes possible to discern a potential 
form of political action commensurable with the concept of praxis. This very transition echoes 
in microcosm the transformation of abstract philosophy into concrete social theory which formed 
80 W. Connolly, 'Tile Complexity of Sovereignty', in, J. Edkins, V. Pin-Fat and M. Shapiro (eds.), Sacred Lives: 
Pawer in Global Politics; New York; Routledge, 2004. p.26-27. 
81 /bid, p.29-30. 
82 Passavant, The Contradictory State ... , p.l59. 
83 Ibid., p.l59-l60. 
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the goal of Man{'s re-orientation of the Hegelian dialectic.84 In the spirit of Marx's eighth 
'thesis on Feuerbach', that the 'mysteries which mislead theory to mysticism find their rational 
solution in human practice' 85, we are seeking to contend that Agamben's ontologisation of the 
condition of bare life results from his failure to grasp its inherent connection to the social 
problem of labour. That, as opposed to a philosophical mystification, which necessarily follows 
its own momentum and delivers him over to an equally mystified theoretical solution, 
Agamben's analysis could benefit from the recognition that bare life is tied to a material, socio-
economic phenomenon and, as such, can also be followed to a material solution. 
In fact, it is possible to conceive of a material and economic contestation, and 
revolutionary transformation in our current relations of production, as the necessary prerequisite 
to Agamben's philosophical revolution. One need not be a Marxian materialist to acknowledge 
that the organisation of the economy forms the primary determinant ofthe individual's everyday 
life, of his relationship with his own labour, the product of his labour, and his relationships with 
others. Further, one need not be a brutal cynic to imagine that, of the six billion souls inhabiting 
the earth, only a small proportion may be able to conceive of a state of ontological non-
relationality as the precondition for an escape from sovereign power. However, if this 'labour 
thesis' linking bare life to alienated and expropriated labour were to be accepted, then it is also 
possible to accept the corollary that a change in the conditions of labour can also equal a change 
in the conditions of life, both bare and qualified. Ultimately, the reorganisation of the economy 
would itself constitute a reorganisation of social relations, and the reorganisation of the ways in 
which we interact with each other and with our own nature, with our own being and the being of 
84 The best analysis ofthis transitiol}, and its crucial components, that I have yet come across is Marcuse's in, H. 
Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (2nd ed.); London; Routledge, 2000., p.258-262. 
85 K. Marx. 'Theses on Feuerbach', in, Marx!Engels Selected Works in One Volume; Moscow; Progress Publishers, 
1968. p.30. 
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others, would constitute nothing less than the very ontological transvaluation Agamben Is 
striving towards. 
To conclude, this chapter has attempted to advance the thesis that Agamben's biopolitics 
is amenable to, and benefits from, the introduction of a Marxian critique of alienated labour and 
capitalist relations of production into his concept of 'bare life', his analysis of specifically 
modem biopolitics, and his prescriptions for future political action. The roots of this enquiry 
were traced to two distinct ob~rvations; firstly, that a critique of capitalist political economy is 
common to Foucault's theory ofbiopolitics and Arendt's analysis of totalitarianism, the two key 
theories upon which Agamben founds his understanding of biopolitics in Homo Sacer; and 
secondly that, within Homo Sacer, Agambert's exploration of the Nazi concept of 'living wealth' 
offered a tantalising glimpse of how the 'radically biopolitical' Nazi state approached the 
question of the life under its care. Hans Reiter et al.'s objective of synthesising the biological 
lives of their populations and the capitalist political economy within which they operated 
indicated the grounds upon which an investigation into the interpenetration of life and economy 
could have been staged, though Agamben chose not to pursue these leads further in this 
particular work. Taking our co-ordinates from these observations, we set out to establish the 
grounds upon which a Ma.rXiail modification of Agamben' s biopolitics, a materialist supplement 
rather than a wholesale revision, could be built. 
Following on from Agamben's brief look at the Nazi eugenicist gesture toward the 
integration of life and capital, this chapter examined the structural proximity of Agamben' s 'bare 
life' to Marx's alienated labour. This section identified four key structural similarities shared by 
the phenomena of bare life and alienated labour; the intra-individual nature of the fractures 
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produced and controlled by each respective system, the resulting animalisation of man and 
society observed by each theorist as a result of these divisions, the dialectical relationship and 
threat each entity poses to the system of power that created it, and the importance of removing 
and preventing such fractures from again isolating an inherent aspect of human life for the 
purposes of power in both theorists' eschatological prescriptions. On the basis of these four 
convergences, we speculated that there may be a constitutive relationship between bare life and 
alienated labour, not on the basis of an economistic reduction, but rather on the basis that labour-
power itself forms a distinct (though not determining) part ofthe constitution of the phenomenon 
of bare life. In further investigating the relationship between Agamben and Marx, we examined 
Agamben's appropriation of Guy Debord. Debord's notion ofthe 'spectacle' was based upon a 
fundamentally Marxist economic critique, and we concluded that Agamben's use of the concept 
of 'spectacle', which continues into Homo Sacer, could not be separated from the Marxist 
foundations which underpin the concept. Further, and in answer to both Agamben's critique of 
Marxism for failing to grasp the ancient nature of sovereignty and the state form in its theory of 
revolution and Passavant's critique that Agamben himself performs an about-turn in his state 
theory in the transition to Homo Sacer, this chapter took the Agambenian step of returning to an 
investigation into the role of labour at the foundation of the arcanum imperii of the state, the 
ancient Athenian polis. 
Examining Arendt's treatment of the foundation of the polis in The Human Condition, we 
found her account of the exclusion of zoe from the political realm to be based not upon the mere 
fact of natural life, as indicated by Agamben, but rather on the basis that zoe, natural life, is 
inseparably attached to the problematic activity of labour. Arendt refuses the entry of labour into 
polis because the compulsion, futility, and inherent inequality that characterise the labour process 
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cannot be accepted into political society without cross-contaminating the public sphere with 
forces hostile to its founding principles of equality and freedom of speech and action. This 
finding was echoed by our examination of Aristotle, whose arguments for the exclusion of slaves 
and workers from citizenship were found to be based upon the biopolitical criterion of physical 
labour-power and an assertion of the citizens' greater available time for civic duties, time which 
we found to form a corollary to the expropriated labour-time of the excluded slave. For these 
reasons, we concluded that, pace Agamben, the centrality of the problem of labour to the 
foundation of the po/is has remained a crucial component at the heart of the state for millennia. 
For Agamben to argue that Marxist analysis has marginalised the arcanum imperii of the state 
form in its fixation upon the modem conditions of labour and economy is doubly unreasonable; 
firstly, because his own sources indicate that the question of labour constitutes a significant part 
of the ancient construction of the state, and secondly because all of his theoretical forebears, and 
Agamben himself, have posited the usurpation of older power structures by new imperatives as a 
central part of their theories, and Agamben does not refute his earlier position that the sovereign 
power has been penetrated and potentially dislodged by the development of modem economic 
power. 
Finally, having argued for the recognition of modem bare life as a socio-economic 
phenomenon via its articulation with the concept of alienated labour, and the further recognition 
that the bare life Agamben finds excluded from the polis is itself intricately bound up with the 
problematic nature of labour, this chapter set out to draw the materialist implications of this 
double-inclusion for Agamben's own prescriptions of possible political action. Beginning with 
Agamben's encounter with Negri, we found his prescription for the ontological renegotiation of 
our dominant conception of being to be overly abstract and potentially useless as a challenge to a 
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Life and Labour: 
On the Foundations of Agamben's Biopolitics 
Conclusions 
This investigation began by acknowledging the conceptual innovations and timely 
intervention of Giorgio Agamben's work in Homo Sacer. From the beginning it established its 
two objectives; firstly, to examine the theoretical grounds upon which Agamben builds his 
theory of biopolitics, and to discuss whether his articulation and appropriation of Michel 
Foucault and Hannah Arendt is ultimately successful; and secondly, to argue that a constitutive 
connection exists between Agamben's notion of 'bare life' and the Marxian concept of 'alienated 
labour', and to explore the implications that this 'labour-thesis' would have for Agamben's 
historical analysis and his prescriptions for future political action. 
Our investigation opened, in Chapter One, with a brief overview of Agamben's Homo 
Sacer, designed to identify the key concepts and categories used by Agamben in the creation of 
his political theory. The first of three sections discussed concepts grouped together under the 
term 'biopolitics', these included; a portrait of the historical figure of homo sacer- the banished 
outlaw of Ancient Rome; a description of 'bare life', the politically unqualified biological life of 
the individual; the 'inclusive exclusion' - the paradoxical relationship of natural life to the 
political community founded upon it; and the term 'biopolitics' as originally coined by Foucault, 
as a term for the increasing intervention of the state into the care of the biological lives of its 
citizens. It found that Agamben uses the term 'bare life' to indicate two distinct phenomena 
within Homo Sacer; as a synonym for natural, biological life, and as a description of a specific 
legal-political status of a life toward which the political order has suspended its own relation. 
Whilst noting the ambiguity of Agamben's elision, this project decided to use the term under the 
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first definition, bare life as synonymous with natural zoe, as this is the defmition Agamben 
appears to use more frequently within his work. Nonetheless, we must also conclude that 
Agamben's conceptual slippage here calls for his own clarification if 'bare iife' is to function as 
a coherent, single term for either of the phenom~na he is attempting to theorise. 
The second section of Chapter One examined a number of cognate concepts grouped 
beneath the umbrella-term 'the exception', outlining; Agamben's use ofthe Schmittian model of 
'sovereign power' and its archetyp~l political relation, the 'sovereign ban'; the way the 
'exception' itself functions - both as a legal-political state of emergency a la Schmitt, and as the 
more expansive logic of exception argued for by Agamben; this section provided a description of 
the 'birth-nation link', an instrument b:y which Agamben sees bare life incorporated into the 
political order of the nation-state, and the fatal destabilisation of this link when presented with 
the limit-case of the 'refugee'- the living embodiment of the fact that birth does not immediately 
confer civic rights; the fmal part of this section examined the phenomenon Agamben sees as 
attempting to replace the malfunctioning birth-nation link in regulating the bare life of the 
individual into the state order, the 'concentration camp', which he sees as an attempt to make 
permanent an exceptional space to contain the lives of an order's homines sacri, and whose logic 
he identifies as expanding well beyond its previous limits, to the extent that the 'camp' becomes, 
for Agamben, the 'paradigm of the modem'. 
The fmal part of our overview sought to uncover Agamben's understanding of the 
foundations/futures of the developments he traces. It began by describing Agamben' s account of 
the 'ontological foundations' of sovereign power and biopolitics, locating the source of our 
current political dilemmas in the ancient configurations of Western metaphysics - a location 
which, Agamben concludes, necessitates an equally profound response. This response came in 
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Agamben's gestures towards a 'new politics', which we saw to be made up of two primary 
motifs; firstly, that the ontological nature of the problem requires a restructuring of our entire 
way of being, particularly through a re-thinking of the relation of potentiality and actuality, in 
order to evade the kind of relations that instantly call forth a sovereign decision; and secondly, 
that the element of human existence known as 'bare life' must find a way of uniting with 
political life, in Agamben's words 'a bios that is only its own zoe', in such a way that bare life 
can never again be isolated and held hostage by the complex of sovereign power that currently 
dominates it. 
With the exception of our note on Agamben's dual use of the term 'bare life', this entire 
Chapter was a description of concepts which would go on to become important during our 
investigation proper and so, besides the summary presented here, contains no further theoretical 
conclusions. The substantial analytical work of this project began with Chapter Two, which 
sought to fi.dfil our first overall objective; to verify Agamben's claim that his own concept of 
biopolitics can be safely built upon an articulation of Michel Foucault's understanding of 
'biopolitics' and Hannah Arendt's analysis of 'totalitarianism'. 
This Chapter began with an examination of the relationship between Agamben and 
Foucault, the original author of the term 'biopolitics'. Our first concern was to establish the 
points of Foucault's analysis most critical to Agamben's appropriation, identifying Foucault's 
notion of a transgressed 'threshold of modernity', the point at which humanity ceased to be the 
politilwn zoon of Aristotelian theory and became a species whose collective existence had come 
to depend upon the structures and outcomes of our politics; and, further, his insight into how the 
phenomenon of 'biopolitics' was historically conditioned by the logic of the market economy-
as the state intervened to care for the lives of its citizens precisely to extract higher quantities and 
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quality of productive labour. This section also noted two interesting points of convergence 
between Agamben and Foucault; the first involved their common reading ofthe classical theory 
of sovereignty, in which the sovereign is characterised by its ability to put its citizens to death 
and specifically the way in which this permanently suspended death sentence leaves each 
individual 'neither alive nor dead' in their relation to the sovereign - and subject to its 
unmediated decision. The second interesting confluence came with Foucault's analysis of the 
reasons for the exclusion of physical life from the social contract, which we demonstrated to 
share the same logic as Agamben's 'inclusive exclusion' of bate life from the Athenian polis. 
Having established key elements of Agamben's appropriation of Foucault, the second 
section of this Chapter went on to sketch a number of divergences which may have threatened to 
destabilise the Agambenian project. The fact that biopolitics played a minor role in Foucault's 
later work was discussed, but we concluded that this fact of itself does not damage Agamben's 
attempted use of what was there. A second divergence was identified in the relative historical 
scope of each theory, noting the dissimilarity between Foucault's modern emphasis and 
Agamben's vastly wider sweep. In this case, we concluded that Foucault's concerns with the 
classical theory of sovereignty and his own starting point with the Aristotelian concept of the 
'political animal' both mitigate the extent to which we can argue Agamben 's deeper reading of 
history is incongruent with Foucault's own work. A third difference was found between 
Foucault's idea of 'biopower' as a separate development, and fundamental challenge, to 
sovereign power and Agamben's unitary understanding of the complex of sovereignty. This 
issue was not clearly resolved, and remains to be raised at the end of these conclusions as one 
recommended extension of this particular area of study. The final note of conflict to be found 
centred upon the role of capitalist economics in each theorist's analysis- of prime importance to 
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Foucault, yet barely mentioned by Agamben- which went on to form the starting-point for our 
analysis in the next Chapter. 
The next section of Chapter Two was taken up with an introduction to the work of 
Hannah Arendt, looking at her historical account of the development of totalitarianism, and a 
number of key concepts from On the Origins ofTotalitarianism and The Human Condition. We 
established the pertinence of Arendt's analysis to Agamben's project, and challenged his 
assertion that Arendt's Origins ... lacked a properly biopolitical analysis by demonstrating that 
her understanding of the phenomena of the refugee, the camps, and the totalitarian system, all 
contained elements which are biopolitical in their construction. Agamben's objections remain 
curious and beg further clarification before they can be so easily asserted. The fourth section 
established the precise workings of Agamben's articulation of Foucault with Arendt, a 
relationship we described as one of 'mutual supplementarity'. Firstly, we found three ways in 
which Agamben uses Arendt to compensate for shortcomings in Foucault; firstly, using her focus 
on totalitarianism to bring a biopolitical analysis to bear on the concentration camp system; 
secondly, sharing her 'vertical' model of power in a way that mitigated Foucault's emphasis on 
dispersive power structures inimicable to Agamben's schema; and, thirdly, using her 
transcendent perspective as a complement to his own. We also found two ways in which 
Foucault is deployed as a counter to Arendt; firstly, by making clear a link between sovereign 
power and the human body and, secondly, by sketching a history ofincreasing state intervention 
in the biological care of its citizens from the seventeenth century - a phenomenon for which 
Arendt conspicuously fails to account, despite its noticeable development, its wide implications, 
and her own comprehensive approach to history. From these particular articulations, we 
concluded that Agamben uses this 'mutual supplementarity' as a method for simultaneously 
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constructing the parameters of his biopolitics and using parts of each theorist to counter or negate 
the elements of the other that might problematise his own appropriation. 
The next section moved on to discuss the areas of convergence that exist between all 
three theorists, or combinations of the three, which were grouped into 'historical' and 
'theoretical' convergences. This section identified four key historical convergences; firstly, the 
emphasis Agamben and Arendt share on the seh;mic effect of the First World Wat in 
destabilising the European political order; secondly, the same theorists' mutual recognition of the 
concentration camp as the pivotal institution~ of their analyses, leading on to the third 
convergence in which Arendt and Aga.mben posit the nature of the camps as far beyond any 
traditional concept of 'crime'. The final historical convergence, shared by all three writers, was 
a deep-rooted criticism of a modem society dominated by the logics of production and 
consumption and resulting in the bestialisation of those populations within. 
The first of five theoretical convergences related to the identification of a dominant 
'processual temporality' in the way that Foucault's 'biopolitics', Arendt's 'totalitarianism', and 
Agamben's 'biopolitics', all constitute supra-human forces working their way through 
populations with no regard to individual life. Secondly, Agamben and Arendt shared in an 
indictment of Marxism as a tradition which, despite its noble objective, results only in the 
perpetuation of oppression- via its conflation of 'labour' and 'work' in Arendt and in its reliance 
on the imposition of a sovereign exception in Agamben. Whilst all three theorists agreed on a 
critique of modem humanitarianism a5 an ill-equipped mystification unable to bring about 
change, the remaining two theoretical sections were shared by Arendt and Foucaultalone; firstly, 
in their recognition of the catalysing effect of the theory of evolution upon the phenomena they 
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seek to study; and, finally, in their recognition of the crucial importance of capitalist relations of 
production in the constitution of the developments they so assiduously trace. 
Each of these historical and theoretical convergences further solidify Agamben' s claim to 
have found two complementary poles upon which to found his own biopolitics. Yet, this section 
also identified a number of divergences that required further analysis. These divergences were 
themselves grouped into three categories; 'methodological-perspectival', 'analytic', and 
'speculative'. Our analysis of methodological-perspectival differences identified two related 
points of dissonance in each theorist's schema; firstly that Foucault holds himself to a strict 
analysis of events and institutions whilst Agamben, and to a lesser extent Arendt, use specific 
case-studies as starting-points for much wider moral and philosophicaJ discussions; and, 
secondly, that Agamben and Arendt's clearly normative intentions in the crafting of their 
theories are not shared by Foucault. In relation to these points, we conclude that the differing 
horizons offered by each theorist in their work does not impair Agamben's ability to bring them 
together, as the perspectival divergence does not undermine the particular content of Foucauldian 
biopolitics on which his analyses are based. 
The first 'analytic' divergence singled out for discussion was Arendt's positive treatment 
of the concepts of power and the nation-state, which stands in contradistinction to the 
Foucauldian suspicion of power relations and Agamben's identification of the nation-state as the 
locus of sovereign power in the modern world. The second point of disagreement consisted of a 
selection of differences between Agamben and Arendt's descriptions of the nature and role of 
concentration camps; for Agamben, an emergency regulator of life and order, working in the face 
of the failure of the birth-nation link to fulfil its historical objective of incorporating the lives of 
its residents into a coherent political order, and for Areildt, laboratories for the production of a 
129 
new kind of human being, desensitised and devoid of the human spontaneity that threatens to 
interrupt the flow of Nature or History through totalitarian populations. In relation to the first of 
these divergences, we conclude that Agamben's theorisation is safe. Whilst it is true that a 
disagreement exists, the role of power and the nation...;state in Arendt's work i!i not one of 
Agamben's concerns in the construction of biopolitics, rather it only gains its cogency in terms 
of prescribed alternatives- over which Agamben and Arendt seriously disagree in any case. The 
second element of conflict, different understandings of the nature of the camp system, ts a 
serious point of divergence. We conclude that reading the camps in a different light is a result of 
the differing intentions and foci of each author and the contradictions present in their works is, 
again, insufficient to challenge the overall basis of their articulation - which, in this case, is to 
bring an analysis of totalitarian practices into tighter step with Foucault's treatment of the 
relationship of human biology to political power. It also should be noted that both theorists 
essentially agree that the camps' raison d'etre is the management and production of distinctive 
human biologies and, in this way, still share an essential common thread of biopolitical analysis, 
a similarity which gestures towards a deeper theoretical reconciliation. 
The remaining 'speculative' divergence returned again to the consideration of the 
potential planes of action to emerge from each theorist's work. Whilst Foucault offers no 
programmatic alternative to complement his biopolitical analysis, Arendt seeks to use her work 
to indicate the necessity of returning to the Classical distinctions between public and private 
realms, and between natural and political life. Developing far beyond both of them, however, is 
Agamben's call for a renegotiation of the human ontology, positing a new way of being as the 
only answer to the continuing hold of sovereign power over bare life. This divergence is clearly 
the most dramatic, and one for which no reconciliation can be found. It is our considered 
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conclusion in this case that, while any reconciliation is impossible, it is also unnecessary. Again, 
this aspect of each thinker's work considers the future alternatives to the phenomena they study, 
and does not prejudice Agamben's ability to build a biopolitics which then continues on to reach 
such radically different conclusions. 
In terms of an overall conclusion to the investigation in Chapter Two, we are satisfied 
that Agamben's biopolitics rests safely upon the foundations he claims for it. Whilst the work of 
Foucault and Arendt may not sit comfortably together, and whilst all three theorisations break 
into discordant analyses in a number of areas, the strong thematic convergences we have outlined 
and the specificity with which Agamben tailors his appropriation of each of his intellectual 
forebears, mitigate the limited nature of most areas of divergence. One question that remains, 
however, is Agamben's failure to enact an analysis of capitalist economic relations in his theory 
of biopolitics, particularly when the same economic critique forms such a central platform of 
both Foucault's and Arendt's cited works. 
Gaining a more complete understanding of the relationship between Agamben's 
biopolitics and a radical critique of capitalist political economy is the central concern of Chapter 
Three. This Chapter considered our second general objective; to posit a constitutive connection 
between Agamben's concept of 'bare life' and the phenomenon of 'alienated labour' familiar to 
Marxian theory. In addition to establishing the link between these two phenomena, in both the 
ancient and modem aspects of Agamben's work, this Chapter also aimed to demonstrate the way 
in which the acceptance of this 'labour-thesis' creates an avenue for political action which 
Agamben's philosophical emphasis is unable to provide. In order to achieve its objectives, this 
Chapter was divided into three sections; the first examining the lack of economic analysis in 
Homo Sacer and Agamben's links to the Marxist tradition; the second sought to establish a 
131 
thread of continuity with Agamben's account of the polis by exploring the relationship of 
political life to the problem of labour in Aristotle's The Politics; and, the third, to outline the way 
in which the 'labour-thesis' itself opens up forms of praxis unavailable to Agamben's call for a 
renegotiated human ontology. 
The first section opened with a description of the fleeting treatment Agamben awards to 
the work of Nazi eugenicists Hans Reiter et al. and argued that their calls for a 'synthesis' of 
biology and economics should have served as the starting-point for Agamben's wider analysis of 
the relationship of this most biopolitical state to the capitalist market economy into which its 
scientists urged the integration of the biological lives of their citizens. From thi_s tantalising 
glimpse of the avenue Agamben could have taken in Homo Sacer, this Chapter turned to its 
fundamental concern with establishing the link between bare life and alienated labour. It found 
four key areas of interSection between the two phenomena; firstly, we observed the way in which 
both bare life and alienated labour are located inside every individual, as a separable element that 
finds itself produced, isolated, and held as an object by a hostile power; we also noted how, for 
both Agamben and Marx, the consequences of establishing a society base<J upon their respective 
phenomena have been to reduce human beings to the level of animals. The third point of 
convergence between each theory centred on the dialectical relationships bare life and alienated 
labour share with their governing powers insofar as both phenomena are simultaneously the 
primary products of each power structure and yet cannot be tolerated within that structure 
without risking a systematic destabilisation. The final point of agreement to be argued for was 
eschatological, as both Agamben and Marx posit a new form of unity between our internal 
divisions - bare life and political life, aild alienated labour and species-being, respectively - as 
the only possible solutions for the iniquities of the present order. Having made arguments for the 
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deep structural links between bare life and alienated labour, this section closed with an analysis 
of Agamben's acknowledged debt to Guy Debord and his notion of the 'integrated spectacle', 
observing that Agamben's continued use of the Debordian 'spectacle' in Homo Sacer is 
impossible without Agamben's continued acceptance of the Marxist architecture of Debord's 
work. On the basis of the arguments made in this section, we conclude that there is a compelling 
structural relationship between Agamben's 'bare life' and the phenomenon of alienated labour. 
We further conclude that bare life is, therefore, not as completely 'bare' as Agamben maintains-
as labour-power itself can only be divorced from biological existence in the most of extreme of 
circumstances, such as the inert condition of the Mussel man, the inhabitant of the camps reduced 
to absolute non-action by their plight. 
The second section began by dismissing Paul Passavant' s critique of Agamben' s 
'contradictory' theories of state. Whilst Passavant saw a contradiction in Agamben's early 
emphasis on the economic determination of the state and his later model of sovereignty as the 
determining factor in all situations, a notion reinforced by Agamben's position in Homo Sacer 
that Marxism has failed to understand the arcanum imperii, the ancient secrets of sovereign 
power that pre-date current economic configurations by millennia, this section found reason to 
challenge both. In order to do so, it took the Agambenian tack of returning to the work of 
Aristotle and the Athenian polis to examine the bases of the originary exclusion of b~e life from 
the political community at the very foundation of the City. Reading Aristotle, with support from 
Arendt, we found that the original exclusion of bare life from the po/is was based on the 
problematic nature of labour, to which it was inherently tied. Further, we found that Aristotle 
based his distinction between master and slave, or citizen and excluded life, partly on the latter's 
physical capacity for labour and that the free time that Aristotle classes as essential for the 
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fulfilment of civic duties in his definition of who may be a citizen is itself based upon the 
expropriated labour-time of others, who are then excluded from citizenship on that basis. 
Therefore, we cannot but conclude that, pace Agamben, the management and expropriation of 
labour-power has been at the heart of the political order, and therefore an intrinsic element of his 
arcanum imperii, from the age of antiquity. This conclusion simultaneously vindicates Marx's 
analysis of the centrality of labour to our political conditions, and indicates that Agamben has 
perhaps unknowingly, and pace Passavant, maintained the content of his earlier theory of the 
state whilst shifting the emphasis from 'spectacular' capitalism to the entity of sovereign power, 
whose arcanum imperii may simply consist of a millennia-long process of reification. 
The final section of this chapter started from a brief description of Agamben's analysis of 
Antonio Negri, which paid particular attention to his concept of 'constituting power'. We saw 
how, for Agamben, Negri's main innovation was to remove the notion of 'constituting power' 
from political theory and return it to the realm of 'first philosophy'. This section moved on to 
note how Agamben appropriated Aristotle's work on the relation of potentiality and actuality to 
base his theory of sovereignty on this primary metaphysical ground, and how this led Agamben 
to call for a relationship of non-relationality and radical non-action, a la Bartleby, as the key to 
evading the depredations of sovereign power. In agreement with Passavant, we concluded that 
Agamben's 'Bartleby' model of political action lacked any feasibility in the face of his own 
understanding of the material reach of the sovereign. It was at this point, that we ventured to 
suggest the 'labour-thesis' as a theoretical corrective; the fundamental continuity and constitutive 
connection between bare life and alienated labour, we argued, ultimately opens Agamben's 
analysis to avenues of concrete political and socio-economic contestation that his current 
philosophical determination does not permit. We also speculated that it was Agamben's original 
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oversight of this connection that may have spurred his retreat into the realm of' first philosophy' 
and that, ultimately, a radical restructuring of our relation to the economy, and our relation to 
each other via the economy, might be the first practical step toward the very ontological 
renegotiation Agamben sees as vital to our escape from catastrophe. Our conclusions for this 
section are twofold; that Agamben's current model for political action is not capable of satisfying 
a materialist demand for political change; and, second, the adoption of the 'labour-thesis' opens a 
terrain of feasible action that remains entirely consistent with Agamben's concerns and work in 
HomoSacer. 
This investigation set out to fulfil two objectives; firstly, to examine the grounds upon 
which Agamben built his concept of biopolitics, and to establish whether his appropriation and 
articulation of Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt succeeds; and, secondly, to argue for the 
recognition that Agamben's concept of bare life shares a distinct structural proximity to the 
Marxian notion of alienated labour, a proximity we sought to argue indicates a constitutive 
connection between each phenomenon. In relation to the first, we found that Agamben's 
appropriation was problematic in places, but structurally sound. We found that Foucault and 
Arendt did work in a relation of 'mutual supplementarily' to open up the terrain upon which 
Agamben based his project, yet we noticed his surprising reticence on the role of capitalist 
economics - on whose ultimate significance both Foucault and Arendt strongly agreed. In 
relation to the second objective, we have outlined a number of compelling intersections between 
bare life and alienated labour, suggesting a fundamental affmity in their conceptual structures. 
We have also shown how expropriated labour has resided as a problem in Western politics 
throughout recorded time, and have shown how a Marxian reading of bare life as connected with 
alienated labour fits entirely with Agamben's historical analysis from the polis to the present 
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day. Finally, we asserted that the 'labour,.thesis' materialises Agamben's call for action in a way 
that is conducive to a reconceived notion of praxis and, ultimately, may function to realise his 
greater call for a new understanding, and even re-founding, of human being itself. 
The final task that remains is to indicate two potential areas of further research, pressing 
questions which, having appeared during the course of this inquiry, we have had neither the 
space nor the time to give ample consideration. Towards the end of our section on Foucault, we 
noted his divergence with Agamben on the issue of the relation of 'biopower' to sovereignty. 
For Foucault, 'biopower' is a separate phenomenon, working under a different logic, and is a 
challenge to sovereign power; in Agamben, the new biopolitical developments are another facet 
of a unitary sovereign power whose mode of domination is evolving over time. This 
disagreement may be one of fundamental importance, particularly as it implies two possible 
solutions of equal consequence; firstly, that Foucault has posited biopower beyond sovereignty 
as a result of an investigative false-step or mystification; or that Agamben, when faced with a 
power outside of the sovereign order, has, perhaps unknowingly, performed an inscription of this 
autonomous power into the very sovereign order he wants to escape, and to which it may pose a 
radical threat. This question also opens out into the wider phenomenon of 'constituting power' 
as sovereign power, and biopower if it is indeed a separate entity, must have been drawn from 
this infinite well of political action- as must all future political forces generated by the collective 
action of free people. Understanding the contours of this relation is, therefore, a task of great 
importance to any political theorist concerned with evading or breaking the hold of established 
legal-political structures of power. 
The final question with which we seek to end this investigation is what precise forms our 
posited unity of labour and bare life may yield. We have offered no programmatic solution here, 
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tboth because. this. :investigation I has 11 imitedi :time ·and: spac:~. · ~d' lbeeause ,the 'practical· conclusions 
ofa ,theoretical positipn, to: which !thinkers should 1be• obliged to. assign. a1ihigh priority; are. always 
far more nuanced and painstaking than the.,proposition on which they are based. 'T:munpick the 
densely emllroi<;iered',telationship:olpower- sovereign~ 'economic~ •sociali, and1politlcal-to life-
bare, qualitied,.'htirrtan,.iandi animal - •and.,to :fin9 the ~essential! nodal,poirits:at which tbe:;gildedl 
cagei ofo\Jr •current biopolitiCall configuration !has· its weakestlinks,,remains a: ,task whose sheet 
scale ,and c·ofi1pleX:ity is ri~alledi only 'by· ;the grilvity of .our :current situation( s)' and. the :absolute 
1political urgency their' swift ,resolution. 
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